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Cain as His Brother’s Keeper:  
Property Rights and Christian Doctrine in  
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government 
Steven Menashi * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his Theories of Surplus Value, Karl Marx devotes a brief chapter 
to John Locke’s disagreement with Sir Dudley North on the cause of 
high interest rates.  In it, Marx summarizes Locke’s labor theory of 
property, and he concludes with an arresting aside: “Locke’s analysis 
is all the more important since he is the classical exponent of bour-
geois society’s ideas of right in opposition to the feudal, and his phi-
losophy moreover served all subsequent English economists as the 
foundation for all their ideas.”
1
  According to Marx, Locke’s theory of 
property created the political economy of modern liberalism.  Thus, 
while “Cromwell and the English people dr[ew] from the Old Testa-
ment the language, passions and illusions for their own bourgeois 
revolution,” Marx explains, “[w]hen the real goal was reached, when 
the remodeling of English society was accomplished, Locke sup-
planted Habakuk.”
2
 
Locke’s labor theory of property sits at the root of modernity
3
 
and of the Anglo-American legal tradition.
4
  A Lockean conception of 
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 1 KARL MARX, THEORIES OF SURPLUS VALUE 29 (G.A. Bonner & Emile Burns 
trans., Int’l Publishers 1952) (1863); see also id. at 26 (“[T]he ownership of a greater 
quantity of means of production than one person can put to use with his own labor 
is, according to Locke, a political device which contradicts the law of nature on which 
property or the right to private property is founded.”).  Harvey C. Mansfield points to 
Marx’s comment in On the Political Character of Property in Locke, in POWERS, 
POSSESSIONS, AND FREEDOM 23, 23 (Alkis Kontos ed., 1979). 
 2 KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 11 (Daniel De 
Leon trans., C.H. Kerr 3d ed. 1914) (1852). 
 3 See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, JOHN LOCKE AND THE ORIGINS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 3 
(1997) (“Locke’s labor theory of ownership has helped to win a place for its formula-
tor among the great thinkers in Western civilization.”); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE 
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property animated the American Revolution and the U.S. Constitu-
tion.
5
  Thomas Jefferson ranked Locke, along with Sir Isaac Newton 
and Francis Bacon, among “the three greatest men that have ever 
lived, without any exception,” men distinguished for having “laid the 
foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the 
Physical & Moral sciences.”
6
  Newton and Locke, wrote James Madi-
son, “established immortal systems, the one in matter, the other in 
mind.”
7
  Beyond law and politics, Locke’s ideas transformed Christian 
doctrine.
8
 
 
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 220–21 (1962) (arguing that Locke’s 
“insistence that a man’s labour was his own . . . provides a moral foundation for 
bourgeois appropriation” and “a positive moral basis for capitalist society”); JAMES 
TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES, at x (1980) (not-
ing that “Locke’s theory of property has played a major and contradictory role in 
western political thought,” alternately providing “the major philosophical foundation 
of modern socialism” and a justification of private property); see also PETER C. MYERS, 
OUR ONLY STAR AND COMPASS: LOCKE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RATIONALITY 1 
(1998) (locating “in Locke’s political philosophy the deepest, most philosophically 
self-conscious expression of modern liberal thought”). 
 4 See Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention 
Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 633 (1993) (“The 
labor theory is the predominant property justification articulated in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence and philosophy . . . . The labor theory is generally attributed to John 
Locke and the influential chapter on property in his Second Treatise of Govern-
ment.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296 
(1988) (“Reference to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government is almost obligatory in 
essays on the constitutional aspects of property.”); see also G. E. Aylmer, The Meaning 
and Definition of “Property” in Seventeenth-Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 95 
(1980). 
 5 See STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70 (1990) (“Lockean theory . . . suppl[ied] the concepts 
and categories in which the Revolutionists articulated their deepest concerns about 
liberty and property.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (1985) (“The Lockean system was dominant at the 
time when the Constitution was adopted.  His theory of the state was adopted in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, and the protection of private property was a central and 
recurrent feature of the political thought of the day.”); JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN 
AMERICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING ERA 209 (1995) (“John Locke’s 
moral philosophy was reflected in the aspirations, controversies, and daily way of life 
of the American colonists.”); Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property 
Rights, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
141, 142–43 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (“It is fair to con-
clude that the protection of private property was as nearly unanimous an intention 
among the founding generation as any other element of a political creed.”). 
 6 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull (Feb. 15, 1789), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 939, 939–40 (1984). 
 7 James Madison, Spirit of Governments, NAT. GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1792, available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jm/17920220_spirit.htm. 
 8 See ALICE M. BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 68 (1965) (noting “clear evidence of the transmission through the cler-
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The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of Locke’s 
theory of property to American law.
9
  Legal scholars continue to de-
bate Locke’s theory and apply it to new issues in the law of property, 
such as regulatory takings,
10
 intellectual property,
11
 cyberproperty,
12
 
the right of publicity,
13
 environmental law,
14
 and family law.
15
  Ameri-
cans are the “inheritors of the Lockean tradition” of property rights, 
Richard Epstein has written.
16
  Yet despite the vast influence of 
 
gy of the theories of Locke”); DWORETZ, supra note 5, at 32 (“The clergy were de-
monstrably conversant with Locke’s writings, and they had similar ‘religious preoc-
cupations.’”); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE 
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 148–201 (1996); cf. HENRY 
LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, Freethinking—Its History and Tendencies, in LETTERS, LECTURES, 
AND REVIEWS 291, 296 (Henry W. Chandler ed., 1873) (“In England, in the early part 
of the last century, both the assailants and the defenders of Christianity borrowed 
their weapons from the armoury of Locke.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627–28 (2001) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that post-enactment purchasers cannot challenge a regula-
tion under the Takings Clause because “[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbe-
sian stick into the Lockean bundle”); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1003 (1984) (citing Locke’s Second Treatise and invoking the labor theory of prop-
erty to establish that trade secret rights constitute “property” for the purpose of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 10 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 162 (arguing that the “public use” language of 
the Takings Clause “fits in with the Lockean conception of the state”). 
 11 See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 
804 (2001) (“Expressed in terms of Lockean labor theory, the ethical justification 
argues that when a creator deliberately combines her mental efforts with language, 
images, techniques, or other ideas in the public domain, the resulting product 
should be identified as her intellectual property.”); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right 
in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (“Locke’s labor theory of property and allied ap-
proaches have been used so frequently as a justification for creators’ ownership 
rights that Locke’s Two Treatises have been erroneously credited with having devel-
oped an explicit defense of intellectual property.”). 
 12 See Michael A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1485, 1500 (2007) (noting that “[c]yberproperty proponents have invoked 
Locke’s labor theory to justify the concept” but arguing that the labor theory does 
not support cyberproperty). 
 13 See Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 
ALB. L. REV. 739, 739 (1995) (“[T]he celebrity’s right of publicity is justified in terms 
of John Locke’s labor theory of property.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy, 
26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1127 (1996) (arguing that “the traditional Lockean viewpoint” 
promotes “ecological abuse” and urging its reconsideration). 
 15 See Shoshana L. Gillers, A Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood, 110 YALE L.J. 691, 693 
(2001) (proposing “a normative model of legal parenthood based on a Lockean la-
bor theory of property that awards parenthood to the gestational mother, or those 
who commissioned her services”). 
 16 Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 750 (1990). 
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Locke’s theory of property, many scholars question its coherence.
17
  
Some conclude that Locke’s theory rests upon theological assump-
tions without which it makes no logical sense.
18
 
Locke himself regarded his theory as a significant accomplish-
ment.
19
  Yet contemporary scholars do not agree.  According to John 
Dunn, the political doctrine of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government 
“was merely the dignifying of the legal order of the English polity.”
20
  
Locke evinced “a considerable degree of acceptance of the conven-
tional social pieties” and merely offered “principles of the most indu-
bitable and parochial political orthodoxy.”
21
  Under this view, howev-
er, the dramatic intellectual influence of Locke’s doctrine—not to 
mention the controversy it created in its own time—seems almost in-
explicable. 
That an apparently conventional theological work had such in-
fluence offers a clue about Locke’s intention.  Perhaps Locke meant 
furtively to accomplish what Marx claims he actually did: to under-
mine feudal society and to supplant traditional religious ethics.  
Against scholars who argue that Locke’s Two Treatises of Government is 
logically incoherent or religiously dogmatic, this Article argues that 
Locke’s theory of property aimed to supplant traditionalist Christian 
ethics with a modern ethic of human autonomy.
22
  Through a close 
examination of the discussion of property in Two Treatises, the Article 
reveals that Locke’s reliance on the authority of scripture is more ap-
 
 17 See Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 155 
(2002) (“Despite its omnipresence in the lawyer’s understanding of property rights, 
his theory of property has fallen prey to modern academic critiques . . . . They dec-
lare, in short, that Locke’s labor argument for property is a lousy justification for 
property rights.”).  For particular critiques, see, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–78 (1974); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
184–91 (1988). 
 18 See infra Part II.A.   
 19 In a 1703 letter to Richard King, Locke assessed his contribution by writing, 
“[P]roperty, I have found nowhere more clearly explained than in a book intitled, 
Two Treatises of Government.”  TULLY, supra note 3, at x.  Locke presented himself as a 
disinterested observer because Two Treatises had been published anonymously.  See 
infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 20 JOHN DUNN, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century, 
in POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT 53, 60 (1980). 
 21 Id. at 60, 63. 
 22 Locke’s theory of property is the heart of his political philosophy.  See 
MACPHERSON, supra note 3, at 197 (“Everyone sees that Locke’s assertion and justifica-
tion of a natural individual right to property is central to his theory of civil society 
and government.”); cf. WILLMOORE KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
MAJORITY RULE 69 (1918) (evaluating Locke’s theory in light of “the most crucial of 
the ‘natural’ individual rights which he is thought to have defended,” the natural 
right to property). 
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parent than real.  While Locke cites biblical teaching ostensibly to 
support his theory of property, his argument in fact undermines the 
biblical view. 
After this Introduction, Part II introduces the “theological view” 
of Locke and argues that while scholars are right to identify apparent 
deficiencies in Locke’s prose, they fail to consider how those difficul-
ties might proceed from a conscious rhetorical method.  Locke avoids 
the appearance of heterodoxy in order to gain wider acceptance of 
his ideas.  Part III explores Locke’s view of nature that forms the basis 
of this theory of property.  Locke’s vision of nature effects a break 
from traditional notions of divine sovereignty in favor of human self-
reliance.  Part IV illustrates how Locke’s theory of property alters the 
biblical ethic.  Locke’s challenge to traditional Christianity becomes 
clear when one compares Locke’s teaching with those of the Church 
fathers, especially the biblical teaching on property to which Locke 
alludes in Two Treatises. Locke’s theory supplants biblical morality by 
justifying material acquisition and celebrating human industry.  Part 
V explains how Locke’s doctrine forms the moral core of a liberal so-
ciety.  What results is a redirection of social life from spiritual devo-
tion to commercial development and a shift in allegiance from 
church to self.  Together, these Parts lead to a fuller understanding 
of a theory that undergirds American constitutionalism, modern libe-
ralism, and the law of property. 
II. LOCKE’S RHETORIC 
Before examining Locke’s articulation of his theory, it is worth 
reviewing contemporary critiques of Locke and how his ostensible de-
ficiencies might be explained by a conscious rhetorical method. 
A. “A Series of Theological Commitments” 
Given the strength of Marx’s assessment—and of Locke’s politi-
cal achievement—one wonders how contemporary scholars can re-
gard Locke’s treatise as a conventional text, judging “practically every 
feature in Locke’s political system” to be “a commonplace of current 
English political theory.”
23
  Or, worse, to regard Two Treatises of Gov-
ernment as an “incoherent and carelessly written work” that “appears 
 
 23 J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 98 (1950); see also JONATHAN 
I. ISRAEL, ENLIGHTENMENT CONTESTED: PHILOSOPHY, MODERNITY, AND THE 
EMANCIPATION OF MAN 1670–1752, at 58 (2006) (identifying Locke as an “essentially 
conservative thinker[]”). 
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to be merely muddle.”
24
  Observing the apparent banality and incohe-
rence of Locke’s argument, some scholars resort to “the standard 
theological reading of Locke’s politics,” in which “[c]ommentators 
assume that Locke, as a child of his times, must have believed” in pre-
vailing Christian doctrines, and these complete his otherwise inade-
quate system.
25
  John Dunn, citing “the theoretical centrality of 
Locke’s religious preoccupations throughout the work,” concludes 
that Locke’s arguments depend “for their very intelligibility, let alone 
plausibility, on a series of theological commitments.”
26
  As Matthew 
Kramer puts it, “Without explicit or tacit affirmations of God’s bene-
volent reign, the principles and arguments [of Locke’s theory of 
property] would crumble under the slightest challenge.”
27
  Readers of 
Locke’s work must accept his religious commitment “unless we pre-
sume that Locke deliberately ventured arguments which he almost 
surely would have assessed as gravely flimsy.”
28
 
According to this view, Two Treatises is “saturated with Christian 
assumptions” such that Dunn locates “the key to Locke’s moral vi-
sion” in the traditional Calvinist doctrine of the calling.
29
  Steven 
Dworetz concludes that “Locke is a sincere theist whose political 
theory cannot be detached from his ‘religious preoccupations’ with-
out unhistorically secularizing, and thus distorting, its character.”
30
  
Similarly, Jeremy Waldron contends that “[t]o treat Locke’s argu-
ment as though it were a secular argument, and thus on a par with 
our patterns of secular argumentation, is one sort of anachronism.”
31
  
According to Waldron, Locke founded his notions of human equality 
 
 24 JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
OF THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 164 (1969). 
 25 JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN 
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 53 (2002); see also David Foster, The Bible and Natural 
Freedom in John Locke’s Political Thought, in PIETY AND HUMANITY: ESSAYS ON RELIGION 
AND EARLY MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 181, 181 (Douglas Kries ed., 1997) (“Ac-
cording to the prevailing view, Locke’s politics rest, whether he was aware of it or 
not, on certain Christian or biblical premises . . . .”).  See generally Eldon Eisenach, 
Religion and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, in JOHN LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT: NEW INTERPRETATIONS 50 (Edward J. Harpham ed., 1992) (discussing 
recent scholarship on the role of religion in Two Treatises). 
 26 DUNN, supra note 24, at ix–xiii. 
 27 KRAMER, supra note 3, at xi. 
 28 Id. 
 29 DUNN, supra note 24, at 99, 245. 
 30 DWORETZ, supra note 5, at 30. 
 31 WALDRON, supra note 25, at 15. 
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and rights “on theological grounds.”
32
  Victor Nuovo calls Locke a 
“Christian philosopher” whose work falls squarely “within the conven-
tions of biblical scholarship of his day.”
33
  For these scholars, “[a]ll the 
roads of Lockean philosophy lead to the hallowed ground of Chris-
tianity.”
34
  It turns out, contra Marx, that Locke was just another Ha-
bakuk all along. 
Yet the theological view of Locke’s Two Treatises fails to account 
for certain realities.  For one, scholars often consider Lockean politi-
cal theory apart from Locke’s religious preoccupations, but his ideas, 
though secularized, remain distinctly and recognizably Lockean.  
Dworetz suggests that secular ideas cannot be authentically Lockean, 
though Waldron—while he insists upon the Christian foundations of 
Locke’s political thought—regards those religious foundations as in-
significant, “at most a genealogical point.”
35
  If the theological 
grounds of Locke’s political principles were so essential, it seems odd 
that those principles hold sway not in Locke’s own time but in mod-
ern liberal societies that lack the same, or even any, theological 
commitments.  One faces the paradox of Lockean principles coming 
to predominate just as their foundation decays.  Such principles, 
moreover, have been politically transformative.  One naturally won-
ders how the author of an incoherent tract of familiar dogmas could 
manage to transform Anglo-American law, inspire American inde-
pendence, and initiate liberal political economy.
36
 
And why was Two Treatises so controversial?  Locke published the 
book anonymously and would not allow his authorship to be ac-
knowledged until his death.
37
  In 1683—six years before Two Treatises 
 
 32 Id. at 151; see also HENNING GRAF REVENTLOW, THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE AND 
THE RISE OF THE MODERN WORLD 244 (John Bowden trans., Fortress Press 1985) 
(“[T]he religious side in Locke’s thinking is in a particular way constitutive of his 
whole philosophical system.”).  Jonathan Israel also argues that Locke “abjured no-
tions of a purely secular morality.”  ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 52.  To Israel, Locke was 
a “Christian[] who believed passionately in Revelation, Christ’s miracles, and a prov-
idential God who sent His son.”  JONATHAN I. ISRAEL, RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT: 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MAKING OF MODERNITY 1650–1750, at 469 (2001). 
 33 Victor Nuovo, Locke’s Christology as a Key to Understanding His Philosophy, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE: NEW PERSPECTIVES 129, 148 (Peter R. Anstey ed., 2003).  
Eldon Eisenach, summarizing recent scholarship, concludes that “Locke was a de-
vout member of the Anglican confession” whose philosophy is “informed by a deep 
faith in the efficacy of biblical revelation as a source of moral and political duties.”  
Eisenach, supra note 25, at 61, 70. 
 34 Richard Ashcraft, Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy, in JOHN LOCKE: 
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 194, 214 (John W. Yolton ed., 1969). 
 35 WALDRON, supra note 25, at 242. 
 36 See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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was published but perhaps five years after Locke started writing it
38
—
Algernon Sidney was convicted of treason and executed for endors-
ing similar ideas.  The court examined manuscript pages of Sidney’s 
Discourses Concerning Government, a “most seditious and traitorous li-
bel,” according to the Lord Chief Justice, that advocates “fixing the 
power in the people.”
39
  Sidney’s Discourses argues against Sir Robert 
Filmer’s Patriarcha—precisely the work against which Locke’s Treatises 
is directed.  Sidney’s and Locke’s arguments are similar in many re-
spects.
40
  In fact, Locke and Sidney had both been involved in the 
same conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy.
41
  It made sense, then, 
for Locke to worry about the reaction to his Two Treatises. 
In 1690, Locke published his Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing, which he had been writing since 1671.
42
  His friends and collabo-
rators, the physicist Sir Isaac Newton and the Whig writer James Tyr-
rell, denounced him for promoting Hobbism.
43
  Newton thought 
Locke’s argument “struck at the root of morality,” as he explained to 
his friend, and “I took you for a Hobbist.”
44
  The Bishop of Worcester, 
meanwhile, alleged that Locke’s “‘new way of ideas’ undermined the 
principles of Christianity.”
45
  The charge of Hobbism was serious.  
Opposition to Hobbes’s work had prompted repeated attempts to 
make Christian heresy a criminal offense.
46
  And apart from the legal 
 
 38 J. Kemp, Book Review, 12 PHIL. Q. 356, 358 (1962) (reviewing JOHN LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) 
(1690)). 
 39 The Trial of Algernon Sidney, in 1 ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES ON GOVERNMENT 
107, 157, 226 (Lawbook Exch. 2002). 
 40 Thomas G. West, Foreword to ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING 
GOVERNMENT, at XV, XXIV (Thomas G. West ed., rev. ed. 1996); see also id. at XXII 
(“Sidney invokes the authority of divine revelation to vindicate conclusions reached 
by reason.”). 
 41 Id. at XXXIV. 
 42 1 JOHN LOCKE, DRAFTS FOR THE ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND 
OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (Peter H. Nidditch & G.A.J. Rogers eds., Oxford Un-
iv. Press 1990)(1690). 
 43 David Wootton, John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist?, in RELIGION, 
SECULARIZATION AND POLITICAL THOUGHT: THOMAS HOBBES TO J.S. MILL 39, 41 (James 
E. Crimmins ed., 1989). 
 44 HENRY RICHARD FOX BOURNE, THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 226 (1876). 
 45 Ashcraft, supra note 34, at 198. 
 46 In 1866, the committee of the House of Commons considering such a bill “was 
specifically empowered to gather information about the atheistical implications of 
Leviathan.”  RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES 42 (1989).  The bill failed in the Lords but was 
reintroduced in 1667, 1674, 1675, and 1680.  Id. at 42–43; see also Noel Malcolm, Gen-
eral Introduction, in 1 THOMAS HOBBES, THE CORRESPONDENCE, at xxi, xxv (Noel Mal-
colm ed., 1994). 
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threat, any work tarred with the Hobbist label would be denied a full 
hearing in the public square.
47
  Locke’s work was susceptible to the 
charge.  The Two Treatises purported to refute not only Filmer’s Pa-
triarcha, but Filmer’s Observations upon Mr. Hobbes’s Leviathan as well.
48
  
Thus, Locke’s work refutes Filmer’s refutation of Hobbes and thereby 
provides an indirect defense of Hobbes.  When Two Treatises ap-
peared, it was hailed “as a controversial work,” and even Whig leaders 
“hesitated at first about accepting it.”
49
  Such a reaction would make 
little sense had Locke simply reflected the commonly accepted ideas 
of the time. 
Contemporary observers must lack some awareness that was pre-
valent in 1690 if they do not believe that Locke offers anything novel.  
Instead of the theological interpretation, it may be worth taking se-
riously the suggested alternative that Locke deliberately ventured 
flimsy arguments—arguments that would be embraced by readers 
with preexisting theological commitments—in order to make other, 
more subversive arguments in the book more palatable.
50
  As Locke 
 
 47 See Jon Parkin, Hobbism in the Later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker, 42 
HIST. J. 85, 86 (1999) (noting “the kind of backlash that unwisely expressed Hobbe-
sian views might face”). 
 48 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. I, ch. II, § 14 (Thomas Hollis 
ed., London, A. Millar et al., 1764) (1690)[hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TREATISES], avail-
able at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/222.  I use the Hollis edition of Two Treatises 
because it is the first to include the corrections and additions Locke made to the text 
during his lifetime.  Each of the first three editions of Two Treatises contained prin-
ter’s errors, and Locke made extensive corrections to a copy of the third edition, 
which is now housed at Christ’s College, Cambridge.  C.B. Macpherson reproduces 
the Hollis edition in JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpher-
son ed., Hackett 1980) (1690), though the Macpherson edition does not include the 
First Treatise.  See A Note on the Text, in SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra,  at 1; 
see also Peter Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 16, 
22–23 (Peter Laslett ed., Mentor rev. ed. 1963) (1690) (noting that Locke “corrected 
a copy of the printed version in minute detail, scrutinizing word-order, the italics, the 
punctuation, even the spelling, as well as the general sense” and that Hollis acquired 
the master copy and published it as the 1764 edition).  Contemporary editors have 
made some further alterations to Locke’s corrected text, see, e.g., Editorial Note, in 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra, at 162, 163–64, so I rely directly on the Hollis 
edition.  Further citations to Two Treatises will identify the book, chapter, and section 
number.  Italics have been omitted in some cases. 
 49 GOUGH, supra note 23, at 133. 
 50 Kramer offers this suggestion sarcastically.  See supra note 28 and accompany-
ing text.  But a similar view was prevalent in Locke’s own time.  Scholars and Angli-
can divines such as Edward Stillingfleet, George Hickes, and William Carroll accused 
Locke of furtively promoting deism, atheism, and “Spinozism” concealed behind 
“such shifts, tricks, stratagems and equivocations to conceal themselves and to set off 
his doctrine under . . . a variety of disguises and abuse of words.”  ISRAEL, supra note 
32, at 606 (quoting WILLIAM CARROLL, SPINOZA REVIV’D 157–58 (1704)).  See generally 
Stuart Brown, Locke as Secret ‘Spinozist’: The Perspective of William Carroll, in DISGUISED 
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explains at the beginning of Two Treatises, a writer may act “like a wary 
physician, when he would have his patient swallow some harsh or cor-
rosive liquor, he mingles it with a large quantity of that which may di-
lute it; that the scattered parts may go down with less feeling, and 
cause less aversion.”
51
 
This Article suggests that Locke crafted Two Treatises in the 
manner Locke himself identified.  It argues that his sometimes opa-
que and seemingly contradictory language obscures a high ambition: 
Locke aims, in his First Treatise, to refute Filmer’s argument for the 
divine right of kings and, ultimately, biblical morality as a foundation 
for political life.  In the Second Treatise, Locke aims to replace bibli-
cal morality with an ethic founded on reason.  Reason, which Locke 
calls man’s “only star and compass,” should be what “he steers by.”
52
  
When reason is “laid aside,” men follow “the authority of example” 
which is based not upon reason but upon custom and folly: “[W]hen 
fashion hath once established what folly or craft began, custom makes 
it sacred, and it will be thought impudence, or madness, to contradict 
or question it.”
53
  According to Locke, many of the world’s “religions, 
governments, and manners” persist in this way.
54
  Locke aims to sup-
plant “the authority of example” with reason.  He states this challenge 
to the authority of revelation rather explicitly, but because it appears 
in a work suffused with deference to religious authority, it fails to im-
press itself upon all readers.  Locke does not want his work dismissed 
as “impudence, or madness” because it questions regnant dogmas. 
 
AND OVERT SPINOZISM AROUND 1700, at 213 (Wiep van Bunge & Wim Klever eds., 
1996); Rosalie L. Colie, Spinoza and the Early English Deists, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 23, 31 
n.32 (1959) (“Locke . . . was roundly attacked by Stillingfleet, Carroll, Witty and oc-
casional minor critics for his ‘Spinozism.’”). 
Carroll urged that the English, being a solid, decent Christian nation, 
would have nothing to do with Spinoza’s philosophy when expounded 
‘in plain, precise and determined terms’ but that Locke, by divesting 
words of their usual connotations, had sought to smuggle in [Spino-
za’s] ‘most absurd, impious and abominable hypothesis . . . covertly’, 
arguing that had Locke ‘defin’d his names as Spinoza did, I mean his 
chief terms . . . he would have quite ruin’d his design, especially in 
these nations . . . . 
ISRAEL, supra note 32, at 607.  This perspective “was broadly in line with the interpre-
tation of Locke that held sway in the eighteenth century.”  Brown, supra, at 216 n.11; 
see also Wim Klever, Locke’s Disguised Spinozism 2 (2009), available at 
http://bit.ly/q3fJhe (defending “the correctness of Carroll’s judgment”). 
 51 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. II, § 7. 
 52 Id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 58. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. 
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B. Locke’s Carelessness 
Those scholars who adopt the theological view observe, with 
some justification, that “Locke is full of illogical flaws and inconsis-
tencies.”
55
  Getting Locke’s message is “complicated by Locke’s failure 
to commit himself unequivocally on several of the most crucial ques-
tions to be discussed.  He frequently used imprecise language, 
and . . . sometimes made plainly contradictory statements.”
56
  Locke 
employs “evasive and incoherent formulations,” marked by “vacilla-
tions over strategies for convincing others.”
57
  “Locke’s carelessness,” 
concludes one scholar, “vexes every attentive reader of his works.”
58
 
The inconsistencies in Locke’s teaching are many and easy to re-
count.  He argues that nature furnishes the supports of life “richly” 
and in abundance, but elsewhere writes that nature provides “almost 
worthless materials” and a state of “penury.”
59
  Locke insists that 
people are the property of God, “sent into the world by his order and 
about his business,”
60
 but also maintains that “every man has a proper-
ty in his own person,” which “nobody has any right to but himself.”
61
  
He teaches that God gave all of nature to mankind in common,
62
 but 
also argues that men may appropriate elements of the common stock 
at will, in varying amounts according to one’s degree of industry.
63
  
He describes the state of nature as “a state of perfect freedom”
64
 go-
verned by a law of nature, but also “full of fears and continual dan-
gers.”
65
 
Beside the apparent inconsistencies, Locke is also imprecise.  He 
employs dissimilar terms synonymously, obscuring his meaning.  For 
example, he sometimes seems to treat interchangeably such terms as 
“law of nature,”
66
 “law of reason,”
67
 “the law of nature, or the revealed 
 
 55 GOUGH, supra note 23, at 123. 
 56 Walter M. Simon, John Locke: Philosophy and Political Theory, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
386, 386 (1951). 
 57 DUNN, supra note 24, at 134, 197. 
 58 C.B. Macpherson, Progress of the Locke Industry, 3 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 323, 324 
(1970) (book review). 
 59 Compare LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 31, with id. bk. II, 
ch. V, § 43. 
 60 Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 6. 
 61 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 27. 
 62 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25. 
 63 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 48. 
 64 Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 4. 
 65 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 123; see infra Part III.A. 
 66 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 4. 
 67 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 30. 
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law of God,”
68
 “the positive law of God,”
69
 “the law of God and na-
ture,”
70
 “the laws of God and nature,”
71
 “the law of God, or nature,”
72
 
“reason, which was the voice of God” in man,
73
 and others.  One 
might either judge Locke a sloppy wordsmith or conclude he delibe-
rately obscured the distinctions between the laws of reason, nature, 
and God—even though he elsewhere insists upon such distinctions.
74
 
In a different sort of imprecision, Locke uses “property” to de-
signate a range of phenomena, such as an attribute (“the property of 
labor should be able to over-balance the community of land”
75
), a 
right of ownership (“men might come to have a property in several 
parts of” the common world
76
), the item owned (man removes a thing 
from nature “and thereby makes it his property”
77
), ownership in gen-
eral (“this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what 
was before common, still takes place”
78
), one’s estate (parents provide 
for “the descent of their property to their children”
79
), and the spec-
trum of individual rights (men join society “for the mutual preserva-
tion of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general 
name, property”
80
).  The term “estate,” moreover, variously refers to 
property (“his father’s estate”), political circumstances (“[m]en being 
[naturally free], no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to 
the political power of another”), wealth (“it would always be a sin, in 
any man of estate, to let his brother perish”), and social structures 
(“[s]lavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man”).
81
  One could go 
on. 
 
 68 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 124. 
 69 Id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 52. 
 70 Id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 66. 
 71 Id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 195. 
 72 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 116. 
 73 Id. bk. I, ch. IX, § 86. 
 74 Cf. Klever, supra note 50, at 13 (“Locke and Spinoza . . . accustom themselves 
mostly to the normal, popular or ‘theological’, way of speaking about God as if he 
would be a kind of superhuman person and spell his name with a capital.  But they 
incidentally deviate from this usage and write consciously in double language, alternat-
ing the words ‘God’, ‘creator’, ‘maker’ etc. with words like ‘universe’, ‘world’, ‘na-
ture’.”). 
 75 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 40. 
 76 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25. 
 77 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 27. 
 78 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 30. 
 79 Id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 89. 
 80 Id. bk. II, ch. IX, § 123. 
 81 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XVIII, § 202; bk. II, ch. VIII, § 
95; bk. I, ch. IV, § 42; bk. I, ch. I, § 1. 
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Locke also shifts and qualifies his arguments.  In Chapter 2 of 
the Second Treatise, for example, Locke advances the “very strange 
doctrine” that every individual in the state of nature has the right to 
enforce the natural law on behalf of mankind.
82
  In the absence of 
such a power, Locke argues, a state could not punish a foreign visitor 
who commits a crime.  The civil laws of the country “speak not to 
him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them.”
83
  Only the 
power to enforce the natural law would allow a magistrate to punish a 
foreigner.
84
  In Chapter 8, however, Locke acknowledges that a fo-
reigner tacitly consents, by living under a government “and enjoying 
the privileges and protection of it,” to be “obliged to comply with the 
laws, and submit to the government he found there.”
85
  The foreigner 
is subject to the civil law after all.
86
 
What makes Locke’s frustrating style especially notable is that he 
attacks Sir Robert Filmer, his interlocutor in Two Treatises, for precise-
ly the same textual faults.  “I imagine I shall have neither the time nor 
inclination to repeat my pains,” writes Locke, “by tracing Sir Robert 
again through all the windings and obscurities.”  Locke hopes readers 
will lack the weakness 
to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, 
and well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains, him-
self, in those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Ro-
bert’s discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and en-
deavour to reduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible 
propositions, and then compare them one with another, he will 
quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put 
together in well-sounding English.  If he think it not worth while 
to examine his works all thro’, let him make an experiment in 
that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let him try, whether 
he can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and consis-
tent with himself, or common sense.
87
 
It is difficult to believe a writer who so brazenly denounces his subject 
for obscurities, contradictions, and inconsistencies would be unaware 
of the same features in his own work, especially when they are so bla-
tant.  In fact, Locke tells his readers not to ascribe such contradic-
tions or obscurities to the author’s carelessness.  In response to Fil-
 
 82 See infra Part II.A. 
 83 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 9. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 122. 
 86 On the significance of Locke’s treatment of aliens, see LEE WARD, JOHN LOCKE 
AND MODERN LIFE 81–83 (2010). 
 87 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, Preface. 
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mer, Locke writes, “I do not think our author so little skilled in the 
way of writing discourses of this nature, nor so careless of the point in 
hand, that he by oversight commits the fault that he himself, in his 
[other writings], objects to.”
88
 
Locke’s objections to Filmer suggest that his readers should not 
attribute his own contradictions and obscurities to carelessness.  
“[O]bscurity cannot be imputed to want of language in so great a 
master of style,” Locke writes of Filmer.  Instead, an author may 
“chose rather to content himself with doubtful and general terms, 
which might make no ill sound in men’s ears who were willing to be 
pleased with them” rather than specific terms that could cause dis-
ruption or outrage.
89
  Locke also identifies 
our author’s way of writing, who, huddling several suppositions 
together, and that in doubtful and general terms, makes such a 
medley and confusion, that it is impossible to show his mistakes, 
without examining the several senses wherein his words may be 
taken, and without seeing how, in any of these various meanings, 
they will consist together, and have any truth in them.
90
 
Locke thus invites readers to strip his own work of doubtful expres-
sions and obscurities, to reduce his words to intelligible propositions 
“and then compare them one with another” to see what argument 
emerges.
91
 
C. Locke’s Caution 
Locke elsewhere provides another standard by which to judge an 
author.  “I have always thought the actions of men the best interpre-
ters of their thoughts,” Locke writes in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.
92
  A look into his background reveals the common 
opinion that “Locke was an inordinately cautious man.”
93
  In fact, 
Locke “was able to preserve his life, liberty and estate, while complet-
ing his major works and extending his influence enormously only 
 
 88 Id. bk. I, ch. II, § 7 (citation omitted). 
 89 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 110. 
 90 Id. bk. I, ch. III, § 20. 
 91 See id. Preface. 
 92 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 27 (Prometheus 
Books 1995) (1693) [hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING].  For a discussion 
of Locke’s caution in light of this statement, see LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND 
HISTORY 206 (1953). 
 93 A.H. MacLean, George Lawson and John Locke, 9 CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 69, 73 
(1947); see also Brown, supra note 50, at 223 (“Locke’s reputation for secrecy was well-
established.”). 
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through the exercise of a unique and all-encompassing caution.”
94
  
Locke not only published Two Treatises anonymously; he took every 
precaution to maintain secrecy.  He “not only evaded his friends’ in-
quiries; the extant correspondence . . . suggests that he was at pains 
to conceal his authorship from the publisher, Awnsham Churchill . . . 
[who] was not to see a scrap of writing in Locke’s hand.”
95
  This cau-
tion makes sense, given the controversial character of the ideas Locke 
propounded.  There was not only the execution of Algernon Sidney.
96
  
As late as 1697, a university student named Thomas Aikenhead was 
executed at Edinburgh for blasphemy.
97
 
As of 1703, Locke would not admit even to having read Sidney’s 
Discourses Concerning Government—even though historians now know 
he had purchased a copy for his library in 1698.
98
  When Stillingfleet 
wrote to Locke accusing him of siding with Hobbes and Spinoza on 
the question of the immortality of the soul, Locke replied that he had 
not read the works of either.  “I am not so well read in Hobbes or 
Spinosa, as to be able to say what were their opinions in this matter,” 
he wrote.
99
  “But possibly there be those, who will think your lord-
ship’s authority of more use to them in the case than those justly de-
cried names.”
100
  (For good measure, Locke included a vigorous de-
fense of the immortality of the soul.)  Historians now know that 
Locke had Hobbes’s Leviathan as well as Spinoza’s works in his li-
brary.
101
  “As a writer, Locke was not in the habit of revealing his 
sources,” observes A.H. MacLean.
102
  “He preferred to foster the im-
pression of being guided by nothing save the dictates of individual 
 
 94 Robert H. Horwitz, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 160, 160 (1980) (reviewing THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE (E.S. de Beer ed., 1978–79)). 
 95 Esmond S. De Beer, Locke and English Liberalism: The Second Treatise of Gov-
ernment in Its Contemporary Setting, in JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 34, at 34, 35. 
 96 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 97 David M. Fahey, The Prudent Ambiguity of John Locke, 23 REV. POL. 410, 410 
(1961) (reviewing RICHARD H. COX, LOCKE ON WAR AND PEACE (1960)). 
 98 MacLean, supra note 93, at 73 & n.28. 
 99 Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to His Second Letter, in 4 WORKS 
OF JOHN LOCKE 193, 477 (Elibron Classics 2005) (1801). 
 100 Id.  
 101 Klever, supra note 50, at 1; MacLean, supra note 93, at 73 & n.29 (“Locke had a 
first edition copy of Hobbes’ Leviathan in his own library.”); see also Wim Klever, 
Slocke, Alias Locke in Spinozistic Profile, in DISGUISED AND OVERT SPINOZISM AROUND 
1700, supra note 50, at 235, 260 (“I think, that our conclusion may be that he was bet-
ter informed about Spinoza’s work and intentions than is suggested in this utterance, 
which may be interpreted as slightly disingenuous on account of the ruling public 
opinion.”). 
 102 MacLean, supra note 93, at 74. 
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reason.”
103
  It made sense to remain guarded.  Several of Locke’s con-
temporaries suspected Locke of Hobbism.
104
  Upon the publication of 
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, Locke’s student and a longtime interlocutor, denounced 
him as a menace to justice and virtue: 
It was Mr. Locke that struck the home blow: for Mr. Hobbes’ cha-
racter and base slavish principles in government took off the poi-
son of his philosophy.  ’Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all funda-
mentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world and made the 
very ideas of these . . . unnatural and without foundation in our 
minds.
105
 
Locke answered his critics “with public silence and private scorn.”
106
 
Given Locke’s cautious behavior, by his own standard one would 
expect him to be an especially careful writer.  “To avoid persecution,” 
observes David Fahey, “the cautious Locke employed oblique literary 
techniques which obscured the extent of his break with tradition.”
107
  
Locke was candid about this method at times.  In his correspondence, 
one finds William Molyneux writing to ask about an apparent contra-
diction in his Essay.  In reply, Locke confirms that the contradiction 
was intentional: “[T]he seeming contradiction between what is said 
p. 147 and p. 341, is just as you take it, and I hope so clearly ex-
pressed, that it cannot be mistaken, but by a very unwary read-
er . . . .”
108
  One might attribute such contradictions to carelessness, 
but Locke seems to have anticipated that charge.  One must, at least, 
entertain the possibility that his style was as he described: its import 
deliberately obscured in order to avoid outright disclosure of unpo-
pular ideas. 
III. LOCKE’S VIEW OF NATURE 
Locke must have been concerned with the reception that his 
ideas would have among the public.  In the first half of the seven-
teenth century, “’[t]was held a Sin to make a Scrutinie into the Waies 
of Nature,” wrote Locke’s contemporary John Aubrey.
109
  Pious citi-
zens regarded the scientific attempt to understand and to master na-
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Fahey, supra note 97, at 410. 
 105 Jason Aronson, Shaftesbury on Locke, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1101, 1103 (1959). 
 106 Jonathan Barnes, Mr. Locke’s Darling Notion, 22 PHIL. Q. 193, 194 (1972). 
 107 Fahey, supra note 97, at 410. 
 108 Horwitz, supra note 94, at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109 AUBREY’S BRIEF LIVES, at xxxiv (Oliver Lawson Dick ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 
1962)(1813). 
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ture as ingratitude for God’s benevolence—and a profane, hubristic 
confidence in the capacities of fallen man to surpass revealed wis-
dom.
110
  Deriding the natural world could be blasphemous, and au-
thors seen to promote Hobbism would attract public scorn.
111
 
A. The Rule of Men 
For this reason, perhaps, Locke begins the Second Treatise by 
insisting upon the distinction between his view of the state of nature 
and the Hobbesian view of nature as a state of war.  But Locke’s ini-
tial portrait of the state of nature is heavily qualified.  At the begin-
ning of his chapter on the state of nature, Locke describes it as “a 
state of perfect freedom” and “[a] state also of equality.”
112
  He writes 
that the state of nature is “not a state of license” because it “has a law 
of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is 
that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty, or possessions.”
113
  But having portrayed the state of 
nature as peaceful, Locke does not indicate that the law of nature is 
 
 110 Id.  
 111 At the end of the century, “[h]eterodox books could still be burned and in-
deed this misfortune befell a book by another of Locke’s followers.  The Blasphemy 
Act of 1698 also posed a threat to the outspoken.”  Brown, supra note 50, at 213. 
 112 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 4.  Men’s “perfect free-
dom” is only to “order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as 
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature.”  Id.  The law of nature appears 
to have narrow bounds: while man has an “uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his 
person or possessions,” he “has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any crea-
ture in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for 
it.”  Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 6.  He must be sure to make practical use of the possessions he 
accumulates: “Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.”  Id. bk. II, ch. 
V, § 31.  And as he accumulates, there must be “enough, and as good, left in com-
mon for others.”  Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 27. 
     Men’s “equality,” which in contrast to their freedom is conspicuously not “per-
fect,” is a state  
wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having 
more than another, there being nothing more evident than that crea-
tures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same 
advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be 
equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, un-
less the lord and master of them all should . . . set one above another.   
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 4.  Locke does not actually say that all men are born “to all the 
same advantages of nature”; in fact, he says people are born to such advantages 
“promiscuously” or by chance.  Id.  He says only that insofar as they are born to the 
same advantages, they should be equal.  Thus, the “perfect freedom” and the “equali-
ty” of men in the state of nature seem to describe the realities of uncontrollable li-
berty and the lack of political authority, neither of which seem desirable.  
 113 Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 6. 
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realized peacefully or that men actually follow it.  Instead, he imme-
diately shifts to the importance of restraining men from harming 
others.  He devotes the rest of the chapter to “execution of the law of 
nature,” the “right to punish transgressors,” “reparation and re-
straint,” “punishment,” “offender[s] dangerous to mankind,” “injury 
and violence,” “mischief,” “trespass,” the “power to kill a murderer,” 
“unjust violence and slaughter,” “war against all mankind,” “wild sa-
vage beasts,” and the right of every man to “punish the offender and 
be executioner of the law of nature.”
114
  Locke’s state of nature turns 
out not to be so peaceful after all.  Rather, there must be enforce-
ment of the natural law so “that all men may be restrained from in-
vading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another,” which 
they would do absent such enforcement.
115
  Because the enforcement 
falls to each individual, meaning each person in the state of nature 
must employ force to prevent harm to himself, Locke’s state of nature 
looks like Hobbes’s vision of man’s natural state as “war, as is of every 
man, against every man.”
116
 
Following this discussion, Locke seems unjustified in insisting, in 
the next chapter, that there is a “plain difference between the state of 
nature and the state of war, which . . . are as far distant as a state of 
peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation; and a state of 
enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction are one from anoth-
er.”
117
  It turns out, however, that the state of nature and the state of 
war are “far distant” only because of a semantic distinction Locke 
draws between them: 
Men living together according to reason without a common supe-
rior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the 
state of Nature.  But force, or a declared design of force upon the 
person of another, where there is no common superior on earth 
to appeal to for relief, is the state of war; and it is the want of such 
an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, 
though he be in society and a fellow-subject.
118
 
Thus, “state of nature” refers only to the lack of political authority 
while “state of war” refers to the violent conflict between individuals 
 
 114 Id. bk. II, ch. II, §§ 7–12. 
 115 Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 7. 
 116 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962) 
(1651).  
 117 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 19. 
 118 Id. 
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that typically results.
119
  Rather than reject the substance of Hobbes’s 
teaching, Locke has redefined the terms. 
As Locke conceives it, the state of war can exist either in the state 
of nature or in civil society.  According to Locke, “Want of a common 
judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without 
right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of war, both where there is, 
and is not, a common judge.”
120
  But Locke has just said that the state of 
war exists only “where there is no common superior on earth to ap-
peal to for relief.”
121
  When does such a state exist in a civil society 
under a government?  Locke explains that sometimes within civil so-
ciety it becomes impossible to appeal to the legal authorities, as when 
one is directly attacked and needs to defend oneself immediately.  
When “the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, 
nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief 
may be irreparable,” one regains his natural right to execute the law 
of nature and kill the aggressor.
122
  But this is just a way of saying that 
the state of nature can break out in civil society at times—that there 
are situations, even in civil society, where no common judge is availa-
ble to settle disputes.  In this way, Locke emphasizes that the state of 
nature is truly the “state all men are naturally in”; civil society is a 
man-made device for keeping our natural condition at bay, though 
nature (and the threat of war) is always lurking just below the sur-
face.
123
 
The state of nature is not coextensive with the state of war, but 
the state of war exists only in the state of nature.  The state of war is 
possible only when there is no common earthly judge—which is the 
definition of the state of nature.  Thus, the state of nature and the 
state of war may be distant in concept, but not in fact: the state of na-
ture makes the state of war possible—even inevitable.  The state of 
nature is unstable because of “those evils, which necessarily follow 
from men’s being judges in their own cases” and because “every one 
has the executive power of the law of nature.”
124
  In the exercise of 
that authority, the law of nature constrains men very little.  Although 
 
 119 Robert A. Goldwin points out Locke’s semantic distinction in John Locke, in 
HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 476, 478–80 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 
3d ed. 1987). 
 120 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 19 (emphasis added). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Goldwin, supra note 119, at 481 (quoting LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, 
bk. II, ch. II, § 13). 
 124 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 13. 
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that law “be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men, 
being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of 
it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application 
of it to their particular cases.”
125
  What, then, is the law of nature that 
men do follow, the law that is “writ in the hearts of all mankind”?
126
  
Only the “fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-
preservation”
127
—“[t]he first and strongest desire God planted in 
men, and wrought into the very principles of their nature, being that 
of self-preservation.”
128
  Locke concedes that in enforcing the law of 
nature, “self-love will make men partial to themselves and their 
friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge 
will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but 
confusion and disorder will follow.”
129
  In Locke’s telling, then, the 
state of nature is ultimately marked by confusion, disorder, and easily 
sown seeds of violence—which is not much different from Hobbes’s 
account.
130
 
With everyone holding the executive power of the law of nature, 
but moved only by the natural law of self-preservation, the state of na-
ture “is full of fears and continual dangers.”
131
  Locke’s account of 
natural equality shifts.  Natural equality of persons no longer appears 
to guarantee each person’s rights, but rather is precisely the condi-
tion that puts them in jeopardy: each person is “constantly exposed to 
the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man 
his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and jus-
tice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, 
very unsecure.”
132
   
 
 125 Id. bk. II, ch. IX, § 124. 
 126 Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 11. 
 127 Id. bk. II, ch. XIII, § 149. 
 128 Id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 88. 
 129 Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 13. 
 130 Cf. HOBBES, supra note 116, at 129 (“[T]he laws of nature, as justice, equity, mod-
esty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others, as we would be done to, of themselves, without the 
terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural pas-
sions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.”). 
 131 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 123.  Compare id., with 
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 100 (noting that the state of nature is characterized by 
“continual fear, and danger of violent death”).  
 132 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 123. Compare id., with 
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 98 (locating the cause of the state of war in “equality of 
ability”), and id. at 101 (“It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no 
propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s, 
that he can get: and for so long, as he can keep it.”). 
MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2012  3:04 PM 
2012] CAIN AS HIS BROTHER’S KEEPER 205 
With this conclusion, it is possible to appreciate what Locke 
means when he twice calls the vesting of executive power in each in-
dividual a “strange doctrine.”
133
  In arguing that each individual may 
execute the law of nature, Locke breaks with the Christian tradition.  
In the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas writes: 
[I]t is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the wel-
fare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who 
has charge of the community’s welfare.  Thus it belongs to a phy-
sician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with 
the care of the health of the whole body.  Now the care of the 
common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public au-
thority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can law-
fully put evildoers to death.
134
 
In his state-of-nature teaching, however, Locke assigns the authority 
of killing evildoers to private individuals, who have no public authori-
ty because they exist outside civil society.
135
  The “state of nature” 
prior to civil society has no place in the biblical tradition.
136
  The Bible 
takes for granted the existence of political societies immediately after 
 
 133 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, §§ 9, 13. 
 134 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3 (2d rev. ed. 1920) 
(1265–74) (emphasis added), available at http://www.newadvent.org/summa. 
 135 Richard Hooker writes that even in “those times wherein there was as yet no 
manner of public regiment established,” while men had a right to act in self-defense, 
“they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, 
and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof.”  1 
RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 50 (John W. Parker 1851) 
(1593), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=pssCAAAAQAAJ.  Hooker 
thereby distinguishes the right of self-defense from the right to punish; the latter re-
quires the authority to act on behalf of the community that only government pos-
sesses.  In the Christian natural law tradition, “punishment is the sole purview of gov-
ernment inasmuch as the power of government inheres in the social nature of 
community and does not derive from any purported natural right of individuals.”  
WARD, supra note 86, at 73. 
 136 See REVENTLOW, supra note 32, at 276 (“[T]he natural state which Locke post-
ulates . . . in no way rests on a biblical basis.”); STRAUSS, supra note 92, at 215 (“From 
the biblical point of view, the important distinction is the distinction, not between 
the state of nature and the state of civil society, but between the state of innocence 
and the state after the Fall.”); cf. 1 GEORGE HICKES, TWO TREATISES, ON THE CHRISTIAN 
PRIESTHOOD, AND ON THE DIGNITY OF THE EPISCOPAL ORDER 182 (John Henry Parker 
4th ed. 1847) (1707), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=28PiIvISyIUC 
(“[H]e supposes there was an antecedent ‘state of nature’ in which men lived before 
political government was erected, though this wild notion hath been so many times 
unanswerably confuted by the writers against Hobbes, and of late by the Rehearsal 
against Mr. Locke.”).  David Foster observes that in Locke’s account the state of na-
ture displaces the biblical teaching of the Fall because “if, as Locke suggests, the orig-
inal human condition was very imperfect, our present distress cannot be explained as 
a falling away from perfection.”  Foster, supra note 25, at 201–02. 
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the Fall and after the Flood.
137
  The Christian tradition held that “God 
hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and vi-
olence of men.”
138
  Paul expresses this view in his epistle to the Ro-
mans: “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for 
there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that ex-
ist have been instituted by God.”
139
  While the Christian tradition rec-
ognized a natural law, its dictates were to be enforced by divine 
judgment through the individual conscience.
140
  By contrast, Locke 
appoints private individuals to be the enforcers of the natural law and 
the source of public authority.  Discounting the efficacy of divine 
judgment, he argues that “the law of nature would, as all other laws 
that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were no body that 
in the state of nature had a power to execute that law.”
141
  Establishing 
the law of nature as an actual law that governs worldly affairs and in-
vesting the natural executive power in individuals challenges the Pau-
line view of submission to governing authority.  The natural law pro-
vides a standard of justice for individuals to demand of their 
government—because the “municipal laws of countries . . . are only 
so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they 
 
 137 See Genesis 4:16–17 (King James) (“[Cain] dwelt in the land of Nod . . . . and he 
builded a city.”); id. 10:32 (“ [By] the families of the sons of Noah . . . were the na-
tions divided in the earth after the flood.”). 
 138 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 13. 
 139 Romans 13:1 (New Revised Standard); Romans 13:1 (King James) (“Let every 
soul be subject unto the higher powers.  For there is no power but of God: the pow-
ers that be are ordained of God.”); see also 1 HOOKER, supra note 135, at 96 (“The 
public power of all societies is above every soul contained in the same societies.”); cf. 
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 42, art. 2 (“[S]edition is opposed to justice and 
the common good.  Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin.”). 
 140 See 1 HOOKER, supra note 134, at 46 (“He is the only rewarder and revenger of 
all such actions; although not of such actions only, but of all whereby the Law of Na-
ture is broken, whereof Himself is Author.”); see also 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF 
WAR AND PEACE 96 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625) (“Justice brings 
Peace to the Conscience; Injustice, Racks and Torments . . . .  [T]o this God is an 
Enemy, to the other a Patron, who does not so wholly reserve his Judgments for a fu-
ture Life, but that he often makes the Rigour of them to be perceived in this.”).  
Locke puts little stock in conscience.  See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 
92, at 30 (noting that conscience is “nothing else but our own opinion or judgment 
of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions” and that men “with the same 
bent of conscience” reach inconsistent conclusions). 
 141 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 7.  But see James 4:12 (King 
James) (“There is one lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy: who art thou that 
judgest another?”). 
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are to be regulated and interpreted”
142
—and a limit to their duty of 
obedience.
143
 
In addition to shifting the character of the natural law in this 
way, Locke also challenges its substance.  According to Aquinas: 
A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a 
wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in 
the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for 
their sake, but on account of the owner’s loss.  On the other hand 
a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; 
hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to 
death for the common good.
144
 
Locke rejects this line of argument.  For Locke, a man who threatens 
others is by nature distinct from good men: 
[A]nd thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power 
to kill a murderer . . . to secure men from the attempts of a crimi-
nal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and meas-
ure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and 
slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all 
mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one 
of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society 
nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, 
Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.
145
 
Aquinas insists that a murderer is not, like a beast, distinct from other 
men, so only a public official may condemn him.  Locke, meanwhile, 
explicitly compares the murderer to a savage beast and argues that 
any person may treat him accordingly, at least in the state of nature. 
 
 142 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 12.  Compare id., with 
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 96, art. 6 (“[I]t is not competent for everyone to 
expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this 
who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dis-
pense from the laws.”). 
 143 See, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIV, § 163 (noting 
that when the people limit government power “they have not pulled from the prince 
any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared, that that power which 
they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was 
not a thing which they intended him when he used it otherwise”).  Even though 
Locke agrees on the importance of civil government, changing the character of nat-
ural law alters the sort of government that may justly rule.  See id. bk. II, ch. II, § 13 
(“[I]f government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from 
men’s being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be 
endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is 
than the state of nature.”).  For this reason, Hobbes does not recognize a natural 
right to punish.  See WARD, supra note 86, at 74–75. 
 144 AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3. 
 145 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 11. 
MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2012  3:04 PM 
208 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:185 
In the course of this discussion, moreover, Locke misrepresents 
the biblical tradition.  The “great law of nature” he cites is God’s 
statement of his moral law, spoken to Noah in Genesis 9:6: “Whoso 
sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image 
of God made He man.”
146
  Locke abridges the text, however, leaving out 
the rationale provided in Genesis.  In disagreement with the biblical 
view, Locke rejects the notion that all men are made in the image of 
God.  Rather, Locke replaces the divine image in man with the capac-
ity of reason.  To Locke, reason—not divine creation—is the mark of 
humanity.  This has the consequence that a person may abandon his 
reason and thereby expel himself from mankind.  As Locke main-
tains, a criminal who has “renounced reason” has the status of those 
“wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society.”
147
 
As an expression of divine will, Genesis 9:6 is a description of 
moral justice reserved to God’s judgment, but Locke implies that the 
passage authorizes a vigilante “right to destroy such a criminal.”
148
  
Moreover, Locke distorts the example he marshals in support of such a 
right: “And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to 
destroy such a criminal,” writes Locke, “that after the murder of his 
brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was 
it writ in the hearts of all mankind.”
149
  Yet Cain states this as a com-
plaint, not a license.
150
  He was not “fully convinced” that others had a 
right to destroy him.  Significantly, neither was God.  God decreed that 
Cain should not be executed.
151
  Locke’s discussion implies that to ex-
ecute Cain for committing murder would be an act of natural justice; 
he fails to mention, however, that to slay Cain would violate a divine 
command.  Killing Cain, whether “writ on people’s hearts” or not, 
would contravene the rule of heaven.  The biblical message is that 
judgment is reserved to the Lord, that men should resist the impulse 
 
 146 Genesis 9:6 (King James) (emphasis added). 
 147 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 11. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Genesis 4:13–14 (King James) (“And Cain said unto the Lord, my punishment 
is greater than I can bear.  Behold, thou hast driven me out this day from the face of 
the earth; and from thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond in 
the earth; and it shall come to pass, that every one that findeth me shall slay me.”).  In-
deed, Locke later writes that “he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will 
scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, 
bk. II, ch. II, § 13. 
 151 Genesis 4:15 (King James) (“And the Lord said unto him, Therefore whosoever 
slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold.  And the Lord set a mark 
upon Cain, lest any finding him should kill him.”). 
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to vengeance,
152
 but Locke takes Cain’s initial statement to be a law of 
nature and the Bible to endorse individual retribution.  Faced with 
the conflict between biblical revelation and his view of reason, Locke 
supplants the divine command with “laws of nature” and the rule of 
heaven with the rule of men. 
B. The Appeal to Heaven 
Locke’s theory of the state of nature, bound up as it is with the 
natural executive power vested in individuals, overturns the rule of 
heaven.  In the same section of the Summa Theologica quoted above, 
Aquinas cites the opinion of Augustine that if one kills pursuant to 
someone else’s legitimate authority, acting as an agent of that author-
ity, then one is not culpable for the death.
153
  Therefore, explains 
Aquinas, one could kill “at the Lord’s command,” in the same way 
that “a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the 
executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge.”
154
 
Locke, by contrast, claims the power of an individual to kill a 
thief—not by the authority of a judge but because the thief has in-
itiated a state of war.
155
  The state of war, by definition, lacks the 
earthly authority of a sovereign or judge: “for where there is an au-
thority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, 
there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the contro-
versy is decided by that power.”
156
  To accord with the traditional 
teaching, Locke would need to ground the individual’s power in di-
vine authority.  As Augustine elaborates in The City of God, “they who 
have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformi-
ty with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice 
or the wisdom of government” and cannot be held guilty.
157
  If Locke 
can show that individuals enforce the law of nature in the state of war 
 
 152 See Romans 12:14–19 (King James) (“Bless them which persecute you: bless, and 
curse not. . . . Recompense to no man evil for evil. . . .  Dearly beloved, avenge not 
yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will 
repay, saith the Lord.”). 
 153 AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3; see also SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE 
CITY OF GOD 27 (Marcus D.D. Dods trans., Modern Library 1950) (5th cent.) (“[H]e 
to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who 
uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals.”). 
 154 AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3. 
 155 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 18 (“[I]t is lawful for me 
to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I 
can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of 
war, and is aggressor in it.”).  But see Matthew 5:39–41 (King James). 
 156 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 21. 
 157 AUGUSTINE, supra note 153, at 27. 
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in conformity with God’s laws, he could ground his system upon 
Christian teaching. 
Locke appears to submit the state of war to divine authority.  
Where there is no earthly judge, he writes, “the only remedy” is “an 
appeal to heaven.”
158
  Locke says that when no earthly authority can 
settle disputes, God will act as judge.  He explains this by reference to 
the biblical story of Jephtha, a judge of Israel who conquered the 
Ammonites.  Locke writes: 
Had there been any such court, any superior jurisdiction on 
earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and the Ammo-
nites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was 
forced to appeal to heaven.  The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge 
this day between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. 
xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads 
out his army to battle.
159
 
The story of Jephtha, which concerns a right of conquest between two 
nations, seems out of place in Chapter 3 of the Second Treatise, 
which is Locke’s discussion of the state of war that emerges between 
individuals who have no common judge to decide their disputes.  But 
it is relevant because Jephtha is the paradigmatic example of an indi-
vidual who kills with divine authority.  In fact, Augustine’s discussion 
in The City of God establishes the principle that one may kill “in ob-
edience to the divine command” by reference to Jephtha.
160
 
The Book of Judges recounts that Jephtha was a judge in Israel, 
called to fight the Ammonites.
161
  In the midst of battle, Jephtha 
makes a vow to God: if God provides him a victory in the war, then 
“whatever comes out of the door of my house to meet me when I re-
turn in triumph from the Ammonites will be the Lord’s, and I will sa-
crifice it as a burnt offering.”
162
  God does deliver victory over the 
Ammonites to Jephtha; Israel under his command devastates twenty 
towns and subdues Ammon.
163
  Upon his return home, however, 
Jephtha’s daughter comes to meet him at the door of his house.
164
  
His daughter is therefore subject to the vow and must be sacrificed.
165
  
 
 158 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 20. 
 159 Id. bk. II, ch. III, § 21. 
 160 AUGUSTINE, supra note 153, at 27. 
 161 Judges 12:7 (King James); see also id. 12:2; LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, 
bk. I, ch. XI, § 163. 
 162 Judges 11:30–31 (New International). 
 163 Judges 11:32–33 (King James). 
 164 Id. 11:34.  
 165 Id. 11:35–36. 
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Jephtha says he is “miserable and wretched, because I have made a 
vow to the Lord that I cannot break.”
166
  His daughter submits willing-
ly, only asking for a two-month mourning period—at the end of 
which Jephtha sacrifices his daughter.
167
 
Augustine holds Jephtha blameless for killing his daughter be-
cause God is “the fountain of all justice.”
168
  Jephtha’s vow indemnifies 
him against punishment.
169
  In the First Treatise, however, Locke has 
already condemned parental killing of children as “the most shame-
ful action, and most unnatural murder, human nature is capable of” 
and an “act more contrary to nature than the wild and most untamed 
part of the creation.”
170
  In refuting Filmer’s argument that the divine 
right of kings rests upon fatherly dominion, Locke denies the author-
ity of fathers to slay or to sell their children, and he writes that when 
parents do so in the name of religion they violate reason and exhibit 
“a brutality below the level of beasts.”
171
 
Jephtha illustrates what Locke opposes in Filmer and in the bib-
lical view: the equation of the good with the ancestral—that is, with 
the father and ultimately with God the creator.  In refuting Filmer’s 
argument for the “monarchical power of the father,” Locke notes 
 
 166 Judges 11:35 (New International). 
 167 Judges 11:36–39 (King James). 
 168 AUGUSTINE, supra note 153, at 27. 
 169 Hobbes, in Leviathan, also holds Jephtha blameless, but for the distinct reason 
that Jephtha was the earthly sovereign power.  Still, in the Hobbesian system, divine 
authority works to indemnify an authoritarian state: 
[N]othing the sovereign representative can do to a subject . . . can 
properly be called injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of 
every act the sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to any 
thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the subject of God . . . . And 
therefore it may, and doth often happen in commonwealths, that a 
subject may be put to death, by the command of the sovereign power; 
and yet neither do the other wrong: as when Jephtha caused his daugh-
ter to be sacrificed: in which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had 
liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless, without injury put 
to death.  And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince, that putteth 
to death an innocent subject.  For though the action be against the law 
of nature, as being contrary to equity, as was the killing of Uriah, by 
David; yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God. 
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 161.  Of course, if the state threatens the life of a citizen, 
the citizen is entitled to resist even if the state acts legitimately.  Id. at 164 (“Subjects 
have liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade 
them.”) (italics omitted). 
 170 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 56. 
 171 Id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 58.  But see HOBBES, supra note 116, at 251 (noting that child-
ren should be taught “that originally the father of every man was also his sovereign 
lord, with power over him of life and death”). 
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that in the Bible the father shares authority with the mother.
172
  It is 
“[h]onor thy father and thy mother,” Locke points out.
173
  Locke then 
quotes the repeated biblical injunctions that those children who fail 
to honor their parents should be put to death, ostensibly to point out 
that in each case the mother appears alongside the father: “he that 
curseth his father, or his mother, shall surely be put to death,” for ex-
ample.
174
  Yet because this discussion immediately follows Locke’s 
condemnation of the killing of children by parents, it is difficult not 
to notice that in each case the Bible calls for the killing of children.  
Locke cites Deuteronomy 21:18–21, though he fails to quote it fully.
175
  
What Locke omits from his quotation reveals that the passage con-
tains a biblical injunction for parents to kill their disobedient child-
ren: 
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey 
the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when 
they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them: Then shall 
his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out un-
to the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place; And they 
shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son is stubborn and 
rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton, and a drun-
kard.  And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that 
he die: so shalt thou put evil away from among you; and all Israel 
shall hear, and fear.
176
 
Locke goes on to quote from Zechariah 13:3: “And it shall come to 
pass, that when any shall yet prophesy, then his father and his mother 
that begat him shall say unto him, Thou shalt not live; and his father 
and his mother that begat him shall thrust him through when he 
prophesieth.”
177
  These passages reveal that Filmer’s argument for pa-
triarchal monarchical authority has support in scripture. 
Locke’s other biblical references in the same passage suggest 
that Filmer’s argument is consistent with the biblical teaching.  Locke 
quotes the prophet Isaiah, for example, as saying, “Woe unto him, 
 
 172 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61. 
 173 Id. (quoting Exodus 20:12 (King James)) (emphasis added). 
 174 Exodus 21:17 (King James). 
 175 Locke’s abridged quotation reads: “If a man have a rebellious son, which will 
not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother; then shall his father and 
his mother lay hold on him, and say, This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will 
not obey our voice.”  LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61. 
 176 Deuteronomy 21:18–21 (King James). 
 177 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61.  Locke omits the words 
“for thou speakest lies in the name of the Lord,” which follow “Thou shalt not live” in 
Zechariah 13:3 (King James). 
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that sayeth unto his father, What begettest thou, or to the woman, 
What hast thou brought forth?”
178
  Locke attributes the quotation to 
Isaiah 11:10, but it actually appears at 45:10, where it occurs as a 
statement in which God explicitly analogizes his authority over man—
exercised through his “anointed” political leader Cyrus in order to 
subdue other nations—to the authority of parents over their child-
ren.
179
  Given this scriptural evidence, which Locke manipulates, the 
accusation Locke directs to Filmer seems to apply to himself: had he 
set forth the biblical text “without garbling, as God gave it, and joined 
mother to father, every reader would have seen, that it had made di-
rectly against him.”
180
  While Locke argues that the Bible does not es-
tablish monarchical authority in the father alone because the mother 
shares in his authority, had Locke “joined mother to father,” it would 
become clear that the Bible does indicate a monarchical authority in 
the father and mother together and that the biblical text Locke quotes 
actually supports Filmer’s ultimate position.  Later, in the Second 
Treatise, Locke even writes that the paternal power would more 
properly be called the “parental power” because it belongs to both 
parents; scripture “every where joins them together.”
181
  Thus, Fil-
mer’s argument for parental dominion, modified to include the 
mother, has support in scripture.  But Locke argues that the parental 
killing of children is contrary not to scripture but to nature, which 
suggests that the biblical teaching contradicts natural justice. 
The figure of Jephtha, then, evokes the image of religious au-
thority that acts contrary to natural justice.  By placing the story of 
Jephtha in his chapter on the state of war, Locke signals his disa-
greement with Augustine’s position.  In Section 20 of the Second 
Treatise—immediately prior to the paragraph in which he references 
Jephtha—Locke reveals the full importance of his distinction be-
tween the states of nature and of war; the state of war can emerge 
 
 178 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61. 
 179 See Isaiah 45:1–14 (King James).  Chapter 11 of Isaiah contains an image of 
universal peace, so the citation to Isaiah 11:10 contrasts sharply with the quotation in 
Locke’s text. 
 180 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61; cf. id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 60 
(noting that “to warp the sacred rule of the word of God, to make it comply with [an 
author’s] present occasion” is “a way of proceeding not unusual to those, who em-
brace not truths because reason and revelation offer them, but espouse tenets and 
parties for ends different from truth, and then resolve at any rate to defend them”). 
 181 Id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 52; see also id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 66 (“[F]ather and mother [are] 
joined all along in the Old and New Testament where-ever honour or obedience is 
injoined children.”). 
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when the prevailing authority, the earthly judge of law or religion, vi-
olates the law of reason: 
[W]here an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open, 
but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a 
barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the vi-
olence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard 
to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is 
used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer 
justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the 
name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to pro-
tect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to 
all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is 
made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right 
them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to 
heaven.
182
 
Locke’s view that the purpose of law is “to protect and redress the in-
nocent” clashes with the legitimacy of Jephtha’s appeal to God, which 
clearly victimized an innocent, his daughter.  In Locke’s account, a 
sovereign authority who fails to protect the innocent is himself an 
outlaw.
183
  Yet as soon as Locke introduces the notion of “an appeal to 
heaven,” its inadequacies appear in the following paragraph, where 
he invokes Jephtha.
184
  Jephtha was the earthly sovereign,
185
 but an ap-
peal to heaven would not save Jephtha’s daughter.  Jephtha’s indem-
nity for killing his daughter came from heaven.  The contradiction be-
tween the two paragraphs raises the question: To whom could 
Jephtha’s daughter appeal?  By scriptural reference, Locke highlights 
the problem of collusion between political and religious authorities.
186
 
Locke answers the problem of political and religious collusion by 
recasting the notions of God as judge and the “appeal to heaven.”  Af-
ter he introduces Jephtha, he writes: 
[A]nd therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, 
who shall be judge?  It cannot be meant, who shall decide the con-
troversy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord 
the Judge shall judge.  Where there is no judge on earth, the ap-
peal lies to God in heaven.  That question then cannot mean who 
shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war 
 
 182 Id. bk. II, ch. III, § 20.   
 183 See infra Part V.B. 
 184 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 21. 
 185 Locke highlights elsewhere that Jephtha was made “head and captain” and 
“judged Israel.”  Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 109. 
 186 Jephtha is referenced five times in Two Treatises.  See id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 163; id. 
bk. II, ch. III, § 21; id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 109; id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 176; id. bk. II, ch. 
XIX, § 241. 
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with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in 
it? of that I myself can only judge in my own conscience, as I will 
answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.
187
 
In Locke’s telling, Jephtha is “forced to appeal to heaven.” He already 
faces war with the Ammonites and has no earthly authority to appeal 
to.  When Jephtha says, “the Lord the Judge be judge this day between 
the children of Israel and the children of Ammon,”
188
 he is not calling 
for God to settle their dispute; he is announcing his intention to en-
gage in combat.  The outcome of the battle will represent God’s judg-
ment.  This is the meaning that “appeal to heaven” takes on in Locke’s 
work: a call to arms.
189
  “[W]hether another hath put himself in a state 
of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in 
it,” he writes, is something “I myself can only be judge in my own con-
science.”
190
  People must judge for themselves whether the earthly au-
thority has violated its responsibilities, entering a state of war with its 
subjects such that they must “appeal to heaven”—that is, to engage in 
war or rebellion: 
Who shall be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to 
their trust? . . .  To this I reply, The people shall be judge; for who 
shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and accord-
ing to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and 
must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him, 
when he fails in his trust?
191
 
In this act of judgment, God does not decide whether the revolution is 
legitimate or just.  It rests with the people, holding the executive power 
of the law of nature, to decide whether the government has abused its 
delegated authority and must be resisted.
192
  God’s “judgment” be-
comes manifest in whether they are successful. 
 
 187 Id. bk. II, ch. III, § 21. 
 188 Judges 11:27 (King James). 
 189 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1434 n.134 (1990) (noting that by “appeal to 
heaven” Locke “meant revolution—‘state of war’ between government and the 
people”). 
 190 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 21. 
 191 Id. bk. II, ch. XIX, § 240; cf. DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in POLITICAL 
ESSAYS 186, 198 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge 1994) (1741) (noting that cases 
“which admit of no determination from the laws of justice and equity . . . could be 
decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence”). 
 192 Id. bk. II, ch. XIX, § 241 (“[W]here there is no judicature on earth, to decide 
controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge.  He alone, it is true, is judge of 
the right.  But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether 
another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal 
to the Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.”). 
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With this doctrine, Locke effects a profound alteration of the 
biblical view.  In the Bible, it is significant that Jephtha was a sove-
reign fighting another sovereign power.  Where the Bible employs 
the phrase “the Lord be judge” in reference to rulers and subjects, it 
counsels submission and restraint.
193
  Consider, for example, the con-
frontation between David and King Saul: 
David also arose afterward, and went out of the cave, and cried af-
ter Saul, saying, My lord the king.  And when Saul looked behind 
him, David stooped with his face to the earth, and bowed himself.  
And David said to Saul . . . .  Behold, this day thine eyes have seen 
how that the Lord had delivered thee to day into mine hand in 
the cave: and some bade me kill thee: but mine eye spared thee; 
and I said, I will not put forth mine hand against my lord; for he is 
the Lord’s anointed. . . .  The Lord therefore be judge, and judge 
between me and thee, and see, and plead my cause, and deliver 
me out of thine hand.
194
 
In the biblical tradition, to have the Lord judge between ruler and 
subject is to have the subject submit to earthly authority and “wait 
upon God’s providence” to change the conditions of political rule.
195
  
The Apostle Paul, likewise, taught submission to rulers: 
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there 
is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist 
have been instituted by God.  Therefore whoever resists authority 
resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur 
judgment.
196
 
“[T]here is no man who can judge the deeds of a king,” according to 
the tradition, and Aquinas explains that “none is competent to pass 
sentence on [the sovereign], if he acts against the law.”
197
  Even in 
 
     In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke raises the possibility of a magistrate assum-
ing religious authority that his subjects think illegitimate.  “Who shall be judge be-
tween them?,” he asks.  JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 61 (Prome-
theus Books 1990) (1689).  “I answer, God alone; for there is no judge upon earth 
between the supreme magistrate and the people.”  Id.  Locke cautions, however, that 
violence “usually happens where controversies arise, without a judge to determine 
them.”  Id.   
 193 NATHAN TARCOV, LOCKE’S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY 66 (1984). 
 194 1 Samuel 24:8–15 (King James). 
 195 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 121 (quoting ROBERT 
FILMER, OBSERVATIONS UPON MR. HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN (1652)). 
 196 Romans 13:1–2 (New Revised Standard); see also 1 Peter 2:13–14 (King James) 
(“Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake: whether it be to 
the king, as supreme; Or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the 
punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well.”). 
 197 AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 96, art. 5.  “When a man is condemned,” 
writes Aquinas, “he may not resist those who lead him to death.”  Id. q. 69, art. 4. 
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cases of tyranny, Aquinas notes that “Peter teaches us to be subject 
with all fear not only to good and gentle masters, but also to those 
who are ill disposed.”
198
  The Christian answer to someone living un-
der an oppressive regime was to pray—to appeal to heaven in a more 
literal way.
199
  The tradition was more concerned with order and vir-
tue than with freedom, duties than with rights, and one’s immortal 
soul rather than worldly joys.
200
 
Locke changes this orientation by treating individuals as the Bi-
ble treats sovereigns.
201
  Man is sovereign in the Lockean order, so it is 
not incongruous to compare the rights of individuals in the state of 
war with those of sovereign nations.  Thus, individuals faced with un-
just rulers may “appeal to heaven” as Jephtha did against the Ammo-
nites and seek to triumph over them.  Locke takes an appeal once re-
served for sovereigns and instills it in each individual as a natural 
inheritance.  Moreover, Jephtha’s association with the appeal re-
minds one that religious teaching may not be a reliable guide to nat-
ural justice.  Rather than look to priestly authority, “every man is 
judge for himself.”
202
  Jephtha serves also as a reminder of the perils 
of resistance—of appealing to heaven too rashly.  Because the appeal 
 
 198 THOMAS AQUINAS, De Regimine Principum (On the Government of Rulers), in 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 5, 19 (R.W. Dyson ed., 2002) (1267). 
 199 Aquinas writes that 
steps are to be taken against the scourge of tyranny not by the private 
presumption of any persons, but through public authority. . . .  If, how-
ever, there can be no human aid at all against a tyrant, recourse must 
be had to God, the King of all, who is ‘a refuge in time of trouble’ 
(Psalm 9:9).  For it is within His power to turn the heart of the cruel ty-
rant towards gentleness . . . . 
AQUINAS, supra note 198, at 19–21.  But see AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 42, 
art. 2 (arguing “there is no sedition in disturbing a government” that is tyrannical).  
See generally Peter Josephson, The Law of Nature in the Age of Consent, 12 GOOD SOC. 58, 
58 (2003) (noting that according to Augustine and Aquinas “subjects must give up 
the ‘right to disobey’”).   
 200 See infra Part V.A. 
 201 See M. SELIGER, THE LIBERAL POLITICS OF JOHN LOCKE 64 (1968) (“Through par-
alleling external and internal relations any contradiction is removed between the 
traditional Christian view which restricted the appeal to heaven of the governed to 
mere prayer, and the justification of active resistance derived from natural law.”). 
 202 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 241; see also id. bk. II, 
ch. XIV, § 168 (“[Individuals] have, by a law antecedent and paramount to all posi-
tive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs 
to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have 
just cause to make their appeal to heaven.  And this judgment they cannot part with, 
it being out of a man’s power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty 
to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to 
neglect his own preservation.”). 
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to heaven is the assertion of man’s own efforts, there is no guarantee 
of success: 
[H]e that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side; 
and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal, as 
he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be 
sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath 
created to his fellow-subjects; that is, any part of mankind.
203
 
Locke counsels caution in making an appeal to heaven; it involves 
harsh real-world consequences.  Locke’s story of the origins of civil 
society—the reality that a state of nature or of war is an ever-present 
possibility and that the ultimate power of enforcing the natural law 
rests with the people—effects a profound change in orientation.  Di-
vine judgment is enforced through individual conscience and human 
action rather than the dictates of priests and kings.  Understanding 
self-preservation as a natural right emboldens the citizen to confront 
governors armed with a pretense to divine authority. 
C. The Fatherly and the Divine 
Placing responsibility in the people for ensuring that rulers act 
justly, Locke suggests, overturns the biblical worldview.  In making his 
case for monarchy, Filmer argues that a father may transfer his pa-
triarchal authority over his family to an heir; such heirs thereby be-
come “not only lords of their own children, but also of their breth-
ren, and all others that were subject to their fathers.”
204
  That a father 
“may have a natural right to some kind of power over his children, is 
easily granted,” Locke writes, but he disputes that such authority may 
be inherited.
205
  Specifically, Locke argues that the Bible does not vest 
a right of dominion in first-born sons and that a son’s “birthright” is a 
solely financial inheritance.
206
  This is not a complete answer to Fil-
mer, however.  Filmer does not argue that the heir is necessarily the 
 
 203 Id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 176. 
 204 ROBERT FILMER, Patriarcha, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 10 (Johann 
P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680) [hereinafter FILMER, Pa-
triarcha]; see also ROBERT FILMER, Observations Upon Aristotles Politiques, in PATRIARCHA 
AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra, at 235, 282 (1652) [hereinafter FILMER, Observations] 
(“God also hath given to the father a right or liberty to alien his power over his child-
ren to any other, whence we find the sale and gift of children to have been much in 
use in the beginning of the world.”). 
 205 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 111. 
 206 Id. 
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first-born son, as Locke acknowledges.
207
  Still, Locke points to 
1 Chronicles 5:1 to prove his points: 
Reuben . . . was the firstborn; but forasmuch as he defiled his fa-
ther’s bed, his birthright was given unto the sons of Joseph the 
son of Israel: and the genealogy is not to be reckoned after the 
birthright.  For Judah prevailed above his brethren, and of him 
came the chief ruler; but the birthright was Joseph’s.
208
 
Based on this text, Locke argues that rule is not due to the first-born 
son because Judah became the chief ruler instead of Reuben, the 
first-born.  Moreover, Locke notes, because “Joseph had the birth-
right, but Judah the dominion,” the birthright could not have in-
cluded the right of dominion.
209
  Yet what is most notable about the 
passage is not whether it was the first-born who received dominion 
over his brethren, but that one brother actually did inherit dominion.  
Filmer’s argument does not depend upon the heir being the first-
born son; he argues that a father may transfer his authority to anyone 
he chooses.
210
 
Locke acknowledges that Judah received dominion through a 
blessing from his father Jacob: “Judah, thou art he whom thy breth-
ren shall praise . . . thy father’s children shall bow down before 
thee.”
211
  Thus, while the biblical text supports Locke’s immediate ar-
gument that dominion does not automatically vest in the first-born, it 
also supports Filmer’s ultimate position “that dominion belongs to 
the heir over his brethren.”
212
  Locke posits that reason cannot “find 
 
 207 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 119 (“[Filmer] leaves us to guess, that by heir, he means the 
eldest son; though I do not remember he any where mentions expresly the title of 
the first-born, but all along keeps himself under the shelter of the indefinite term 
heir.”); cf. id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 111 (“[H]e seems to insinuate, that the eldest son is heir; 
but he no where, that I know, says it in direct words.”).  In fact, Filmer argues that 
the inheritance does not go automatically to the first-born, but that fathers choose 
their own heirs: 
[T]he wisdom of all or most princes hath thought fit to adopt many 
times those for heads of families and princes of provinces whose merits, 
abilities, or fortunes have enabled them, or made them fit and capable 
of such royal favours.  All such prime heads and fathers have power to 
consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign 
authority on whom they please. 
FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note 204, at 11. 
 208 1 Chronicles 5:1–2 (King James).  Locke quotes the passage in the First Treatise, 
Section 115, though he cites “1 Chron. v. 12.”  LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, 
bk. I., ch. XI, § 115.  
 209 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115. 
 210 See supra notes 204 and 207 and accompanying text. 
 211 Genesis 49:8 (King James).  Locke cites the blessing in LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, 
supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118. 
 212 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115. 
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any such natural superiority amongst brethren.”
213
  But given the heri-
tability of paternal authority in the Bible, it seems that scripture does 
not follow Locke’s view of reason on this point. 
To bolster his argument, Locke cites the example of Esau.  Esau 
could not have understood a connection between the birthright and 
his father’s blessing (which gave dominion), Locke argues, because 
Esau complains that his brother Jacob cheated him twice: first by tak-
ing his birthright and second by taking his blessing.  “[H]ad the bless-
ing, which was to be lord over his brethren, belonged to the birth-
right,” writes Locke, Esau could not have counted it as a second, sep-
arate theft.
214
  Again, Locke supports his limited point (that the birth-
right does not entail a right of dominion) while lending even more 
support to Filmer’s ultimate position (that fathers did transfer a right 
to be lord over one’s brethren).  Just as it does not depend upon a 
right of first-born sons, Filmer’s argument also does not depend 
upon the inclusion of fatherly authority in the biblical “birthright”; a 
father may distribute authority as he pleases, according to Filmer. 
Locke further argues that that the blessings of dominion given 
by Isaac to Jacob and by Jacob to Judah were “only predictions of 
what should long after happen to their posterities, and not any decla-
ration of the right of inheritance to dominion in either.”
215
  Accord-
ing to Locke, Jacob’s blessing signified only the promise of God to 
Rebecca about her sons Jacob and Esau: “Two nations are in thy 
womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels; 
and the one people shall be stronger than the other people; and the 
elder shall serve the younger.”
216
  In the same way, writes Locke, “Ja-
cob blessed Judah . . . and gave him the scepter and dominion.”
217
  
The “scepter” refers to the leadership of Judah’s descendants over 
the descendants of his brothers, the other tribes of Israel.
218
  It could 
represent a prediction regarding Judah’s posterity.  It seems that 
“dominion,” however, is a different concept; the express language of 
the blessing seems to confer on Judah a direct lordship over his 
 
 213 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 111. 
 214 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 113; see also Genesis 27:29 (King James) (“Let people serve 
thee, and nations bow down to thee: be lord over thy brethren, and let thy mother’s 
sons bow down to thee.”). 
 215 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118. 
 216 Genesis 25:23 (King James). 
 217 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118. 
 218 See Genesis 49:10 (King James) (“The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a 
lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering 
of the people be.”). 
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brothers.
219
  Even accepting Locke’s interpretation, however, does not 
undermine the idea that the Bible places monarchical authority in 
the father.  It would seem to be an even greater endorsement of fa-
therly authority to say that, based on the initial vesting of Jacob’s pa-
ternal authority in Judah, Judah’s posterity should enjoy political rule 
in Israel throughout the generations.  Or, that “the elder shall serve the 
younger” denotes not simply the subservience of Esau to Jacob, but 
that, because Jacob was heir to Isaac’s authority, for generations “the 
Israelites, the posterity of Jacob, should have dominion over the 
Edomites, the posterity of Esau,” as Locke puts it.
220
  Thus, Locke 
again supports his limited claim (that the blessing might not confer 
an individual right of dominion) while lending even more support to 
Filmer’s ultimate position (that the Bible identifies political authority 
with ancestral paternal power). 
In support of his related argument that the birthright was only a 
financial inheritance, Locke notes that “[w]hat this birth-right was” 
appears in Genesis 48:22, in which Jacob gives Joseph an extra por-
tion of his spoils.
221
  But, in the same paragraph, Locke quotes the 
Book of Chronicles to the effect that the birthright was given not to 
Joseph himself but to the “sons of Joseph.”
222
  Following Locke’s ref-
erence to Genesis 48, one finds that the birthright was not only an ex-
tra portion.  Rather, Jacob adopts Joseph’s two sons, Ephraim and 
Manasseh, and passes onto them God’s promise to Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob to “make of thee a multitude of people” and to “give this 
land to thy seed after thee for an everlasting possession.”
223
  Says Ja-
cob: “[L]et my name be named on them, and the name of my fathers 
Abraham and Isaac; and let them grow into a multitude in the midst 
of the earth.”
224
  Jacob declares that Manasseh shall become a people 
and be great, but “his younger brother shall be greater than he, and 
his seed shall become a multitude of nations.”
225
  Locke cites the ex-
ample of Joseph’s birthright to show that the birthright “was nothing 
but a double portion.”
226
  But further inspection reveals that the 
 
 219 See supra notes 211 and 214 and accompanying text. 
 220 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118. 
 221 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 115; Genesis 48:22 (King James) (“Moreover I have given to 
thee one portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite 
with my sword and with my bow.”). 
 222 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115. 
 223 Genesis 48:4–5 (King James). 
 224 Id. 48:16. 
 225 Id. 48:19.  Therefore Jacob “set Ephraim before Manasseh.”  Id. 48:20. 
 226 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115. 
MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2012  3:04 PM 
222 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:185 
birthright entailed the inheritance of God’s promise to the biblical 
patriarchs to elevate their posterity and to deliver their land—and 
that Jacob, transferring this divine promise, could set the rank and 
destiny of each son and his posterity.  Thus, monarchical authority 
passed from God through the patriarchs to generations of their post-
erity. 
In discussing the birthright inheritance, Locke focuses on who 
receives the paternal authority, arguing that Filmer’s examples pro-
vide no reliable guide to identify the proper heir.
227
  Yet the real dis-
pute between Locke and Filmer is not who holds the authority, but 
how that authority is established—whether political power is fatherly, 
extending from God through natural fathers to the rulers of nations, 
or popular, extending from people to the government through a so-
cial compact.  According to Filmer, fathers may confer their authority 
“on whom they please,” by whatever criteria they prefer; the impor-
tant point is that “he that is so elected claims not his power as a dona-
tive from the people, but as being substituted properly by God” acting 
through the earthly fathers.
228
  Locke’s argument from scripture, os-
tensibly directed against Filmer, not only fails to confront this argu-
ment but illustrates that the nature of power in the Bible is as Filmer 
describes it.
229
 
 
 227 See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 129 (“[I]f our author’s own proof be to be taken, a 
younger brother may, in the life of his father and elder brothers, by right of descent, 
enjoy Adam’s monarchical power; and if one so qualified may be monarch by des-
cent, why may not every man?”). 
 228 FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note 204, at 11.  Indeed, Filmer argues that whatever 
the form of government, political power rests upon the fatherly authority of God: 
[W]hether the prince be the supreme father of the people or but the 
true heir of such a father, or whether he come to the crown by usurpa-
tion, or by election of the nobles or of the people, or by any other way 
whatsoever, or whether some few or a multitude govern the common-
wealth, yet still the authority that is in any one, or in many, or in all 
these, is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father. 
Id. (editorial mark omitted). 
 229 See J.W. Allen, Sir Robert Filmer, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME 
ENGLISH THINKERS OF THE AUGUSTAN AGE 27, 27 (F.J.C. Hearnshaw ed., 1928) (“Either 
Locke had failed to understand Filmer, or he misrepresented him deliberately.”); id. 
at 45 (“Locke’s criticisms simply do not touch [Filmer’s] contention.”). 
     In another revealing example, Locke disputes Filmer’s argument that the pa-
triarchs “numbered their sons or subjects amongst their possessions, and disposed of 
them with as absolute a dominion, as they did their other goods.”  LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 154.  In the next paragraph, as evidence for 
his own argument, Locke cites the example of Reuben offering his two sons as 
pledges to Jacob for the safe return of Benjamin.  Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 155.  Reuben in 
fact treats his sons as possessions in just the way Filmer describes.  See Genesis 42:37 
(King James) (“And Reuben spake unto his father, saying, Slay my two sons, if I bring 
him not to thee.”).  Locke argues that the pledge would be superfluous if Jacob al-
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Locke’s argument nevertheless challenges the view of both Filmer 
and the Bible that right authority is paternal, ancestral, and ultimate-
ly divine.  Because the rightful heir is never apparent, according to 
Locke, the biblical view fosters arbitrary and abusive government.
230
  
While revelation may endorse patriarchal government, reason coun-
sels otherwise.  To illustrate the folly of looking to the authority of 
Adam, Locke poses a rhetorical question: 
In the state the world is now, it is irrecoverably ignorant, who is 
Adam’s heir. This fatherhood, this monarchical power of Adam, 
descending to his heirs, would be of no more use to the govern-
ment of mankind, than it would be to the quieting of mens con-
sciences, or securing their healths, if our author had assured 
them, that Adam had a power to forgive sins, or cure diseases, 
which by divine institution descended to his heir, whilst this heir 
is impossible to be known.  And should not he do as rationally, 
who upon this assurance of our author went and confessed his 
sins, and expected a good absolution; or took physic with expecta-
tion of health, from any one who had taken on himself the name 
of priest or physician, or thrust himself into those employments, 
saying, I acquiesce in the absolving power descending from Adam, 
or I shall be cured by the medicinal power descending from 
Adam; as he who says, I submit to and obey the paternal power 
descending from Adam, when it is confessed all these powers des-
cend only to his single heir, and that heir is unknown?
231
 
The answer to Locke’s question cannot be yes.  One might trust that 
a priest possesses “the absolving power of Adam” and assume one’s 
sins to be absolved after confession, but one cannot similarly trust 
that a physician holds “the medicinal power descending from Adam” 
and assume one’s disease to be cured.  The illness will either respond 
to treatment or it will not.  A pretender cannot assume the role of 
physician without being found out.  But a pretender may assume the 
 
ready had dominion over Reuben’s sons, “as if a man should take two lambs out of 
his lord’s flock, and offer one as security, that he will safely restore the other.”  
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 155.  But this argument assumes 
that Jacob values all his descendants equally, and Reuben still has an independent 
interest in the survival of his own line, making the pledge a strong commitment on 
his part.  What is most striking about the example is what Locke glosses over: the 
readiness with which Reuben exercises dominion over the lives of his sons. 
 230 See, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 121 (“And hence 
not being able to make out any prince’s title to government, as heir to Adam . . . he is 
fain to resolve all into present possession, and makes civil obedience as due to an 
usurper, as to a lawful king; and thereby the usurper’s title as good.”); id. bk. I, ch. 
XI, § 161 (“[W]hat a brave right of lineal succession, to his paternal or regal gov-
ernment, our author has re-established, for the securing the rights and inheritance 
of crowns, where every one may have it, let the world consider.”). 
 231 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 125. 
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role of priest, Locke suggests, without any confirmation of or check 
on his authority.  One may “acquiesce” to priestly power, just as one 
may “submit” to kingly power, and thereby make it real.  Priestly or 
kingly powers exist only to the extent that parishioners or subjects 
acquiesce, Locke implies, but one cannot similarly will oneself 
“cured.”  Medicine shows whether it has power in the actual curing of 
disease; it does not depend upon the acquiescence of subjects. 
Because Locke has argued that submission to rulers based on 
their claims of paternal power is irrational, his equation of that sub-
mission with acquiescence to priests’ claims of absolving power im-
plies that churchly authority is similarly unfounded and the submis-
sion of believers is similarly irrational.  Believers do confess their sins 
and expect absolution based on the “assurance” and authority of 
those who have “taken on . . . the name of priest.”  In a similar way, 
the biblical doctrine of paternal power may encourage submission to 
government.  But Locke aims for political rule to resemble medicine 
more than religion: to be governed by an appreciable rational stan-
dard rather than irrational faith.  It is in this sense that Locke regards 
Filmer’s doctrine as of no use to the government of mankind. 
Locke indicates that the biblical perspective provides no rational 
guide to political life, highlighting that even God in the Bible com-
mits the same mistake as Filmer.  He criticizes Filmer for using the 
vague term “heir” to describe the recipient of paternal power, but he 
also notes that when God gave the land of Canaan to Abraham, he 
specified that it was to go to “his seed” after him.
232
  “Seed” does not 
seem more precise than “heir,” and indeed Locke later criticizes Fil-
mer for using the term “issue” as well.  “[I]f God give any thing to a 
man and his issue in general, the claim cannot be to any one of that 
issue in particular; every one that is of his race will have an equal 
right,” Locke writes.
233
  “[F]or if the regal power be given by God to a 
man and his issue, as the land of Canaan was to Abraham and his 
seed, must they not all have a title to it, all share in it?”
234
  If the an-
 
 232 Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 128 (“If God had given the land of Canaan to Abraham, and 
in general terms to some body after him, without naming his seed, whereby it might 
be known who that somebody was, it would have been as good and useful an assign-
ment, to determine the right to the land of Canaan, as it would be the determining 
the right of crowns, to give empire to Adam and his successive heirs after him, with-
out telling who his heir is: for the word heir, without a rule to know who it is, signifies 
no more than some body, I know not whom.”); cf. Genesis 15:18 (King James) (“Unto 
thy seed have I given this land.”); id. 13:15 (“For all the land which thou seest, to 
thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever.”). 
 233 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 162. 
 234 Id.  
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swer were yes, it would imply a fairly expansive title to Canaan.
235
  But 
Locke knows that this is not consistent with the biblical text because 
he also observes that Isaac was Abraham’s sole heir.
236
  Locke recounts 
that Isaac became sole heir because his mother Sarah urged Abraham 
to cast out his first-born son Ishmael, and Abraham sent away Ishmael 
and his other sons and “gave all he had unto Isaac.”
237
  Locke leaves 
out God’s role in the choice of Isaac as Abraham’s heir.
238
  In Locke’s 
account, the inheritance is decided not by divine will but by human 
intrigue.
239
 
Filmer may not offer clear rules of inheritance, but Locke reveals 
that this is because God does not offer such rules either.  Locke offers 
examples from the Bible—of Jacob stealing his older brother’s birth-
right, of Reuben’s disqualification and the younger Judah’s appoint-
ment as chief ruler, of the favoritism shown to Isaac and to Joseph, 
and of conspiracies and revolts in the Kingdoms of Israel and Ju-
dah—to show that Filmer cannot make out a clear rule of inherit-
ance, but in the course of doing so he makes out a critique of the Bi-
ble itself.  The examples do not undermine Filmer’s insistence that, 
according to the Bible, God rather than the people decides who is to 
rule, but the examples do show that God’s will proceeds through ar-
bitrary and unjust human events. 
Filmer acknowledges the same point, arguing that in the Bible 
unjust acts by individuals are part of God’s larger design: “God doth 
but use and turn men’s unrighteous acts to the performance of His 
righteous decrees.”
240
  Locke, not acknowledging Filmer’s explana-
 
 235 Cf. Genesis 13:16 (King James) (“And I will make thy seed as the dust of the 
earth: so that if a man can number the dust of the earth, then shall thy seed also be 
numbered.”); id. 25:2–4 (noting many sons of Abraham and their descendants). 
 236 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 114. 
 237 Id.; see also Genesis 21:10–14 (King James) (recounting the expulsion of Ish-
mael); Genesis  25:5–6 (King James) (“And Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac.  
But unto the sons of the concubines, which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and 
sent them away from Isaac his son, while he yet lived, eastward, unto the east coun-
try.”).  
 238 God tells Abraham to listen to Sarah “for in Isaac shall thy seed be called.”  Ge-
nesis 21:12 (King James). 
 239 Compare, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 167 (noting 
that God gave the crown to David and “his seed”), with id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 162 (“Solo-
mon, who succeeded David in the throne, [was] no more his heir than Jeroboham, 
who succeeded him in the government of the ten tribes, was his issue.”).  
 240 FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note 204, at 11.  Filmer also acknowledges that the 
identity of the true heir is uncertain but obedience is nevertheless due to a ruler: “No 
child naturally and infallibly knows who are his true parents, yet he must obey those 
that are in common reputation are so, otherwise the commandment of ‘honour thy 
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tion, condemns Filmer’s doctrine on the basis of its arbitrariness.  
Anyone can claim the fatherly power of Adam, Locke argues, all with 
the same degree of legitimacy.
241
  In Locke’s account, the fatherly 
power as Jephtha wields it is tyrannical, and its descent through the 
patriarchs is arbitrary.  Locke therefore replaces the descent of power 
from God through the patriarchs to sovereign kings with the ascent 
of power from individuals through compact to civil society. 
At the same time, Locke indicates that there can be a rational 
check on that power.  If government power resembled medicinal ra-
ther than priestly power, it would be judged and constrained by ac-
tual standards.  In the First Treatise, Locke suggests that if a “power 
rising from property” were considered the foundation of govern-
ment, it would supplant fatherly power.
242
  Property, then, has the po-
tential to replace fatherly power—the inherited authority emanating 
from the God of the Bible. 
IV. PROPERTY 
At first blush, Locke’s state of nature appears distinct from the 
Hobbesian one, but further inspection reveals similarities to the 
Hobbesian system.  First, while Locke makes a conceptual distinction 
between the state of nature and the state of war, the dynamics of the 
state of nature lead to a state of war inevitably and constantly.  “[T]he 
nature of war,” writes Hobbes, “consisteth not in actual fighting; but 
in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no as-
surance to the contrary.”
243
  That sounds like the Lockean state of na-
ture, in which coequal sovereigns—no greater part the observers of 
law and justice—wield coercive authority over each other.  Second, 
the law of nature for Locke as well as for Hobbes consists in the dy-
namics of individual self-preservation.  Third, the state of nature in-
duces people to form civil society. 
 
father and thy mother’ were in vain, and no child bound to the obedience of it.”  
FILMER, Observations, supra note 204, at 192. 
 241 Locke writes: “[I]f one so qualified may be monarch by descent, why may not 
every man? if Judah, his father and elder brother living, were one of Adam’s heirs, I 
know not who can be excluded from this inheritance; all men by inheritance may be 
monarchs as well as Judah.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 129.  
Judah actually did hold monarchical power, see supra notes 208–11 and accompany-
ing text, so this passage reads as a criticism of the Bible as well as Filmer. 
 242 Locke quotes a passage from Filmer explaining that the fatherly power cannot 
coexist with a power in the people, except he replaces “power of the people” with 
“power rising from property.”  See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VII, 
§ 77 (quoting FILMER, supra note 195, at 158).  
 243 HOBBES, supra note 116, at 100. 
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But the civil societies that result from Hobbes’s and Locke’s ac-
counts are not identical.  Hobbes aims to suppress those human pas-
sions, especially pride, which he takes to be the root of human con-
flict: “The passion, whose violence, or continuance, maketh madness, 
is either great vain-glory; which is commonly called pride, and self-
conceit; or great dejection of mind,” Hobbes writes.
244
  Hobbes and 
Locke aim to counter dejection of mind by replacing piety with hu-
man self-reliance.  To control pride, Hobbes advocates an absolutist 
form of government as well as a state religion that will moderate its 
subjects.
245
  According to Hobbes, “The passions that incline men to 
peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to 
commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.”
246
  
Hobbes relies primarily upon the first mechanism for promoting 
peace, the fear of death: Hobbesian man submits to government to 
control his passions; Leviathan keeps him in check through force.
247
 
Locke places greater emphasis upon men’s desires for material 
things and commodious living, and the hope by their industry to ob-
tain them, as a way to channel the passions toward social peace.  
Lockean man submits to government in order to preserve and ac-
quire property.
248
  By making property the foundation of civil society, 
Locke aims to channel the passions away from factional strife and to-
ward human industry.  Legitimizing the desire for material gain—
against religious teachings that condemn it—redirects human ener-
gies and transforms social attitudes.  In doing so, Locke’s theory of 
property entails a significant challenge to the biblical tradition. 
 
 244 Id. at 63; see also id. at 120 (“[F]or the ninth law of nature, I put this, that every 
man acknowledge another for his equal by nature.  The breach of this precept is pride.”). 
 245 Hobbes calls his government “Leviathan” after the great sea monster that the 
Bible calls “a king over all the children of pride.”  See id. at 235–36 (“Hitherto I have 
set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to 
submit himself to government: together with the great power of his governor, whom 
I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one-
and-fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth 
him king of the proud.”); see also Job 41:33–34 (King James) (“Upon earth there is not 
his like, who is made without fear.  He beholdeth all high things: he is a king over all 
the children of pride.”). 
 246 HOBBES, supra note 116, at 102. 
 247 Id. 
 248 See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 124 (“The great and 
chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves 
under government, is the preservation of their property.”). 
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A. The Status of Locke’s Theory of Property 
Close attention to Locke’s text reveals this purpose.  The open-
ing statement of Locke’s chapter on property, for example, includes a 
revealing inaccuracy: 
Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, be-
ing once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequent-
ly to meat and drink and such other things as Nature affords for 
their subsistence, or revelation, which gives us an account of those 
grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his 
sons, it is very clear that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has 
given the earth to the children of men, given it to mankind in com-
mon.
249
 
Locke begins the chapter by insisting upon the agreement of reason 
and revelation.  Whether we consult one or the other, he says, we 
have an account of men’s right to “meat and drink” and everything 
that sustains life.
250
  But this is demonstrably false; in this case, the ac-
count provided by reason and that provided by revelation diverge.  In 
Genesis 3:18, God grants to Adam “the plants of the field” to eat.
251
  It 
is not until after the Flood, in God’s grant to Noah, that God permits 
mankind to eat meat: “Every moving thing that lives shall be food for 
you; and just as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything.”
252
  
Locke is well aware of the discrepancy between the grants to Adam 
and to Noah.  He discusses the discrepancy in the First Treatise, 
where he implicitly criticizes God’s arbitrary rule: 
Adam . . . could not make bold with a lark or rabbit to satisfy his 
hunger, and had the herbs but in common with the beasts . . . . 
Should any one, who is absolute lord of a country, have bidden 
our author subdue the earth, and given him dominion over the 
creatures in it, but not have permitted him to have taken a kid or 
a lamb out of the flock to satisfy his hunger, I guess he would 
scarce leave thought himself lord or proprietor of that land, or 
the cattle on it; but would have found the difference between 
“having dominion,” which a shepherd may have, and having full 
property as an owner.
253
 
By specifying “meat” as well as Adam and Noah in his opening sen-
tence, Locke highlights the discrepancy between the law of reason 
and the law of God.  According to Locke, the law of reason says that 
 
 249 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Genesis 3:18 (King James). 
 252 Genesis 9:3 (New Revised Standard). 
 253 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 39; see also id. bk. I, ch. IV, 
§ 27. 
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men, upon birth, have a right to preservation and therefore to those 
things “nature affords for their subsistence.”
254
  If this right of proper-
ty is founded upon the right of preservation, it cannot be a collective 
right of all men in common because the inability to appropriate food 
for oneself would make self-preservation impossible.  Thus, contrary 
to what Locke says, when we consult natural reason, it is not “very 
clear” that God has given the earth to mankind in common.  Accord-
ing to natural reason, all individuals have a right to meat and drink in 
accordance with self-preservation.  If God has vested title to the earth 
in mankind in common, then God has acted contrary to natural rea-
son. 
Locke makes this argument explicit in the First Treatise when he 
discusses man’s dominion over the animals.  Irrespective of any expli-
cit grant by God, Locke explains, man had the right to use the crea-
tures for his own preservation because reason dictated that by “pur-
suing that natural inclination he had to preserve his being, he 
followed the will of his maker, and therefore had a right to make use 
of those creatures, which by his reason or senses he could discover 
would be serviceable thereunto.”
255
  That natural instinct for self-
preservation made the animals his property: “And thus man’s proper-
ty in the creatures was founded upon the right he had to make use of 
those things that were necessary or useful to his being.”
256
  This dic-
tate of reason makes God’s explicit instructions to man irrelevant.
257
 
Strictly speaking, therefore, the task Locke sets for Chapter 5, his 
chapter on property in the Second Treatise—namely, to derive an 
individual right to property from God’s grant to mankind in com-
mon—is unnecessary.  Having already established a natural right to 
self-preservation, Locke has established the right to individual appro-
priation from nature, and he announces it up front. 
Considering the other side of Locke’s statement—that is, taking 
the perspective of revelation—it is similarly not “very clear” that God 
has given the earth to mankind in common.  The revelation here, the 
biblical “account of those grants God made of the world to Adam and 
to Noah and his sons,” is the subject of Locke’s debate with Filmer in 
Chapter 4 of the First Treatise, in which Locke purports to refute 
Filmer’s argument that those grants entitled Adam’s and Noah’s des-
 
 254 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25. 
 255 Id. bk. I, ch. IX, § 86. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. (“I doubt not, but before these words were pronounced, i. Gen. 28, 29. (if 
they must be understood literally to have been spoken) and without any such verbal 
donation, man had a right to an use of the creatures, by the will and grant of God.”).  
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cendants to monarchical rule.  There, Locke considers whether the 
donation of God to Adam in Genesis 1:28 could have given him pow-
er over other men.
258
  Because “all positive grants convey no more 
than the express words they are made in will carry,” Locke examines 
the precise words of God’s grant.
259
  Specifically, Locke considers 
whether the words “every living thing that moveth” could include 
mankind, giving Adam dominion over other men. 
Filmer, however, never argues that mankind is included in those 
words.
260
  Locke quotes Filmer as arguing that Adam “having here 
dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of 
the whole world.”
261
  In context and without the modifications in 
Locke’s quotation, that passage from Filmer’s Observations upon Aris-
totle’s Politics distinguishes between people and creatures, and it treats 
Adam’s dominion over the creatures as a right of ownership or con-
trol.  That exclusive control, Filmer argues, establishes Adam’s mo-
narchical power because his posterity could not possess anything “but 
by his grant or permission, or by succession from him.”
262
  Neverthe-
less, Locke insists that Filmer is best understood to mean that the 
grant of dominion itself made Adam the sovereign ruler of all men by 
giving him direct dominion over mankind.
263
  Locke is aware that this 
is a misrepresentation of Filmer’s argument; in an earlier chapter, 
Locke quotes the same passage in full and without modifications, and 
he explains that Filmer intends “monarch of the whole world” to sig-
 
 258 See Genesis 1:28 (King James) (“And God blessed them, and God said unto 
them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living 
thing that moveth upon the earth.”). 
 259 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 25. 
 260 The words do not even appear in Patriarcha.  See FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note 
204. 
 261 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 23. 
 262 Filmer writes:  
Adam, being commanded to multiply, and people the earth, and to 
subdue it, and having dominion given him over all creatures, was the-
reby the monarch of the whole world.  None of his posterity had any 
right to possess anything but by his grant or permission, or by succes-
sion from him.   
FILMER, Observations, supra note 204, at 236. 
 263 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 23 (“[O]ur author says, 
Adam was hereby monarch of the world, which, properly speaking, signifies sovereign ru-
ler of all the men in the world; and so Adam, by this grant, must be constituted such 
a ruler.  If our author means otherwise, he might with much clearness have said, that 
Adam was hereby proprietor of the whole world.”). 
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nify “proprietor of all the world exclusive of the rest of mankind.”
264
  
By shifting his understanding of the passage, Locke enters into a re-
futation of an opinion Filmer does not hold.  Yet his textual study of 
the grants to Adam and to Noah allows Locke to criticize the Bible in 
the guise of defending it. 
First, Locke examines what the Bible means by “every living 
thing that moveth.”  He finds that God divides the animals into three 
kinds: the fishes of the sea, the fowls of the air, and the living crea-
tures of the earth.
265
  In Genesis 1:24, Locke explains, God further di-
vides the living creatures of the earth into three ranks: cattle, wild 
beasts, and the “creeping animals” or reptiles.
266
  Locke explains this 
subdivision as ranking the animals from most to least useful to man, 
but the biblical text actually lists the creatures in a different order 
than Locke does, without any hint of ranking.
267
  Moreover, Genesis 
1:25 lists them in a still different order.
268
  Locke quotes both of these 
biblical verses in the same paragraph in which he explains the rank-
ing.  While it may be sensible to rank the creatures as he does, 
Locke’s own textual evidence shows that he has no biblical founda-
tion for the ranking.
269
  Instead, the Bible catalogues the creatures in 
an inconsistent manner. 
Locke notes that in Genesis 1:26, where God announces his in-
tention to give Adam dominion over the creatures, God identifies cat-
tle and reptiles as terrestrial creatures but leaves out the second rank, 
wild beasts.
270
  In the actual grant of dominion to Adam in Genesis 
 
 264 Id. bk. I, ch. III, § 16.   (“Monarch of the world is also differently used by our au-
thor; for sometimes he means by it a proprietor of all the world exclusive of the rest 
of mankind, and thus he does in the same page of his preface before cited: Adam, 
says he, being commanded to multiply and people the earth, and to subdue it, and having do-
minion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world; none of his 
posterity had any right to possess any thing but by his grant or permission, or by succession from 
him.”); cf. id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 38 (quoting FILMER, supra note 195) (noting Filmer’s view 
of “dominion” as a “title to a property of all things”). 
 265 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 26. 
 266 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 25. 
 267 See Genesis 1:24 (King James) (“And God said, Let the earth bring forth the liv-
ing creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his 
kind: and it was so.”). 
 268 See id. 1:25 (“And God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle 
after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind: and 
God saw that it was good.”). 
 269 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 25. 
 270 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 26; see also Genesis 1:26 (King James) (“And God said, Let us 
make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish 
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, 
and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”). 
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1:28, Locke further explains, the Hebrew term for terrestrial crea-
tures signifies only beasts and reptiles, leaving out cattle.
271
  The same 
term appears in God’s grant to Noah in Genesis 9:12, Locke ob-
serves—though Locke neglects to mention that the biblical verse in-
cludes not only that term, signifying beasts and reptiles, but also 
“every beast of the earth.”
272
  If Locke is correct, therefore, God men-
tions beasts twice but excludes cattle from Noah’s dominion.  The 
express language of the grants to Adam and to Noah, then, do not 
include all the types of animals: “[A]ll the words, whereby they are 
expressed in the history of their creation, are no where used in any of 
the following grants, but some of them omitted in one, and some in 
another.”
273
  Nevertheless, Locke concludes that the grants to Adam 
and to Noah must include all the species of irrational animals be-
cause “since God certainly executed in one place, what he declares he 
designed in the other, we cannot but understand the same in both 
places.”
274
  But this conclusion violates the standard Locke set at the 
start—that positive grants convey no more than the express words will 
carry.  Thus, if one does not abandon that standard in evaluating 
God’s donation—that is, if one expects of God at least as much as 
would be expected of a man—it becomes clear that God’s grants to 
Adam and to Noah are arbitrary: God’s accounts of the living crea-
tures are inconsistent, and the express terms of the grants do not in-
clude cattle, those creatures most useful to man, which Locke de-
scribes as “such creatures as were or might be tame, and so be the 
private possession of particular men.”
275
  In other words, God has giv-
en man possession of only those creatures of which man cannot take 
possession. 
Locke concludes that the grants do not include dominion over 
human beings: “[W]hether we understand the Hebrew words right or 
no, they cannot be supposed to comprehend man,” especially be-
cause the term for “every living thing that moveth” is used in contra-
distinction to man elsewhere in Genesis.
276
  This conclusion reveals 
 
 271 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, §§ 25–26. 
 272 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 27; see also Genesis 9:2 (King James) (“And the fear of you and 
the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the 
air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your 
hand are they delivered.”). 
 273 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 27. 
 274 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 26. 
 275 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 25.  In Locke’s view, the express terms are binding even in 
the case of a divine grant.  See id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 195 (“Grants, promises, and oaths 
are bonds that hold the Almighty.”). 
 276 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 27. 
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that the textual analysis regarding the subdivisions of irrational ani-
mals was not relevant to Locke’s argument about Adam’s dominion 
over men.  Man was not included in God’s grants to Adam and to 
Noah regardless of which particular animals were comprehended in 
the language.  The only purpose of Locke’s textual analysis is to show 
that God’s grants do not withstand rational scrutiny. 
In the end, Locke discounts the positive grants, arguing instead 
that it is man’s “intellectual nature” that allows him to have dominion 
over the inferior creatures.
277
  According to Locke, this is the meaning 
of God’s declaration that he will make man “in our image, after our 
likeness.”
278
  Locke recasts Genesis 1:26 from a statement of God’s in-
tention to create the first man in the divine image to God’s creation 
of a whole species of intellectual creatures.
279
  In this way, Filmer’s ar-
gument that a “natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed 
without the denial of the creation of Adam,” which Locke dismisses,
280
 
has some merit.  To defend the natural freedom of mankind, Locke 
argues that the “man” created and blessed by God in Genesis 1:26–28 
is not Adam but “the species of mankind.”
281
 
In a similar way, Locke recasts the grant to Noah.  Though 
Noah’s sons are mentioned in the biblical text, Filmer argues that the 
blessing is best understood as including the sons in subordination or 
succession to Noah.
282
  Locke argues that this interpretation, while 
possible, is not the best understanding of the text.  Yet in Genesis 
6:18, God says individually to Noah, “with thee will I establish my co-
venant; and thou shalt come into the ark, thou, and thy sons, and thy 
wife, and thy sons’ wives with thee.”
283
  Given this statement of God’s 
 
 277 Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 30.  Locke also argues that men had a right to eat animals 
despite God’s admonition to the contrary.  See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying 
text. 
 278 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 30 (quoting Genesis 1:26 
(King James)). 
 279 Id. (“In the 26th verse, where God declares his intention to give this dominion, 
it is plain he meant, that he would make a species of creatures, that should have do-
minion over the other species of this terrestrial globe.”).  Locke sees that Genesis re-
fers to man as “them” and concludes that it cannot thereby signify Adam alone—
even though God also refers to himself in the plural in the same verse. 
 280 Id. bk. I, ch. III, § 15 (quoting FILMER, supra note 195). 
 281 See id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 40 (“I think it is impossible for any sober reader, to find 
any other but the setting of mankind above the other kinds of creatures, in this ha-
bitable earth of ours.  It is nothing but the giving to man, the whole species of man, 
as the chief inhabitant, who is the image of his Maker, the dominion over the other 
creatures.”). 
 282 See id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 32. 
 283 Genesis 6:18 (King James). 
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intention, one need only recall Locke’s own admonition that “since 
God certainly executed in one place, what he declares he designed in 
the other, we cannot but understand the same in both places.”
284
  To 
make God’s design consistent with his execution, it would be neces-
sary to read the grant as including Noah’s sons in subordination or 
succession.  Moreover, because God makes his covenant not only with 
Noah and his sons but also with “your seed after you”
285
 and “every liv-
ing creature that is with you, for perpetual generations,”
286
 it is not 
possible for the covenant to be executed in any other fashion but 
successively.  Yet Locke insists that one cannot depart from the ex-
press words of the grant to Noah, even though if he were to apply the 
same contextual method he applies to Adam’s grant, the meaning 
would be more consistent with the biblical text as a whole.
287
  That 
reading, however, would also be consistent with Filmer’s argument 
for monarchical rule and the biblical association of the right with the 
ancestral. 
In Locke’s vision, man has a right to “meat and drink” and to the 
use of inferior creation not because of God’s explicit grant, but be-
cause the strong desire for self-preservation was “planted in him as a 
principle of action by God himself” and reason, “which was the voice 
of God in him, could not but teach him and assure him, that pur-
suing that natural inclination he had to preserve his being, he fol-
lowed the will of his maker.”
288
  In other words, God’s will is not re-
vealed in the biblical account of his word, but in the instinct and 
reason he placed in mankind. 
While Locke’s view of natural reason makes his labor theory log-
ically unnecessary to establish individual rights to property, the view 
he addresses—that the world was given to mankind in common—was 
one conventionally held in his day.
289
  As Locke writes, “this being 
supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should 
 
 284 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 26. 
 285 Genesis 9:9 (King James). 
 286 Id. 9:12. 
 287 Compare LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 32 (invoking “the 
express words of the scripture” and “the plain express words of scripture” and ar-
guing that the “express words [of the grant to Noah and his sons] give a joint title in 
present”), with supra note 274 and accompanying text.  In the same way, Locke writes 
that “we may well suppose” that Adam had “more sons” than those recounted in 
scripture, LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 112, but does not al-
low a similar assumption for Noah, see id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 33 (“[W]e read not of any 
children he had after the flood.”). 
 288 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IX, § 86. 
 289 See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA 15 (David Armitage ed., Richard Hakluyt 
trans., Liberty Fund 2004) (1609). 
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ever come to have a property in anything.”
290
  Locke himself does not 
hold such a supposition, nor is he among those “some” to whom pri-
vate property poses “a very great difficulty.”  But Locke “will not con-
tent myself to answer” that if one concedes the supposition, private 
property is impossible.
291
  In other words, Locke proceeds to make an 
argument based on the suppositions of others; he engages with the 
conventional, commonly held view rather than his own. 
B. The Theory of Property 
As with his teaching on the state of nature, Locke at first appears 
to be situated within the conventional view—Hugo Grotius, for ex-
ample, also argued that property could be removed from the com-
mon through labor
292
—but Locke’s argument pushes the idea toward 
novel implications.  In Locke’s hands, the argument for private prop-
erty becomes a refutation of religious authority and an emancipation 
of human industry. 
Locke begins the argument by (once again) painting a rosy pic-
ture of man’s natural state: “God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 
12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration,” he writes.
293
  By 
employing the phrase “reason confirmed by inspiration,” Locke calls 
attention to the deep disagreement between reason and revelation 
that he has already noted.  The phrase also sets a hierarchy between 
reason and inspiration: reason is the primary ground of knowledge, 
and it seeks only “confirmation” from inspiration. 
Locke’s quotation of scripture is inexact.  The King James Bible 
refers to “God, who giveth us richly all things to enjoy.”
294
  Locke’s 
rendition entails a change of tense and emphasis.
295
  Additionally, his 
 
 290 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 25 (emphases added). 
 291 Id. 
 292 GROTIUS, supra note 289, at 15 (“[O]f those things which nature had brought 
forth for the use of man she would that some of them should remain common and 
others through every one’s labor and industry to become proper.”). 
 293 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 31.  The citation to the 
First Book of Timothy is in Locke’s text. 
 294 1 Timothy 6:17 (King James). 
 295 Locke quotes the same verse in the First Treatise but there he uses the present 
tense.  See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 40 (“God gives us all 
things richly to enjoy”).  In his chapter on property, however, Locke treats God’s dona-
tion of “all things” as having occurred in the past.  “God gave the world to men in 
common” after which men were required to labor “to draw from it” the conveniences 
of life.  Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 34 (emphasis added); see also id. bk. II, ch. V, § 32 (“God, 
when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, 
and the penury of his condition required it of him.”).  The biblical teaching, howev-
er, evokes God’s ongoing beneficence to man while emphasizing the relative unim-
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citation to the Book of Timothy is incorrect.  The verse appears at 1 
Timothy 6:17, but Locke cites to 6:12, leaving the reader to search 1 
Timothy 6.
296
  As it happens, Chapter 6 of the First Book of Timothy 
contains the Christian teaching on property.  When read in parallel, 
Locke’s own chapter on property engages with the biblical text. 
Locke’s disagreement with the Pauline teaching can be seen 
most starkly in the fact that Paul begins 1 Timothy 6 with a defense of 
slavery: 
Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own mas-
ters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and his doctrine 
be not blasphemed.  And they that have believing masters, let 
them not despise them, because they are brethren; but rather do 
them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of 
the benefit.  These things teach and exhort.
297
 
It may fairly be said that Locke’s goal in Two Treatises is to “teach and 
exhort” the opposite notion.  He opens the work with a denunciation 
of slavery: “Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so 
directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, 
that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gen-
tleman, should plead for it.”
298
  Under this view, the apostle Paul is 
neither an Englishman nor a gentleman.  Paul teaches Timothy that 
slavery should not be questioned in order to protect “the name of 
God and his doctrine.”  Like Locke, Paul suggests that human auton-
omy is a threat to divine sovereignty. 
 
portance of material comforts: “Charge them that are rich in this world, that they be 
not highminded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God, who giveth us richly 
all things to enjoy.”  1 Timothy 6:17 (King James) (emphasis added).  Paul encourages 
the rich to “be rich in good works,” a kind of wealth that provides “a good founda-
tion against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life.”  Id. 6:18–19; cf. 
Romans 11:33 (King James) (“O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and 
knowledge of God!”). 
     The placement of “richly” in the verse may affect whether the verse implies that 
God provides material abundance for individuals or that God “hath made all things 
for his own sake: . . . for him to shew beneficence and grace in them.”  1 HOOKER, 
supra note 135, at 7. (internal quotation mark omitted); cf. On the Misquotation of 
Scripture, in 7 THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER AND CHURCH OF IRELAND MAGAZINE 402, 403 
(1828), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=khUEAAAAQAAJ (“[In the 
King James Bible] we find the word richly connected with the Author and giver of 
every good and perfect gift . . . and not with the creature or his enjoyments.”). 
 296 Some contemporary editions of the Second Treatise change the citation to 
6:17, but this may violate Locke’s injunction “not [to] think our author so little 
skilled in the way of writing discourses of this nature . . . that he by over-sight com-
mits the fault.”  LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. II, § 7. 
 297 1 Timothy 6:1–2 (King James). 
 298 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. I, § 1. 
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Significantly, Paul sees the threat to divine authority coming not 
only from a desire for liberty but also from a desire for material gain.  
After he tells Timothy to urge the willful submission of slaves to mas-
ters, he says: 
If any man teach otherwise . . . [h]e is proud, knowing nothing, 
but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh 
envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings,  Perverse disputings of men 
of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain 
is godliness: from such withdraw thyself.  But godliness with con-
tentment is great gain.
299
 
Those who are godly and contented, Paul argues, will gain more than 
those who promote disputes and contention for the sake of gain.  
The contrast between these rival camps corresponds to a central 
teaching in Locke’s chapter on property—that the earth belongs “to 
the use of the industrious and rational . . . not to the fancy or cove-
tousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.”
300
  Both Paul and Locke 
oppose promoters of quarrels and contention.
301
  For Locke, however, 
the quarrelsome and contentious are not those who lack content-
ment but those who lack industry—those who do not labor for ma-
terial gain.
302
 
Against Paul’s ideal of “godliness with contentment,” Locke 
praises the “industrious and rational.”
303
  Locke exalts industry rather 
 
 299 1 Timothy 6:3–6 (King James). 
 300 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 34 (emphasis added). 
 301 Locke condemns the “quarrelsome and contentious” while Paul condemns 
those with “an unhealthy interest in controversies and quarrels,” 1 Timothy 6:4 (New 
International), or “a morbid craving for controversy and for disputes,” 1 Timothy 6:4 
(New Revised Standard). 
 302 In his chapter on property, Locke writes that when labor entitled one to prop-
erty, “there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so es-
tablished.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 31 (emphasis add-
ed).  Where labor provided title to land, “there could be no doubt of right, no room 
for quarrel.”  Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 39.  Where labor began a title to property in the 
common things of nature, “there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title.”  
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 51.  Locke suggests that quarrelsomeness does not arise from the 
acquisition of property, at least where it is acquired through labor.  In the Second 
Treatise, Locke uses the word “contend” exclusively in relation to those who seek 
power over others.  See id. bk. II, ch. III, § 21 (“contenders” in a state of war); id. bk. 
II, ch. VI, § 53 (men “who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of 
the fatherhood” and “contend for” monarchy); id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 61 (“blinded con-
tenders for monarchy”); id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 103 (referring to “contenders for pater-
nal empire” who will not find in history “such a power as they contend for”).  Locke 
uses the word “quarrel” once outside Chapter 5, where he describes one who “joins 
with” a contender in the state of war “and espouses his quarrel.”  Id. bk. II, ch. III, § 
16.  The quarrelsome justify the use of force by the contentious—as religious author-
ity might justify the abuses of a king.   
 303 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 34. 
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than contentment, and reason rather than godliness.  In Locke’s vi-
sion, industry and reason represent “great gain”—one gains title to 
the earth.  Locke’s chapter on property attacks Paul’s rationale for 
“godliness with contentment” and supplants it with an ethic of indus-
try and reason.  Paul teaches: 
For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can 
carry nothing out. And having food and raiment let us be therewith 
content.  But they that will be rich fall into temptation and a 
snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men 
in destruction and perdition.
304
 
Locke also mentions “food and raiment” in his teaching on property, 
where he derides it as the relatively worthless product of unassisted 
nature: 
[F]or whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, 
and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing 
to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment 
which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions 
which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much 
they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he 
will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the 
value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which pro-
duces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, 
but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that 
is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, 
tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall 
find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.
305
 
Locke is not content with “food and raiment,” as according to Paul 
one ought to be.  To Locke, “the far greatest part of the value of 
things we enjoy in this world” comes from “our industry and pains.”  
So he urges the promotion of productive labor against the penury of 
“the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with.”306 
Locke disputes Paul’s contention that “we brought nothing into 
this world.”307  Rather, he maintains that we own the labor we carry in 
ourselves and that this labor creates virtually all the value in the 
world.  Before the introduction of human labor, the world was bar-
ren.  “[T]he extent of ground is of so little value, without labour,” ac-
cording to Locke.
308
  “It is labour then which puts the greatest part of 
value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any 
 
 304 1 Timothy 6:7–9 (King James) (emphasis added). 
 305 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 42 (emphasis added). 
 306  Id. 
 307  1 Timothy 6:7 (King James). 
 308 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 36. 
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thing . . . . [N]ature and the earth furnish[] only the almost worthless 
materials, as in themselves.”
309
  The uncultivated earth is “to be 
looked on as waste.”
310
  Locke teaches the opposite of what Paul tells 
Timothy: the world was empty when we got here; man brings practi-
cally everything into this world. 
Locke also reverses Paul’s teaching that the temptation of riches 
leads to ruin.  For Locke, it is idleness that “drown[s] men in destruc-
tion and perdition,”311 while the desire to be rich (“the desire of hav-
ing more than man needed,” as Locke puts it) is what increases the 
common stock of mankind and supports human life.
312
  The desire to 
be rich thereby benefits one’s neighbors, who react with gratitude.
313
  
For Locke, it is the desire to be rich that spurs men to labor, and it is 
labor that creates virtually everything of value.
314
 
Locke turns the Pauline teaching about money on its head.  Paul 
preaches to Timothy that “the love of money is the root of all evil.”
315
  
Locke argues the opposite: love of money drives human industry 
beyond mere subsistence production.  “Find out something that hath 
the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the 
same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions,” writes 
Locke.
316
  “[F]or as a man had a right to all he could employ his la-
bour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could 
make use of.”
317
  As long as man had no temptation to labor for more 
than he could make use of, he refrained from laboring on the earth 
except to gather whatever provision would sustain him at the given 
moment, before it spoiled.  Because man could not benefit from any-
thing beyond what he could immediately consume, men “contented 
themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities.”
318
  
Locke teaches that man’s contentment is not gainful but wasteful be-
cause the vast global common—all the resources beyond individual 
immediate need—went undeveloped.  Money, however, liberated 
people from the penurious conditions of nature because it created a 
 
 309 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 43. 
 310 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 38. 
 311  1 Timothy 6:9 (King James). 
 312 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37. 
 313 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 36. 
 314 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 42 (“[L]abour makes the far greatest part of the value of 
things we enjoy in this world.”). 
 315 1 Timothy 6:10 (King James). 
 316 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 49. 
 317 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 51 (emphasis added). 
 318 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 45 (emphasis added).  The language contrasts with Paul’s 
invocation of contentment as a virtue. 
MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2012  3:04 PM 
240 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:185 
storehouse of value that enabled individuals to labor for more than 
their immediate consumption.  “[W]ant of people and money gave 
men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land,”
319
 but with 
the introduction of money people had an incentive to develop the 
global common that had been lying in waste: 
Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever 
any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which 
remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than 
mankind makes use of.  Men, at first, for the most part, contented 
themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessi-
ties: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where 
the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made 
land scarce, and so of some value) the several communities settled 
the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within them-
selves regulated the properties of the private men of their society, 
and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which la-
bour and industry began.
320
 
In Locke’s telling, the introduction of money was the crucial step in 
the transition from the penurious state of nature to the creation of 
human civilization.  Before money, the benefit of one’s labor re-
dounded only to oneself, so no one had any incentive to labor for 
more than his own needs.  With money, which places a permanent 
and transferable value upon individual labor, people could work for 
something beyond their individual needs and still realize a benefit.  
Money enabled people, for the first time, to work in common.  Thus, 
according to Locke, the founding of cities and countries comes only 
after money is introduced.  Money is the essential precondition of 
common human action.
321
  Locke’s earlier discussion established that 
the state of nature preceding civil society is full of various evils: strife 
and fear, violence and continual dangers.  Only the coming together 
in civil society, formed “by compact and agreement,” allows mankind 
to escape those evils.  Money enables man to form civil society, and 
therefore to end the evil state in which man first finds himself. 
In the Lockean view, the desire for money generates human in-
dustry, which provides comfort above the meager provisions of nature 
and creates a common stock.  The desire for money also generates 
civil society, which enables common human action and provides se-
curity from the strife of the state of nature.  In sum, money produces 
 
 319 Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 108. 
 320 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 45 (emphasis added). 
 321 Cf. HOBBES, supra note 116, at 189 (“[M]oney . . . . passeth from man to man, 
within the commonwealth; and goes round about, nourishing, as it passeth, every 
part thereof.”). 
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comfort, community, and peace.  Locke reverses the Pauline teach-
ing: in Locke’s account, the love of money is the root of all good.  
Without the love of money, neither human comfort nor a peaceful 
society would be possible.  Locke challenges the Bible: the gospel, by 
preaching against the love of money, leads not only to poverty but to 
strife—to quarrels and contentions. 
In Locke’s vision, God left the world to the “use of the indus-
trious and rational,” not to the “fancy or covetousness of the quarrel-
some and contentious.”
322
  The labor of individuals, rather than the 
doctrines of priests or the greed of kings, entitles one to it.
323
  Return-
ing to Locke’s original, misnumbered citation to the Book of Timo-
thy, one finds Paul’s instruction to “[f]ight the good fight of faith.”
324
  
Paul appropriates the phrase “good fight” from classical philosophy, 
but he alters its meaning in the service of Christian faith.
325
  Citing the 
verse as the “voice of reason,” Locke evokes the original meaning and 
thereby makes his own “good confession”: Locke fights the “good 
fight of faith” against faith on behalf of reason.
326
 
Locke’s rejection of biblical morality emerges in a particularly 
remarkable fashion in the middle of his chapter on property.  In Sec-
tion 37, Locke explains: 
[H]e who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not les-
sen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provi-
sions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre 
 
 322 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 34. 
 323 See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
 324 1 Timothy 6:12 (King James) (“Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal 
life, whereunto thou art also called, and hast professed a good profession before 
many witnesses.”). 
 325 Victor Pfitzner explains that “in assimilating the metaphor to his purposes,” 
Paul “fit this image which typifies the Greek spirit of self assertion, of human 
achievement and endeavor, into his own theological system of thought with its em-
phasis on human impotence and divine grace.”  VICTOR C. PFITZNER, PAUL AND THE 
AGON MOTIF 6–7 (1967).  Paul’s use of the phrase contains “little of the Greek spirit 
of moral idealism.”  Id. at 6.  According to Pfitzner, “references to the typically helle-
nistic tone . . . (containing the idea of the good and the beautiful) are beside the 
mark.”  Id. at 185.  For Paul, the fight is good and noble because it seeks God’s glory.  
Id.; see also id. at 166 (“The original polemic contained in the adjective ‘good’ is 
completely lost in I Tim 6:12 . . . .”); cf. HARPER COLLINS STUDY BIBLE 2232 n.1.18 
(1993) (noting that “good fight” is “a traditional phrase in Hellenistic moral philos-
ophy”); RAYMOND F. COLLINS, I & II TIMOTHY AND TITUS: A COMMENTARY 274 (2002) 
(“The moralists used the images to speak of the struggle for the truth and the strug-
gle of the moral life.”). 
 326 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37 (citing 1 Timothy 6:12).  
The construction “professed a good confession,” which also appears in 1 Timothy 
6:12, is likewise “common in Hellenistic uses of the agon motif.”  COLLINS, supra note 
325, at 163. 
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of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within com-
pass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of 
land of an equal richness lying waste in common.
327
 
Locke previously noted that he who “subdued, tilled, and sowed any 
part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, 
which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from 
him.”
328
  He proceeds, in Section 37, to contrast this individual with a 
second human type: “Before the appropriation of land, he who ga-
thered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of 
the beasts, as he could” remained under the old “rule of propriety.”
329
  
Locke explains: 
[I]f [the goods] perished, in his possession, without their due use; 
if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could 
spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was 
liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he 
had no right, farther than his use called for any of them.
330
 
Thus, “in the beginning” (Locke begins Section 37 with that phrase), 
there were two human types: a laborer on the land, who increases the 
common stock of mankind, and a gatherer of fruit or beasts, who 
merely collects “the spontaneous products of nature” and thereby les-
sens the common stock.
331
 
The full implications of Locke’s theory of property come to light 
in the following paragraph (Section 38), where Locke introduces the 
biblical figures of Cain and Abel: “Thus, at the beginning, Cain might 
take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and 
yet leave enough to Abel’s sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve 
for both their possessions.”
332
  The phrase “at the beginning” links 
Cain and Abel to the two human types Locke introduced in the pre-
vious paragraph, the tiller of land and the gatherer of beasts.  Note 
that Cain tills the land and makes it “his own” while Abel’s sheep 
simply feed.  Abel has only propriety, not property, in them.
333
  Thus, 
“in the beginning”—when the first appropriation of land created the 
right of property and saved mankind from the penury of nature—
 
 327 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37. 
 328 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 32. 
 329 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 37. 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id.; see also Genesis 1:1 (King James). 
 332 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 38.  Thanks to Steven 
Lenzner for calling my attention to the significance of this passage. 
 333 Cf. id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 39 (noting “the difference between having dominion, 
which a shepherd may have, and having full property as an owner”). 
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Cain emerged as the great benefactor of mankind.  Abel was his be-
neficiary.  Locke continues: 
[A]s families increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their 
possessions inlarged with the need of them; but yet it was com-
monly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, 
till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; 
and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of 
their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and 
their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the prop-
erties of those of the same society.
334
 
This other advance, the building of cities, humanity owes to Cain.  
Cain, according to Genesis, was the founder of the first city.
335
  Cain’s 
descendants, moreover, initiated those advances in the arts and 
sciences that are for Locke the mark of human civilization, including 
the raising of cattle,
336
 music,
337
 and metallurgy.
338
  The Bible treats the 
progress of the arts and sciences with moral skepticism by attributing 
these advances to Cain and his descendants.
339
  The biblical tradition 
elevates piety over science, but Locke reverses this judgment.  He 
creates an alternative biblical narrative in which God commands hu-
man industry.
340
  Locke does not mention Cain’s killing of Abel—
which the Bible takes to be the crucial moral point of the story—in 
his chapter on property.  In Locke’s retelling of the story, Cain is the 
hero.  While the Bible celebrates the line of Adam through Seth, 
Locke’s theory provides a new foundation myth that celebrates Cain 
as the founder of civilization and his line as mankind’s benefactors.
341
 
 
 334 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 38 (emphasis added). 
 335 Genesis 4:17 (King James) (“And Cain knew his wife; and she conceived, and 
bare Enoch: and he builded a city, and called the name of the city, after the name of 
his son, Enoch.”). 
 336 Id. 4:20. 
 337 Id. 4:21. 
 338 Id. 4:22. 
 339 See Leo Strauss, Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization, 
1 MOD. JUDAISM 17, 38 (1981). 
 340 Locke even recasts the biblical injunction to “[b]e fruitful, and multiply, and 
replenish the earth, and subdue it,” Genesis 1:28 (King James), as a mandate for 
scientific improvement.  LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 33 
(identifying “this great and primary blessing of God Almighty, Be fruitful, and multiply, 
and replenish the earth, which contains in it the improvement too of arts and sciences, 
and the conveniences of life”); see THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN 
REPUBLICANISM 142 (1988). 
 341 Locke writes that Cain had a right of property in his land “which another had 
no title to, nor could without injury take from him,” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra 
note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 32, while Abel had no rights of property, but was at risk of vi-
olating “the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished.”  LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37.  One might suspect that the killing, when 
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The actual theory of property Locke provides has few direct im-
plications for anyone now alive—that is, those who live in civil society 
under a government.  “[I]n governments, the laws regulate the right 
of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive con-
stitutions,” according to Locke.
342
  One cannot, therefore, appropriate 
from nature in civil society.
343
  Even outside of governments, if anyone 
were to find themselves in the state of nature today, the “rule of pro-
priety” does not act as much of a constraint after land has been ap-
propriated and money implemented.  The rule cannot be enforced 
absent natural spoilage, and money does not spoil. 
It is unclear whether anyone besides Adam, Eve, Cain, and Abel 
ever lived under the “rule of propriety,” as they were the only ones to 
live before the appropriation of land.  Not only the enclosure of land 
but also the introduction of money appears to have occurred early in 
human history.  The invention of money was a natural step following 
the first appropriation: 
He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had the-
reby a property in them, they were his goods as soon as gathered.  
He was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else 
he took more than his share . . . .  And if he also bartered away 
plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last 
good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not 
the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that 
belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his 
hands.  Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, 
pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool 
for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all 
his life, he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as 
much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the 
 
the brothers “were in the field,” Genesis 4:8 (King James)—that is, Cain’s field—was 
an act of natural justice.  Abel was a shepherd who offered of his flock in sacrifice to 
God.  Since this was before mankind was allowed to eat meat, see supra notes 249–53 
and accompanying text, the meat surely spoiled without being consumed, which was 
a violation of “the common law of nature” for which Abel “was liable to be pu-
nished.”  In fact, the whole of Abel’s flock was liable to spoil before being consumed 
because the consumption of meat was not permitted until after the Flood.  Abel 
made no “use” of any of his flock.  Abel’s raising of sheep was an act of pure piety—
the sheep were sacrificed to God but not consumed by man—whereas Cain’s efforts 
supported human life.  See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 112. 
 342 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 50. 
 343 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 35 (“[I]n land that is common in England or any other coun-
try, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and com-
merce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his fel-
low-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law of the land, 
which is not to be violated.”). 
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bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his pos-
session, but the perishing of anything uselesly in it.
344
 
It makes sense that people would seek to exchange their produce for 
more durable goods, but Locke cannot be serious that people would 
collect gold (“a little piece of yellow metal”
345
) only because of its 
pleasing color—or diamonds because they sparkle—and not soon 
realize that it could be used as a medium of exchange.
346
 
In addition to Cain and Abel, Locke cites other biblical figures 
who lived “in that part of the world which was first inhabited.”
347
  Fol-
lowing Locke’s citations to Genesis, a reader learns that Abraham was 
“rich” in cattle, gold, and silver.
348
  His nephew Lot “had flocks, and 
herds, and tents”
349
 and lived “in the cities of the plain.”
350
  Esau “took 
his wives, and his sons, and his daughters, and all the persons of his 
house, and his cattle, and all his beasts, and all his substance, which 
he had got in the land of Canaan; and went into the country.”
351
  
There he founded a nation, Edom, and “kings . . . reigned in the land 
of Edom, before there reigned any king over the children of Israel.”
352
  
In other words, from the beginning of human habitation, people 
hoarded large stocks of durable goods.  The early chapters of Genesis 
also recount the use of money, trade between communities, and the 
purchase of land.
353
  It would seem that money and “the desire of hav-
ing more than man needed” are more permanent fixtures of human 
life than Locke’s narrative initially suggests. 
Yet Locke’s naturalistic account of the evolution of money pro-
vides a story whereby rights of ownership grow out of a natural law of 
equality and an equitable distribution of property.  This allows Locke 
to ground his case for private property in Christian moral commit-
ments to egalitarianism and charity, despite the inequality that re-
 
 344 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 46. 
 345 Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 37. 
 346 Compare id. bk. II, ch. V, § 46 (“[G]old, silver and diamonds, are things that 
fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use, and the necessary 
support of life.”), with HOBBES, supra note 116, at 189 (“[S]ilver and gold have their 
value from the matter itself.”). 
 347 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 38. 
 348 Genesis 13:2 (King James). 
 349 Id. 13:5. 
 350 Id. 13:12. 
 351 Id. 36:6. 
 352 Id. 36:31. 
 353 E.g., id. 23:15–16 (“[T]he land is worth four hundred shekels of silver . . . . 
[A]nd Abraham weighed to Ephron the silver, which he had named in the audience 
of the sons of Heth, four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the mer-
chant.”). 
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sults.  “[I]t is plain that men have agreed to a disproportionate and 
unequal possession of the earth,” Locke concludes.
354
  In this way, un-
equal material accumulation becomes a matter not simply of efficien-
cy or necessity but of morals and justice.
355
  A natural individual right 
to property thereby displaces the traditional Christian natural-law 
view that property was held in stewardship for the common good.
356
 
In the Lockean story, few if any people lived under the original 
natural law of distribution, which in any event was less an ethical 
mandate to be followed than a harsh condition to be overcome.
357
  
Locke writes straightforwardly that his theory is about the origin of 
property, how “labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property” ra-
ther than anything relevant to property today.
358
  This is on the order 
of a creation myth.  Locke’s theory establishes that 
man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own per-
son, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great 
 
 354 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 50 (“[They have] by a tacit 
and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may fairly possess more land than 
he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold 
and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one.”). 
 355 WARD, supra note 86, at 11 (“Locke transforms the idea of property, traditional-
ly one of the key grounds for natural and civil inequality, into a basis for an under-
standing of moral relations rooted in equality.”); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James 
Madison) (arguing that “the first object of government” is “[t]he diversity in the fa-
culties of men, from which the rights of property originate” and recognizing that 
“[f]rom the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the 
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results”). 
 356 According to Aquinas, “whatever certain people have in superabundance is 
due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor . . . .  [E]ach one is en-
trusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to 
the aid of those who are in need.”  AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 7; see 
also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 34 (1991) (“The ideas of stewardship, of prop-
erty as inherently entailing obligations, and of subsistence needs as taking prece-
dence over property rights, became major themes of Christian ethics.”). 
 357 In the state of nature, a full share of property was available to all only because 
man was too primitive to develop property in large amounts.  See LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 36 (“[N]o man’s labour could subdue, or 
appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it 
was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or ac-
quire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbor.”).  While Locke writes 
that “the desire of having more than man needed . . . altered the intrinsic value of 
things,” that value always “depend[ed] only on their usefulness to the life of man.”  
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 37.  The introduction of money did not affect men’s natural desires 
but simply made the accumulation of more things useful, and hence “desired.” 
 358 Id., bk. II, ch. V, § 45.  This intention may help explain why “the moves by 
which Locke extends his justification of property past its supposed beginnings are, as 
many commentators have pointed out, less convincing than those beginnings them-
selves.”  Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and Its Significance, in NOMOS 
XXII: PROPERTY 3, 10 (J. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
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foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of 
what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when in-
vention and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was per-
fectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.
359
 
Locke’s theory of property, which is ostensibly grounded upon the 
Christian doctrine that God gave the earth to man in common, re-
quires one to accept that man owns himself and the product of his 
labor, that everything of value we enjoy comes from human inven-
tion, and that human ingenuity established the right to property in 
the first place.  Accepting Locke’s theory helps a Christian explain 
private property without abandoning the belief that God gave the 
world to man in common.  But it also leads him to abandon a posture 
of selfless devotion and to assert his individual self-interest in worldly 
pursuits.  Instead of pious reverence for divine creation, the Lockean 
God commands industrious mastery over it.  Instead of godliness and 
glory, and their attendant quarrels and contentions, society’s mission 
becomes the progress of industry and the arts. 
C. Property and Autonomy 
As noted above, Locke uses the word “property” imprecisely,
360
 
often employing the term to refer generally to a person’s “life, liberty 
and estate.”
361
  He does so advisedly, however, because the right to 
property formalizes an individual’s sovereignty over his own person 
and mind.  By creating an inviolate sphere around each individual, 
the innate right to hold material goods creates a “fence” to freedom, 
just as freedom is a fence to life.
362
  One cannot be enslaved before 
 
 359 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 44. 
 360 See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 361 E.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VII, § 87 (“[Man] hath by 
nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, 
against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the 
breaches of that law in others.”); id. bk. II, ch. IX, § 123 (arguing that people form 
society “for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by 
the general name, property”); id. bk. II, ch. XV, §173 (“By property I must be unders-
tood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons 
as well as goods.”). 
 362 See id. bk. II, ch. III, § 17 (noting that freedom is “the only security of my pre-
servation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who 
would take away that freedom which is the fence to it”); id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 93 
(“[W]hat security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and op-
pression of this absolute ruler?”); cf. CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS 
OF GOVERNMENT 94 (2007) (“[O]nly in a regime of secure entitlements can there be 
liberty.”); Minogue, supra note 358, at 15–17 (arguing that the abolition of property 
“requires the abolition of the will”). 
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being dispossessed.
363
  Moreover, because property cannot be taken 
without consent, the right to property instantiates the requirement of 
popular consent.
364
  An inviolate right of property ensures that no au-
thority, religious or governmental, can have total sway over a person’s 
life or liberty. 
Moreover, the societal focus upon material gain will limit the in-
clination of governments to infringe those rights.  In discussing his 
labor theory of value, Locke digresses: 
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to 
largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the 
right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that 
prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of 
liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest in-
dustry of mankind, against the oppression of power and narrow-
ness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbors.
365
 
 
 363 See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XV, § 174 (noting the in-
consistency of slavery with property and distinguishing between political power, un-
der which “men have property in their own disposal” and “despotical, over such as 
have no property at all”); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 1 (2008) (“The right to exclude 
protects against both conscious aggression and accidental entry.”). 
 364 See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XI, § 138 (“The supreme 
power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent.”); 
id. bk. II, ch. XI, § 139 (“[T]he prince, or senate, however it may have power to make 
laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet 
can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects[’] 
property, without their own consent.”); id. bk. II, ch. XI, § 140 (“[G]overnments 
cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share 
of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of 
it.  But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it 
either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them.”); Harvey C. Mans-
field, The Forms of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM? 1, 19 (Fred E. Baumann ed., 
1986) (“[T]he right to property becomes the visible, formal protection of the right to 
consent.”). 
 365 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 42; see also HOBBES, supra 
note 116, at 185 (“[T]here have been commonwealths that having no more territory, 
than hath served them for habitation, have nevertheless . . . increased their power, 
partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the 
manufactures whereof the materials were brought in from other places.”).  The ad-
vice to a prince echoes Machiavelli.  According to Carnes Lord: 
Machiavelli’s argument—the message that is intended to improve on 
and eventually supplant the Christian message—may be summarized as 
follows.  Men’s natural desire to acquire must be respected as the pre-
mise of all political action.  This desire cannot and should not be re-
pressed.  But it must be regulated so as to promote the common 
good. . . .  For Machiavelli, men freed from religious passions are 
bound to love a prince who respects the necessities their own nature 
imposes on them; yet they require an authority that is more immediate-
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A society oriented toward producing wealth through industry will not 
be interested in warring against other peoples, nor will its govern-
ment seek to oppress its people in the service of a religious doctrine 
or factional interest.  Property, like Locke’s theory of nature, limits 
passions rooted in pride, honor, or glory and replaces the passionate 
devotion to abstract ideals with the rational pursuit of material self-
interest.
366
 
Constraining political authority is also necessary because remov-
ing religious authority carries the risk of augmenting earthly power.  
A prepolitical, natural right to property serves a key political purpose: 
an “appeal to heaven” when neither earthly nor heavenly authority 
can be trusted.  Moreover, a public ideology of respect for rights of 
private property orients political life to the interests of the citizenry 
and the facilitation of commerce.  If the purpose of government is 
the protection of property, the state has no business risking blood 
and treasure for the glory of the nation or of the church.  Just as the 
pursuit of material wealth channels public passions in a more benign 
(but assertive) direction, so too does the state focus upon the more 
mundane (but profitable) task of facilitating the industry of its citi-
zens. 
As Paul recognized, the desire for material gain undermines re-
ligious piety and loyalty to the higher powers.  The pursuit of proper-
ty promotes self-interest at the expense of passionate, selfless partici-
pation in public life.  Locke makes it the central organizing principle 
of society.  Paul instructs Timothy to counsel the wealthy not to “trust 
in uncertain riches, but in the living God,”
367
 while Locke reverses this 
advice. 
V. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME 
To appreciate the change that Locke’s theory effected, one 
might consider the understanding of ownership and the model of so-
cial life it displaced.  Locke treats as self-evident the principle that the 
individual and his capacity for ownership precedes civil society, but 
such an idea could not have been obvious to someone familiar with 
 
ly and visibly fearful than the Christian God to check their unruly natu-
ral passions. 
Carnes Lord, Machiavelli’s Realism, in NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 114, 120 
(Angelo M. Codevilla ed., 1997).  Locke seems to advance that argument in Two Trea-
tises. 
 366 See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text. 
 367 1 Timothy 6:17 (King James). 
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the views of classical philosophy and the religious tradition that built 
upon it. 
A. Locke’s Departure from the Traditional View 
The Lockean state of nature resembles the Hobbesian one in 
that man, exposed to continual dangers, cannot enjoy property.
368
  Yet 
from this premise Hobbes concludes, in contrast to the Lockean idea 
of natural rights, that property is a product of social convention; it 
does not exist without a government that creates property interests 
and protects those interests.
369
  Aquinas similarly insists upon the con-
ventional character of private property, holding that “the ownership 
of possessions is . . . an addition [to the natural law] devised by hu-
man reason.”
370
  That is, man does not own possessions by nature; 
there is only a conventional rather than a natural right to property.  
Hobbes, moreover, invokes the authority of Greek antiquity for the 
idea that justice concerns the proper distribution of property by the 
sovereign authority.
371
  Classical debates about justice addressed the 
arrangement of property interests.
372
  In order to promote public 
peace, many ancient laws enforced a particular distribution of prop-
erty and constrained the transfer of possessions.
373
 
 
 368 See supra Part III.A. 
 369 HOBBES, supra note 116, at 186 (“[W]here there is no commonwealth, there is 
. . . a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour; and therefore every thing is 
his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety, nor community; 
but uncertainty.”). 
 370 AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 2.  Accordingly, “the division and 
appropriation of things which are based on human law” does not withstand the fact 
that “whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the 
purpose of succoring the poor.”  Id. pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 7. 
 371 HOBBES, supra note 116, at 186 (“[E]ven Cicero, a passionate defender of liber-
ty, in a public pleading, attribueth all propriety to the law civil. . . . Seeing therefore 
the introduction of propriety is an effect of commonwealth, which can do nothing but 
by the person that represents it, it is the act only of the sovereign; and consisteth in 
the laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power.  And this they well 
knew of old, who called that [Nomos], that is to say, distribution, which we call law; and 
defined justice, by distributing to every man his own.”). 
 372 “Some,” Aristotle observes, “hold that a fine arrangement concerning property 
is the greatest thing: it is about this, they assert, that all factional conflicts arise.”  
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1266a36–38, at 67 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 
1984) (350 B.C.E.). 
 373 See id. 1266b14–21, at 67–68 (“[T]he leveling of property does indeed have a 
certain power to affect the political partnership.  This was plainly recognized by some 
of former times, as in the legislation of Solon, and others have a law which forbids 
the acquisition of land in whatever amount one wishes.  Similarly, some laws forbid 
the sale of property, for example among the Locrians, where there is a law against 
sale unless he has suffered manifest misfortune; and some attempt to preserve origi-
nal allotments [of land in colonies].”). 
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In the classical view, property is conventional and the city con-
trols its accumulation and distribution in order to promote social 
good or justice.  Plato, for example, suggests that the ideal republic 
would have no private property.
374
  In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian 
Stranger says that to avoid civil war a city must place an upper and a 
lower bound on each citizen’s property holdings.
375
  For citizens to 
live happily, self-interest must be tempered by community ties.  Ac-
cordingly, no private citizen should be allowed to hold gold or silver, 
but only the coin which depends for its value upon the society in 
which it is traded.
376
  The city ought to discourage “big profits made 
through vulgar occupations, or usury, or other sorts of shameful 
breeding” and instead rely upon “just the things that farming gives 
and yields, and only as much of that as will not compel one because 
of money-making to neglect those things which money is by nature 
intended to serve—namely, the soul and the body.”
377
  Plato argues 
that property should be understood as held in common so that citi-
zens will make use of it for the common good.
378
  Aristotle suggests 
that property should be held privately but used in common in order 
to avoid resentment and to build community ties.
379
 
 
 374 In The Laws, the Athenian Stranger advocates common ownership as part of 
the view that the best city would approach unity.  See PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 739c, 
at 126 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1988) (360 B.C.E.).  But see ARISTOTLE, supra note 
372, 1261a16–18, at 56 (“[Y]et it is evident that that as it becomes increasingly one it 
will no longer be a city.  For the city is in its nature a sort of multitude.”). 
 375 See PLATO, supra note 374, 744d–e, at 132 (“We assert that if (as we presume) 
the city must avoid the greatest illness, which has been more correctly termed ‘civil 
war’ than ‘faction,’ then neither harsh poverty nor wealth should exist among any of 
the citizens.  For both these conditions breed both civil war and faction.  It follows, 
therefore, that the lawgiver must announce a limit for both conditions.”). 
 376 Id. 741e–742a, at 129. 
 377 Id. 743d, at 131. 
 378 Id. 740a, at 127 (“[T]he division of lands is to be understood in something like 
the following way: each shareholder must consider his share to be at the same time 
the common property of the whole city, and must cherish his land, as a part of the 
fatherland, more than children cherish their mother.”). 
 379 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1263a32–39, at 61 (“[I]n finely administered ci-
ties . . . . everyone has his own possessions, but he makes some of them useful to his 
friends, and some he uses as common things. . . .  It is evident, then, that it is better 
for possessions to be private, but to make them common in use.”).  Aquinas concurs 
in this view: 
Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things.  One is 
the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful 
for man to possess property. . . .  The second thing that is competent to 
man with regard to external things is their use.  On this respect man 
ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so 
that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. 
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 2. 
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Like the Athenian Stranger, Aristotle counsels that wealth 
should be based on agriculture rather than commercial exchange, so 
as to achieve sustenance but not luxury.
380
  “[A]ll who engage in busi-
ness increase their money without limit,” Aristotle warns, “and since 
that desire of theirs is without limit, they also desire what is produc-
tive of unlimited things.”
381
  Such unchecked desire threatens political 
life because the other virtues—Aristotle mentions courage and mili-
tary valor—are made “forms of expertise in business, as if this were 
the end and everything else had to march toward it.”
382
  In this way, 
commerce may supplant the civic virtues and the life of the city. 
Desires must be limited for the city to be stable and happy.  
“[O]ne ought to level desires sooner than property,” writes Aristotle, 
“but this is impossible for those not adequately educated by the 
laws.”
383
  Accordingly, Aristotle’s system of property requires “the 
adornment of character and an arrangement of correct laws.”
384
  Simi-
larly, Plato’s Athenian Stranger argues that a healthy society would 
discourage the accumulation and exchange of property through a re-
ligious teaching that it is impious to “dishonor the well-measured 
height and magnitude of property that you were allotted at the be-
ginning, by buying and selling it among yourselves.”
385
  The teaching 
would be enforced through the prayers of priests and the penalties of 
law.
386
 
Controlling material desire is necessary also to maintain the 
proper attitude toward nature, Aristotle suggests.
387
  Excessive eco-
nomic activity promotes the idea that men cannot rely upon nature 
for sustenance but must transform nature in order to produce wealth.  
Aristotle analogizes economic activity to political rule: “just as politi-
 
 380 Waller R. Newell, Oligarchy and Oikonomia: Aristotle’s Ambivalent Assessment 
of Private Property 9 (paper delivered at the Western Political Science Association 
annual meeting, April 1–3, 2010) (on file with author).  
 381 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1257b34–1258a2, at 48. 
 382 Id. 1258a13–14, at 49.  If “expertise in business” does not supply the desired 
excess, Aristotle explains, men “attempt this in some other fashion, using each sort of 
capacity in a way not according to nature.  For it belongs to courage to produce not 
goods but confidence; nor does this belong to military or medical expertise.”  Id. 
1258a9–12, at 48; see Newell, supra note 380, at 9 (describing Aristotle’s view that if 
“household management were synonymous with open-ended acquisition, then all the 
virtues . . . would have to be viewed as means to money-making and material pleas-
ures”). 
 383 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1266b30–31, at 68. 
 384 Id. 1263a22–23, at 60. 
 385 PLATO, supra note 374, 741b, at 128. 
 386 Id. 741c, at 128. 
 387 See Newell, supra note 380, at 10–12. 
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cal expertise does not create human beings but makes use of them 
after receiving them from nature,” so too does proper economic ac-
tivity make use of what nature provides without attempting to alter 
nature through human industry.
388
  “[A]ccording to Aristotle,” ex-
plains Waller Newell, “we need to envision nature as providing for 
our basic needs without an excessive emphasis on transforming na-
ture through human productive techniques.”
389
 
If nature were seen as lacking sufficient wealth to maintain hu-
man life, then human industry would need to intervene in nature to 
bring it forth.  This attitude, Aristotle suggests, has implications for 
the political regime.  If nature is deficient with respect to our materi-
al needs, human nature may be deficient with respect to our capacity 
for political order.  If men by nature lack sufficient virtue to achieve 
self-government, then perhaps political leaders need to apply coer-
cive force to suppress human nature and achieve social peace.
390
 
It is better, argues Aristotle, to respect nature as the standard for 
economic as well as political life.  When nature provides sustenance, 
the city can stress “the good life over mere life and need not be 
preoccupied with scarcity and survival.”
391
  When nature endows hu-
man beings with the capacity for virtue, the city can rely on institu-
tions that foster citizenship instead of a sovereign power that employs 
political terror to impose order.
392
 
In the Aristotlean view, excessive emphasis upon economic pro-
duction promotes unchecked desire, crowding out civic life, and in-
vites tyrannical government.  Accordingly, the laws must set limits 
upon the acquisition of property and foster such virtues as temper-
ance and liberality.
393
  Property arrangements were part of a system of 
social conventions that aimed to harmonize the character of citizens 
 
 388 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1258b22–25, at 49.  “Expertise in business relative 
to crops and animals is thus natural for all” while “expertise in exchange is justly 
blamed since it is not according to nature but involves taking from others.”  Id. 
1258a37–1258b2, at 49.  Moneylending is objectionable because “one’s possessions 
derive from money itself and not from that for which it was supplied.”  Id. 1258b3–4, 
at 49. 
 389 Newell, supra note 380, at 10. 
 390 Id. at 11 (“If nature at large is too poor, we will have to stress economic pro-
ductivity over purposeful use.  If human nature is too vicious from the outset, if its 
material is too poor or intractable, statecraft will have to stress compulsion based on 
fear over relying on people to be capable of virtue if properly educated in an envi-
ronment where the laws support virtue.”). 
 391 Id. 
 392 Id. at 11–12. 
 393 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1263a39–40, at 61 (“That [the citizens] become 
such [as to use possessions in common]—this is a task peculiar to the legislator.”). 
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with the good of the community.
394
  In this way, the classical city 
would exhibit a holistic way of life, what the Greeks called the politeia, 
the particular regime of the society.
395
  “[L]aws should be enacted—
and all are in fact enacted—with a view to the regimes” of each politi-
cal community, according to Aristotle.
396
  A democratic society, for 
example, will arrange its laws differently than an aristocratic or oli-
garchic society.  The regime finds expression in formal institutions 
and procedures of government, which direct social activity toward its 
distinctive way of life.
397
  The laws governing property are part of this 
system and therefore aim to maintain a community and to shape the 
character of the citizens who live according to that way of life.
398
  
 
 394 See Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 421, 431–32 (1995). 
[The ancient Greeks] perceived people as gaining an understanding of 
their lives from participation and interaction with others in a social 
world that they jointly created.  Consequently, the assumption was that 
people were shaped by the institutions in which they functioned; the 
central theme was connection rather than autonomy.  Society preceded 
the individual, for self-knowledge was possible only with reference to 
the social matrix within which individuals found themselves.  Institu-
tions of social life, therefore, were important because they forged the 
character of citizens. . . .  A virtuous citizenry was one that had learned 
from its institutions that the public good differed from the aggregate of 
private preferences. 
Id. 
 395 “[T]he Greek politeia . . . .  is a term which comprises all the innumerable cha-
racteristics which determine [the] state’s peculiar nature, and these include its whole 
economic and social texture as well as matters governmental in our narrower mod-
ern sense.”  CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 
26 (rev. ed. 1947).  “Each constitution embodied a scheme of life, and tended, con-
sciously or not, to bring the lives of those living under it into harmony with its partic-
ular scheme.”  Id. at 27 (quoting 1 W.L. NEWMAN, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 210 
(1887)); cf. STRAUSS, supra note 92, at 193 (identifying “regimes” as politeiai). 
 396 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1289a14, at 119;  id. 1289a9–14, at 119 (“[T]he va-
rieties of the regimes—how many there are and in how many ways they are com-
bined—should not be overlooked.  And it is with this same prudence that one should 
try to see both what laws are best and what are fitting for each of the regimes.”); id. 
1282b8–11, at 103 (“Laws are necessarily poor or excellent and just or unjust in a 
manner similar to the regimes [to which they belong].”). 
 397 Id. 1289a14–19, at 119 (“For a regime is an arrangement in cities connected 
with the offices, [establishing] the manner in which they have been distributed, what 
the authoritative element of the regime is, and what the end of the partnership is in 
each case; and there are distinct laws among the things that are indicative of the re-
gime—those in accordance with which the rulers must rule and guard against those 
transgressing them.”). 
 398 Cf. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, 
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 645 (1993) 
(describing the classical view that “because the polity, to which all are subordinate, is 
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“[V]irtue must be a care for every city,” according to Aristotle,
399
 be-
cause the city exists “not only for the sake of living but rather primari-
ly for the sake of living well”
400
 and “for the sake of noble actions, not 
[only] for the sake of living together.”
401
 
Aristotle rejects the idea that the city exists merely in order to 
protect property and to prevent each person from suffering injustice.  
“[I]f it were for the sake of possessions that they participated and 
joined together, they would share in the city just to the extent that 
they shared in possessions.”
402
  If it were “for the sake of an alliance to 
prevent their suffering injustice from anyone” or “for purposes of ex-
change and of use of one another,” political life would be reduced to 
a defense pact and trade alliance.
403
  In such a polity, “law becomes a 
compact and . . . a guarantor among one another of the just things, 
but not the sort of thing to make the citizens good and just.”
404
  Each 
citizen would be indifferent to the character of his fellows, insisting 
only that fellow citizens “should not act unjustly toward one anoth-
er.”
405
  This may be a precondition for the city to flourish, but it is an 
impoverished view of political life.  “It is evident,” Aristotle concludes, 
“that the city is not a partnership . . . for the sake of not committing 
injustice against each other and of transacting business.”
406
  Yet this 
idea—that society is a compact for preventing harm and protecting 
property—closely resembles the social contractarian views of Hobbes 
and Locke.
407
  And Aristotle’s view that nature provides for human 
needs contradicts the Hobbesian and Lockean views of man’s natural 
state.
408
 
 
governed by its citizens, the polity has a strong interest in the character of its citizens, 
which can be maintained only through moral education”). 
 399 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b7, at 98. 
 400 Id. 1280a31–32, at 98. 
 401 Id. 1281a3–4, at 99. 
 402 Id. 1280a25–27, at 98. 
 403 Id. 1281a34–35, at 98; cf. Newell, supra note 380, at 23 (“To foment, as do 
Madison and the other founders, the limitless expansion of commerce over a limit-
less geographical extent would, for Aristotle, reduce politics to economics, with the 
common good diluted and distended into something akin to a trade alliance.”). 
 404 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b11–13, at 98. 
 405 Id. 1280b4, at 98. 
 406 Id. 1280b30–32, at 99. 
 407 See supra Part III. 
 408 See supra Part IV. 
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B. An Antecedent and Paramount Right 
What intervened between Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, 
and Hobbes and Locke, on the other, was the development of biblical 
religion, culminating the Christian claim to universal religious 
truth.
409
  A universal religion entailed the claim that there was “a right 
antecedent and paramount to all government.”
410
  The classical re-
gime, by contrast, defined justice by reference to its own needs and 
way of life without an antecedent standard of abstract right.  Instead, 
the classics recognized “a kind of natural right in the noble, wise, and 
virtuous, to govern” in the interest of the polity.
411
 
As Locke puts it, “[T]he first beginners of commonwealths gen-
erally put the rule into one man’s hand, without any other express 
limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end 
of government required.”
412
  Locke describes a “golden age” that “had 
more virtue, and consequently better governors” before “vain ambi-
tion, and amor sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted 
men’s minds into a mistake of true power and honour” and then 
“ambition and luxury in future ages . . . taught princes to have dis-
tinct and separate interests from their people.”
413
  At that point, “men 
 
 409 Cf. Lord, supra note 365, at 119 (noting Machiavelli’s understanding that “the 
political and military realities of the world had been decisively affected by the victory 
of Christianity over paganism”). 
 410 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 126. 
 411 1 HOOKER, supra note 135, at 51 (citing ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, bks. III–IV). 
 412 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 110. 
 413 Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111.  The Latin phrase amor sceleratus habendi is from Ov-
id’s Metamorphoses.  See OVID, METAMORPHOSES 20 (Charles Martin trans., W.W. Nor-
ton & Co. 2005) (8 C.E.) (“shameful lusting after acquisitions”).  Paul condemns 
“evil concupiscence” in the Epistle to the Colossians.  Colossians 3:5 (King James) 
(“Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, unclean-
ness, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is idolatry.”).  
In Ovid’s account, amor sceleratus habendi is a corruption that emerges in the iron age, 
late in mankind’s development, when “modesty, fidelity, and truth departed.”  OVID, 
supra, at 20.  For Paul, evil concupiscence is a worldly trait that the faithful must dis-
card in favor of “mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, longsuffering.”  
Colossians 3:12 (King James); see also id. 3:2 (“Set your affection on things above, not 
on things on the earth.”).  Locke’s “golden age” corresponds neither to that of Ovid 
nor to the biblical time before the Fall because Locke indicates that there was gov-
ernment.  LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111 (noting “better 
governors”).  Indeed, Locke’s golden age contrasts sharply with that described by Ov-
id.  Compare, e.g., OVID, supra, at 18–19 (noting that in the golden age men were 
“[c]ontent with food acquired without effort”), with LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra 
note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 32 (arguing that God commanded mankind to labor).  Locke 
does not condemn worldly cravings as such but argues that the “desire of having 
more than man needed,” when governed by reason and channeled toward industry, 
promotes peace and comfort.  See supra Part IV.B. 
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found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights 
of government” in order to “prevent the abuses of that power.”
414
 
In support of this chronology, Locke quotes a passage from Ri-
chard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity in which Hooker in-
vokes Cicero to describe the older regime under which rulers were 
“permitted unto their wisdom and discretion.”
415
  Classical polities, 
according to Cicero, selected as their rulers those men who were 
“conspicuous for [their] virtue” and “whose reputation for justice was 
high in the eyes of the people.”
416
  By Locke’s time, such natural lead-
ers had been taught “to have distinct and separate interests from 
their people” because they identified justice not with the needs of 
their particular polity but with a universal religious teaching.
417
  From 
the Christian perspective, justice cannot vary with the needs of the 
regime but takes on the character of a fixed, eternal law.
418
 
Outside of public view, Locke was candid about his disapproval 
of prevailing Christian beliefs and his distrust of religious authority.  
He thought universal religion distorted and disrupted political life.  
“[H]ad man kinde noe concernments but in this world [and] noe 
apprehension of any being after this life,” Locke wrote in his journal, 
people would “trouble their heads” with only “an enquiry into the 
qualitys of the things in this mansion of the universe which hath fal-
len to their lott” and “direct[] their thoughts to the improvement of 
such arts and inventions . . . as might best contribute to their contin-
uation in it with conveniency and delight.”
419
  In an early, unpub-
lished work, Locke observed that “those flames that have made such 
havoc and desolation in Europe, and have not been quenched but 
with the blood of so many millions, have been at first kindled with 
 
 414 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111. 
 415 1 HOOKER, supra note 135, at 52 n.3. 
 416 CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 211 (Walter Miller trans., McMillan Co. 1913) (44 B.C.E.), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=H4u1pu9GpUUC (“If the people se-
cured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; 
but when such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at 
all times in one and the same voice.”). 
 417 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111. 
 418 “[O]n account of the uncertainty of human judgment . . . different people 
form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws 
result,” writes Aquinas.  AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II-I, q. 91, art. 4.  “In order, 
therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he 
ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law giv-
en by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.”  Id. 
 419 JOHN LOCKE, Understanding, in AN EARLY DRAFT OF LOCKE’S ESSAY TOGETHER 
WITH EXCERPTS FROM HIS JOURNALS 84, 85–86 (R.I. Aaron & Jocelyn Gibb eds., Cla-
rendon Press 1936) (1677). 
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coals from the altar”; he speculated “how much it might conduce to 
the peace and security of mankind if religion were banished the 
camp and forbid to take arms . . . [and] if men would suffer one 
another to go to heaven every one his own way.”
420
  He left the reader 
to judge “how much I say if such a temper and tenderness were 
wrought in the hearts of men our author’s doctrine of toleration 
might promote a quiet in the world.”
421
 
When claims to moral truth transcend the needs of the polity, 
religious loyalties may undermine the social order.  Against Aristotle’s 
advice, justice will be measured according to supernatural standards 
rather than according to nature.
422
  Citizens will follow and become 
dependent upon those authorities with privileged access to religious 
teaching.
423
  Before universal religion, writes Hobbes: 
 
 420 JOHN LOCKE, From: ‘Question: Whether the Civil Magistrate May Lawfully Impose and 
Determine the Use of Indifferent Things in Reference to Religious Worship. Answer: Yes’ (First 
Tract on Government, 1660), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 141, 144–45 (David Wootton ed., 
2003). 
 421 Id. at 145.  The full passage reads:  
All those flames that have made such havoc and desolation in Europe, 
and have not been quenched but with the blood of so many millions, 
have been at first kindled with coals from the altar, and too much 
blown with the breath of those that attend the altar, who, forgetting 
their calling, which is to promote peace and meekness, have proved the 
trumpeters of strife and sounded a charge with a ‘curse ye Meros’.  I 
know not therefore how much it might conduce to the peace and secu-
rity of mankind if religion were banished the camp and forbid to take 
arms, at least to use no other sword but that of the word and spirit, if 
ambition and revenge were disrobed of that so specious outside of re-
formation and the cause of God, were forced to appear in their own 
native ugliness and lie open to the eyes and contempt of all the world, 
if the believer and unbeliever could be content as Paul advises to live 
together, and use no other weapons to conquer each other’s opinions 
but pity and persuasion (i Cor. 7), if men would suffer one another to 
go to heaven every one his own way, and not out of a fond conceit of 
themselves pretend to a greater knowledge and care of another’s soul 
and eternal concernments than he himself, how much I say if such a 
temper and tenderness were wrought in the hearts of men our author’s 
doctrine of toleration might promote a quiet in the world, and at last 
bring those glorious days that men have a great while sought after the 
wrong way, I shall leave everyone to judge. 
Id. at 144–45. 
 422 See supra notes 389–92 and accompanying text. 
 423 Carnes Lord describes the Machiavellian critique of Christianity: 
For Machiavelli, Christianity is the extreme and therefore paradigmatic 
case of successful fraud in politics.  The Christian religion attempts to 
hold men to impossible standards of behavior through the promise of 
rewards and punishments that are (he assumes) impossible of delivery.  
Yet the promise is highly effective—up to a point—in attaching men’s 
loyalties to the princes of the Church and the secular rulers who de-
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[S]ubjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and 
judgments of private men, but by the laws of the realm; nor were 
they kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority.  
Yea, they reverenced the supreme power . . . .  Therefore they lit-
tle used, as in our days, to join themselves with ambitious and hel-
lish spirits, to the utter ruin of their state.  For they could not en-
tertain so strange a fancy, as not to desire the preservation of that 
by which they were preserved.
424
 
According to Hobbes, the classical regime is no longer possible.
425
  In-
stead, Hobbes advocates the sort of government from which Aristotle 
recoils.  He installs an absolute sovereign to coerce citizens and sup-
press human nature.  He conceives of society as a compact, the sort of 
polity that Aristotle describes as an alliance rather than a city: where 
people do not “take thought that the others should be of a certain 
quality, or that none of those coming under the compacts should be 
unjust or depraved in any way, but only that they should not act un-
justly toward one another.”
426
  Hobbes does not want to encourage 
laws that “make the citizens good and just”
427
 because he wants to li-
berate both the government and its citizens from the prevailing reli-
gious standards of goodness and of justice.  Accordingly, the Hobbe-
sian sovereign enjoys absolute power unconstrained by Christian 
ethics; the citizen pursues his individual self-interest freed from the 
“dejection of mind” that Hobbes believes Christian teaching fosters.
428
  
What results are more assertive citizens and a more commanding 
government, with correspondingly less influence for religious author-
 
pend on them.  But the inevitable failure—or, better, the lack of evi-
dent success—in delivering heavenly goods and sanctions is in the end 
doubly corrupting, and hence destructive, of sensible politics. 
Lord, supra note 365, at 119. 
 424 THOMAS HOBBES, The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and 
Society, in MAN AND CITIZEN (DE HOMINE AND DE CIVE) 87, 97 (Bernard Gert ed., Hackett 
1991) (1651). 
 425 Indeed, Hobbes almost ridicules it.  He writes of Cato, for example, that “ani-
mosity should so prevail instead of judgement, and partiality instead of reason, that 
the very same thing which he thought equal in his popular state, he should censure 
as unjust in a monarchical; other men perhaps may have leisure to admire.”  Id. at 
90. 
 426 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b1–4, at 98; see supra notes 402–06 and accom-
panying text.  According to Hobbes, men join society for the purpose of “getting 
themselves out from [the] miserable condition of war.”  HOBBES, supra note 116, at 
129. 
 427 ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b11–13, at 98; see supra note 404 and accompa-
nying text. 
 428 HOBBES, supra note 116, at 63; see supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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ity.
429
  Hobbes approximates the particularity of the classical polity, in 
a way, because the sovereign enjoys supreme authority over his own 
particular society and does not serve a larger religious mission.  As “a 
right antecedent and paramount to all government,”
430
 Hobbes rep-
laces religious truth with a social contract that constitutes society and 
the enforcement of which is the government’s paramount aim.  Yet to 
those who believe in universal moral truth, the Hobbesian system ap-
pears unacceptably relativistic. 
Locke retains the eternal law as “a right antecedent and para-
mount to all government,” though he conflates the law of God with 
the law of nature, the law of reason, and ultimately a scheme of natu-
ral rights to property.
431
  Antecedent to government is a contract that 
aims not simply at self-preservation but at the vindication of property 
rights that are given to man by nature and that all men are bound by 
natural law to respect.  Those rights remain paramount to all gov-
ernment: “[T]he law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, 
legislators as well as others.  The rules that they make for other men’s 
actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be con-
formable to the law of nature . . . .”
432
  The sovereign, therefore, still 
defines justice by reference to an eternal law beyond his particular 
society, but that law now commands attention to the well-being of his 
people and prohibits their expropriation or abuse. 
Locke provides some discretion to the legislator,
433
 but because 
his system responds to the Christian demand for an antecedent and 
paramount right, the laws correspond to a prepolitical moral code ra-
ther than the particular, present needs of the polity.  Locke indicates 
this shift when he distinguishes the “form of government” from the 
 
 429 Hobbes explains the derivation of his system from the connection between jus-
tice and ownership: 
[W]hen I applied my thoughts to the investigation of natural justice, I 
was presently advertised from the very word justice (which signifies a 
steady will of giving every one his own), that my first enquiry was to be, 
from whence it proceeded that any man should call anything rather his 
own, than another man’s. . . .  I found that this proceeded not from na-
ture, but consent (for what nature at first laid forth in common, men 
did afterwards distribute into several impropriations). 
HOBBES, supra note 424, at 92–93. 
 430 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 126. 
 431 See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. 
 432 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XI, § 135. 
 433 See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. V, § 50 (noting that “in governments, the laws regulate 
the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitu-
tions”). 
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larger “commonwealth”—a distinction alien to the classical city.
434
  
For Locke, the term “commonwealth” signifies “not a democracy, or 
any form of government; but any independent community, which the 
Latines signified by the word civitas.”
435
  To “avoid ambiguity,” Locke 
writes, “I crave leave to use the word common-wealth in that sense, in 
which I find it used by king James the first; and I take it to be its ge-
nuine signification.”
436
  Locke’s reference to the usage of King James I 
points toward the King James Bible, in which the word “common-
wealth” is a translation from the original Greek politeia.
437
  Moreover, 
the Latin civitas, to which Locke also refers, expresses the meaning of 
politeia.
438
 
When Locke uses “commonwealth,” therefore, he means to indi-
cate the regime and to distinguish it from the government.  The 
commonwealth is the political community that is prior to and above 
any established government.
439
  The commonwealth, by the decision 
of a majority of its members, may proceed to establish whatever “form 
of government” it prefers.  As examples of possible forms, Locke 
mentions democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy.
440
  According to 
 
 434 See supra notes 394–401 and accompanying text. 
 435 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. X, § 133. 
 436 Id. 
 437 The word appears twice: in the Epistle to the Ephesians and in the apocryphal 
Second Book of Maccabees.  See Ephesians 2:12 (King James), available at 
http://bit.ly/scq7cS (“That at that time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the 
commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no 
hope, and without God in the world.”); 2 Maccabees 13:14 (King James), available at 
http://bit.ly/ucsWpB (“So when he had committed all to the Creator of the world, 
and exhorted his soldiers to fight manfully, even unto death, for the laws, the temple, 
the city, the country, and the commonwealth, he camped by Modin.”). 
 438 H.G. LIDDELL & R. SCOTT, GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1240 (9th ed. 1996). 
 439 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 211 (“That which 
makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one po-
litic society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and 
act as one body, and so be one distinct common-wealth.”).  Locke distinguishes be-
tween “the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government” in a re-
cognizably modern way.  Id.  But that distinction is an innovation on the ancient re-
gime in which  
there is no remedy for an unconstitutional act short of actual revolu-
tion. . . .  [S]uch revolution, when it occurs, is . . . a complete overturn 
of the state’s institutions, a change in its whole way of life. . . .  Aristotle 
refers to such revolutions as a dissolution of the polities in which they 
occur.   
MCILWAIN, supra note 395, at 38. 
 440 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. X, § 132.  Locke identifies the 
three basic regime types described by Aristotle—democracy, oligarchy, and mo-
narchy—as “form[s] of government.”  Id.  In contrast to the Aristotlean view, Locke 
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Locke, a society precedes the formation of a government and wields 
political authority over whatever form of government it chooses to es-
tablish.
441
  This society delegates its legislative power to a government, 
but if that power is ever forfeited “by the miscarriages of those in au-
thority . . . it reverts to the society, and the people have a right to act 
as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or erect a new 
form, or under the old form place it in new hands.”
442
  The common-
wealth does not forfeit its authority; its purpose is to provide a com-
mon life for persons united by agreement and affection.
443
  It is sepa-
rate from the particular forms of rule. 
The distinction between “form of government” and “common-
wealth” is recognizable as the modern liberal division between state 
and society, and it is characteristic of liberal constitutionalism in 
which the fundamental constitution of society constrains the authori-
ty of the government.  This feature distinguishes the Lockean com-
monwealth from the classical regime, which viewed the city as a 
whole.
444
 
But the commonwealth is not indifferent to the character of the 
citizen.  That character is shaped not by positive laws but by the natu-
ral law, the prepolitical social ethos that defines the distinctive virtues 
 
maintains that the forms of government are subject to a superior authority: “the 
whole power of the community,” which reposes in the majority.  Id. 
 441 Id.; see also Jeremy Rabkin, Grotius, Vattel, and Locke: An Older View of Liberalism 
and Nationality, 59 REV. POL. 293, 317 (1997) (“It is not a political constitution that 
makes a nation, in Locke’s account, but the prior existence of a nation that makes it 
possible to have a liberal constitution.”). 
 442 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 243. 
 443 Id. (“The power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, 
can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always 
remain in the community; because without this there can be no community, no 
common-wealth, which is contrary to the original agreement.”).  The commonwealth 
is formed not simply by political compact but by underlying social bonds.  See id. bk. 
II, ch. VIII, § 107 (“[T]hose, who liked one another so well as to join into society, 
cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and 
some trust one in another.”); see also Rabkin, supra note 441, at 306 (“Locke takes for 
granted that a political society does rest on social affinities, which are prior to, and 
deeper in some ways, than political consent to a particular government.”).  The aim 
of a commonwealth is “to be preserved one intire, free, independent society, to be 
governed by its own laws.”  LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX, 
§ 217.  It dissolves only when it can no longer exist as an independent body, as when 
a society is conquered and dispersed by a foreign power.  Id. bk. II, ch. XIX, § 211. 
 444 See Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 340 (noting that the “social compact theory of John Locke . . . 
posits a strict separation between the state and its citizens” and therefore “projects a 
mirror image of the ancient Greek relationship between the individual and the 
state”). 
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of the liberal regime.
445
  Commerce and property rights play a central 
role in acculturating citizens toward the liberal virtues.
446
  In a Lock-
ean society, citizens embrace norms of equality and consent, and they 
celebrate industriousness, innovation, and material production.
447
  
These norms, based on a prepolitical natural law, provide a new stan-
dard of justice to govern social and political life.
448
 
C. Liberalism and the Social Virtues 
The liberal regime is not indifferent to the character of its citi-
zens, as some have suggested,
449
 though its government may be.  In 
 
 445 See generally PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 
(2000); Ronald Beiner, The Liberal Regime, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 73 (1990). 
Liberalism, no less than socialism, feudalism, or any other social order, 
is a global dispensation, that is, a way of life that excludes other ways of 
life. It does no good for the liberal to say that the liberal state is neutral 
between the diverse life-choices of individuals.  Is it neutral about con-
tinual growth and higher productivity?  Is it neutral about scientific 
progress?  Is it neutral about the market as a means of maximizing con-
sumer choices?  The fact that all of this supposedly enhances the pre-
rogatives of individuals in the design of their life-options is what actual-
ly defines this dispensation rather than showing that there is none. 
Id. at 84–85. 
 446 See Suzanna Sherry, Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty, 78 MINN. L. REV. 61, 
71 (1993) (“[T]he right to property, which we would consider a paradigmatic indi-
vidual right against the community, was viewed differently by the founding genera-
tion. . . .Land ownership both allowed citizens to cultivate virtue and independence, 
and tied them to their communities.”); David Lewis Schaefer, Locke’s Troubling Legacy, 
51 REV. POL. 125, 126 (1989) (book review). 
[T]he Founders’ thought embodies a radically new conception of the 
sort of virtue that good government requires, as compared with the 
classical, and traditional Christian, views. While deemphasizing aristo-
cratic pride, military courage, and Christian meditation or asceticism, 
[the American Founders] . . . sought to encourage “moderation,” . . . . 
Central to this goal was the promotion of commerce and of practically 
oriented scientific innovation, not only for their effect in raising the 
general standard of living, but, more importantly, as a means of en-
couraging a sober and rational patriotism, based on what Tocqueville 
was later to term “the principle of self-interest rightly understood.” 
Id. 
 447 See supra Part IV. 
 448 Locke’s “constitutionalism is not merely materialistic, for it does respect the 
form of man in the state of nature.  It is based on an original, perfect democracy of 
men equal in the state of nature.”  Mansfield, supra note 364, at 17; cf. LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 12 (“[T]he municipal laws of countries . . . 
are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature.”). 
 449 See, e.g., JOHN DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-
INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM 16 (1984) (“Between Machiavelli and 
Locke lies the dilemma of American politics.  Classical political philosophy aims to 
discipline man’s desires and raise him far above his vulgar wants; liberalism promises 
MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2012  3:04 PM 
264 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:185 
Locke’s view, norms and social attitudes are a greater constraint on 
human behavior than positive laws or even religious teaching.  In An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke contrasts three alterna-
tive “moral rules” that may lead men to keep their compacts: the 
Christian, based upon divine command; the Hobbist, based upon the 
civil law; and that of “the old heathen philosophers,” based upon vir-
tue.
450
  Locke argues that the Christian and Hobbist alternatives are 
unreliable.  Men outwardly profess allegiance to rules that are “sa-
cred,” Locke writes, but their actions demonstrate that such rules do 
little to govern them.
451
  Civil law is also unreliable: “Ignorance or 
doubt of the law, hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the 
lawmaker, or the like, may make men give way to a present appe-
tite.”
452
 
Locke’s discussion supports the classical alternative: the view that 
each society must cultivate its own necessary virtues and shape indi-
vidual conscience.  Men may “come to assent to several moral rules, 
and be convinced of their obligation,” Locke writes, “from their edu-
cation, company, and customs of their country; which persuasion, 
however got, will serve to set conscience on work, which is nothing 
else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or prav-
ity of our own actions.”
453
  Even those who are not so persuaded re-
main subject to social pressure: “men may sometimes own rules of 
morality which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be 
true, only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst 
 
to realize desires and satisfy wants.  The first is more noble, the second more attaina-
ble.”); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 262 (1996) (“[B]y abandoning the ambition of inculcating certain habits 
and dispositions, [liberalism] denied government a stake in the moral character of 
its citizens and affirmed the notion of persons as free and independent selves.”); 
Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
983, 1002 (1990) (noting that Locke “is considered the most influential thinker to 
have separated issues of personal virtue from political philosophy” such that for 
Locke the character of the citizen “loses its status as an integrated part of a whole 
concept of justice” in contrast to the classical view that “the virtues are all encom-
passed in the broad justice of obedience to the laws of a good state”).  But see LOCKE, 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 29 (“God ha[s], by an inseparable connex-
ion, joined virtue and public happiness together, and made the practice thereof ne-
cessary to the preservation of society . . . .”). 
 450 LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 29. 
 451 Id. (noting that “self-interest and the conveniences of this life make many men 
own an outward profession” of sacred rules, but their “actions sufficiently prove that 
they very little consider the Law-giver that prescribed these rules”). 
 452 Id. at 33. 
 453 Id. at 30. 
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those who are persuaded of their obligation.”
454
  Men will not disown 
a law “where fear of shame, censure, or punishment carries the mark 
of some awe it has upon them.”
455
  Different societies exert different 
pressures and encourage different moral rules and virtues.
456
 
Locke later makes his view of morality more explicit when he 
contrasts three types of law: the divine law, the civil law, and the “law 
of reputation or opinion,” which Locke also calls “[p]hilosophical 
law, the measure of virtue and vice.”
457
  In explaining the philosophi-
cal law, Locke discounts the religious conception of virtue and vice; 
he argues that virtue varies with the needs and mores of each society: 
“Virtue” and “vice” are names pretended and supposed every-
where to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong 
. . . .  But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these 
names, “virtue” and “vice,” in the particular instances of their ap-
plication, through the several nations and societies of men in the 
world, are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each 
country and society are in reputation or discredit. . . .  Thus the 
measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed “virtue” and 
“vice,” is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a 
secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, 
tribes, and clubs of men in the world, whereby several actions 
come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the 
judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place.
458
 
Locke addresses the criticism that private censure cannot properly be 
termed a “law.”  According to Locke, man’s sociality, his desire for so-
cial acceptance and esteem, is stronger than the dictates of other-
worldly religion or positive law: 
[H]e who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong 
motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and 
rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the 
nature or history of mankind: the greatest part whereof he shall 
 
 454 Id. at 32. 
 455 Id. 
 456 LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 29 (“[T]he great variety of 
opinions concerning the moral rules . . . are to be found among men according to 
the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves.”).  
Locke writes that “there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of 
virtue to be thought on . . . which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and con-
demned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opi-
nions and rules of living quite opposite to others.”  Id. at 32. 
 457 Id. at 280. 
 458 Id. at 280–81; see also id. at 281 (“Virtue is everywhere that which is thought 
praiseworthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem is 
called ‘virtue.’ . . .  This is the language of the heathen philosophers, who well un-
derstood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted.”). 
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find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fa-
shion; and, so they do that which keeps them in reputation with 
their company, little regard the laws of God or the magistrate. . . .  
He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can con-
tent himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his 
own particular society.  Solitude many men have sought, and been 
reconciled to: but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a 
man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and 
ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with.  This is a 
burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up 
of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in compa-
ny, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his com-
panions.
459
 
To Locke, credit and reputation represent no less than “[t]he prin-
cipal spring from which the actions of men take their rise, the rule 
they conduct them by, and the end to which they direct them.”
460
 
For Locke, it is the law of reputation or opinion that determines 
the character of society: “this makes merchants in one country and 
soldiers in another; this puts men upon school divinity in one coun-
try, and physic or mathematics in another; this cuts out the dresses 
for the women, and makes the fashions for the men; and makes them 
endure the inconveniences of all.”
461
  Thus, despite his insistence in 
Two Treatises that government must be by “established standing 
laws,”
462
 Locke recognizes that he who “would govern the world well, 
had need consider rather what fashions he makes than what laws; and 
to bring anything into use he need only give it reputation.”
463
 
In Two Treatises, Locke follows his own advice.  By bringing in-
dustry into social repute, and sanctifying property with natural law, 
Locke establishes a new commercial regime in place of traditional so-
ciety.  Through his theory of property, he obliges cities and palaces to 
 
 459 Id. at 282–83.  Locke’s argument recalls Aristotle’s observation that “man is by 
nature a political animal.”  ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1253a2–3, at 37; see also LOCKE, 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 282–83 (“[N]o man escapes the punish-
ment of their censure and dislike who offends against the fashion and opinion of the 
company he keeps, and would recommend himself to.”). 
 460 JOHN LOCKE, Credit, Disgrace, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 420, at 236, 236 
(1678)[hereinafter LOCKE, Disgrace]. 
 461 Id.; see also id. at 237 (“Where power, and not the good exercise of it, gives rep-
utation, all the injustice, falsehood, violence and oppression that attains that [i.e. 
power] goes for wisdom and ability. Where love of one’s country is the thing in cre-
dit, there we shall see a race of brave Romans; and when being a favourite at court 
was the only thing in fashion, one may observe the same race of Romans all turned 
flatterers and informers.”). 
 462 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 131; id. ch. XI, § 137. 
 463 LOCKE, Disgrace, supra note 460, at 237. 
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“keep right by following nature.”
464
  He establishes a civil religion, 
based upon his own creation myth and couched in the language of 
Christian natural law, that will unite the interests of governors and 
citizens and that will liberate minds from subservience to priests.
465
  
Locke’s new law of reputation or opinion, however, is antecedent to 
government and therefore governs the lawgivers as well as citizens.  
In this way, Locke applies a classical understanding of politics mod-
ified to meet the challenge posed by Christianity. 
VI. CONCLUSION: LOCKE AND LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The Greek politeia is often called the “constitution” of the clas-
sical city because it constitutes the polity.
466
  “For Aristotle, the consti-
tution is more fundamental than the laws, not as a higher law that 
can be appealed to against the laws but as the fundamental political 
fact that shapes the laws.”
467
  The ancient constitution encompassed 
the whole social regime, including social bonds and mores as well as 
the form of government.
468
  By separating the regime from the form 
of government—making the regime prior to the government—Locke 
introduces the recognizably modern idea of “constitutionalism” as a 
constraint on government.
469
  Locke’s constitutionalism identifies a 
fundamental law, a scheme of prepolitical natural rights, that con-
strains government action and ordinary legislation.  But Locke also 
appreciates the emphasis upon social mores and character formation 
that characterized the classical regime.
470
  The Lockean idea of prop-
 
 464 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 58. 
 465 Cf. Lord, supra note 365, at 119–20 (arguing that Machiavelli offered a “coun-
tertheology” that “is intended to improve on and eventually supplant the Christian 
message”).  Lord argues that Machiavelli’s rhetoric “served the serious purpose of 
preparing the ground for the emergence of a public philosophy or ideology that 
could contend with Christianity as the basis of modern politics,” but he suggests that 
more “direct historical impact” was achieved by “John Locke, who couched an argua-
bly Machiavellian teaching in the language of Christian natural law.”  Id. at 120–22. 
 466 See MCILWAIN, supra note 395, at 26 (“Of all the varied meanings of which our 
word ‘constitution’ is susceptible, the Greek politeia conforms to one of the most an-
cient. . . .  It is a purely descriptive term, and as inclusive in its meaning as our own 
use when we speak generally of a man’s constitution or of the constitution of mat-
ter.”). 
 467 Nathan Tarcov, Ideas of Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern, in THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 11, 17 (Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009). 
 468 See supra notes 394–401 and accompanying text. 
 469 See WARD, supra note 86, at 115 (“Locke appears to have envisioned something 
like the liberal principle of constitutional supremacy over ordinary legislative pow-
er.”). 
 470 See supra Part V.C.; cf. Tarcov, supra note 467, at 14 (“Insofar as Platonic consti-
tutionalism depends on character and education as well as on countervailing institu-
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erty rights undergirds not only a legal regime but also a sort of social 
ethos.
471
 
The connection between property and political liberty is a signif-
icant aspect of the American legal tradition.
472
  Property rights protect 
not only the person of the individual against the state, but also his 
conscience against established orthodoxy.  “Can it be reasonable that 
he that cannot compel me to buy a house should force me his way to 
venture the purchase of heaven?” asks Locke.
473
  “That he that cannot 
in justice prescribe me rules of preserving my health should enjoin 
me methods of saving my soul?”
474
  The right to control objects in the 
external world is the formal embodiment of the individual’s sove-
reignty over his own person and mind.  By creating a fence around 
each individual, property “serves as a metaphor for liberalism—a po-
litical regime organized around rights, to keep off-limits from the 
government the power to compel citizens to follow any one contesta-
ble theory of virtue.”
475
  Madison illustrates the connection in Federal-
ist 10 when he argues that “the first object of government” is the pro-
tection of the “diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights 
of property originate.”
476
  Protecting property is ultimately about pro-
 
tions to preserve rule of law and prevent tyranny, it thereby depends on cultural cha-
racter-formation.”). 
 471 As legal scholars have recognized, “[T]he recognition of legal rights in proper-
ty structures social relations.”  JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES 
OF PROPERTY 14 (2000).  See generally Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Prop-
erty, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (2010). 
 472 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing 
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characte-
rized as property—the right to exclude others”); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 
405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“[A] fundamental interdependence exists between the 
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property.  Neither could have 
meaning without the other.  That rights in property are basic civil rights has long 
been recognized.”); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896) (“[T]he laws 
of all civilized States recognize in every citizen the absolute right to his own earnings, 
and to the enjoyment of his own property, and the increase thereof, during his life, 
except so far as the State may require him to contribute his share for public ex-
penses.”).  See generally JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1998) (“[T]he protection of prop-
erty ownership was an integral part of the American effort to fashion constitutional 
limits on governmental authority.”). 
 473 JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667), in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra 
note 420, at 186, 188–89 [hereinafter LOCKE, Toleration]. 
 474 Id. 
 475 Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
889, 892 (2009). 
 476 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
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tecting the faculties of mind that allow one to acquire it.
477
  As Marga-
ret Jane Radin has observed, “[T]o achieve proper self-
development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over 
resources in the external environment.  The necessary assurances of 
control take the form of property rights.”
478
 
While certain “object relations,” as Radin puts it, are necessary to 
“self-constitution,”
479
 the institution of property itself and the cultural 
norms it fosters shape the character of citizens on a social scale.
480
  
When Tocqueville visited America, he concluded that “[t]here is no 
country in the world where the sentiment for property shows itself 
more active and more restive than in the United States,” and the jeal-
ousy with which Americans held their property made them resist po-
litical upheaval that would “threaten to alter the constitution of 
goods.”
481
  In this way, Lockean rights of property conduce to social 
 
 477 Kenneth Minogue notes “a significant continuity between property understood 
as ownership of productive capital and property understood as personal characteris-
tics, a point that haunts the literature and is recognized in Locke’s famous remark 
that ‘Every man has a property in his own person.’”  Minogue, supra note 358, at 12; 
see also E.J. Hundert, The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke Between Ideology and Histo-
ry, 33 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 9 (1972) (describing Locke’s view that “[o]ne’s property was 
the extension of self by virtue of the injection of personality into nature through 
work”). 
 478 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982). 
 479 Id. at 967. 
 480 See William M. Sullivan, Institutions as the Infrastructure of Democracy, in NEW 
COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 170, 
173–74 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995). 
As Tocqueville saw it, it was the institutional order, the patterns of 
normative, sanctioned interaction themselves, which worked through 
daily life to shape the imagination and character of the citizens.  That 
is, institutionalized mores linked market, state, and civil society into the 
mutually reinforcing whole Tocqueville identified as American democ-
racy.  Besides individual consciousness and social interaction, human 
life also entails shared, socially sanctioned patterns of purpose. These 
are the institutional forms of family, school, religious congregation, 
business firm, and club, which structure the patterns of everyday life. 
Id.  Like Locke, Tocqueville emphasized social attitudes.  In a democratic society, 
“public favor seems as necessary as the air that one breathes, and to be in disagree-
ment with the mass is, so to speak, not to live,” he writes.  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 615 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., Univ. of 
Chi. Press 2000) (1835).  “[The mass] does not need to use the laws to bend those 
who do not think like it.  It is enough for it to disapprove of them.”  Id.; see supra Part 
V.C. 
 481 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 480, at 610.  “[T]heories that are revolutionary by 
their nature, in that they cannot be realized except by a complete and sometimes 
sudden change in the state of property and of persons, are infinitely less in favor in 
the United States than in the great monarchies of Europe,” Tocqueville observes.  Id.  
“If a few men profess them, the mass repels them with a sort of instinctive horror.”  
Id. 
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peace because people view politics in terms of their material well-
being.  This political culture developed from the Lockean story about 
the origins of property and the pre-political nature of property rights.  
The idea of property in American life began “not with Locke the phi-
losopher or Locke the political theorist, but with Locke the story-
teller,” as Mary Ann Glendon has written.
482
  “Property acquired its 
near-mythic status in our legal tradition, in part, because the lan-
guage and images of John Locke played such a key role in American 
thinking about government.”
483
 
While a Lockean conception of property helps to entrench polit-
ical liberalism and to prevent authoritarianism or theocracy, it may 
also undermine the spirit of community that was central to the clas-
sical regime.
484
  The idea of the Lockean social contract “underplays 
the significance of belonging to a community,” writes Hanoch Da-
gan.
485
  The social vision it inspires “perceives our membership [in a 
political community] in purely instrumental terms, and insists that 
our mutual obligations as members of such a community should be 
derived either from our consent or from their being to our advan-
tage.”
486
 
This is not quite Locke’s position; Locke recognizes and relies 
upon human sociability.
487
  He places the inculcation of “moral vir-
tues and vices” beyond the state because the property-rights regime 
fosters the necessary virtues through acculturation and by linking so-
cial arrangements to self-interest.  Lawmakers may safely “leave the 
practice of them entirely to the discretion and consciences of his 
people” because the moral virtues and vices are “a means to settle or 
disturb men’s peace and properties” and, through the formal institu-
tions of property, to promote “the weal of the public.”
488
  But the 
property-rights regime promotes certain social norms at the expense 
of others, such as an orientation toward commerce and individualism 
rather than religious piety and community.
489
  As Glendon argues, 
 
 482 GLENDON, supra note 356, at 20–21. 
 483 Id. 
 484 See supra Part V.A. 
 485 Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 771 (1999). 
 486 Id. at 771–72. 
 487 See supra Part V.C. 
 488 LOCKE, Toleration, supra note 473, at 195; cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 480, at 
509 (“The particular taste that men of democratic centuries conceive for material 
enjoyments is not . . . . the enemy of regular mores; for good mores are useful to 
public tranquility and favor industry.”). 
 489 See supra Part IV.B.  Social scientists have long explained the emergence of ca-
pitalist society in the West in terms of acculturation.  Max Weber, for example, ar-
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American society conceives of its principles and interests in terms of 
individual rights.
490
  In her account, the dominance of “rights talk” 
undermines community, responsibility, and public deliberation.
491
   
The moral virtues associated with liberal capitalist society, Daniel 
Bell has argued, have been eroded by the working of capitalism it-
self.
492
  The “acquisitive impulses” unleashed by consumer culture 
undermined the moral character marked by “the sober, prudential, 
delayed gratification of the Protestant ethic.”
493
  The “prudential 
bourgeois culture” surrendered to “cultural modernism.”
494
  Whereas 
religious tradition emphasized the need to restrain human desires 
and provided continuity with the past,
495
 capitalist culture unleashed a 
ceaseless quest for new satisfactions.
496
 
 
gued that Protestantism promoted capitalism indirectly: “[not] by encouraging, let 
alone inventing, the pursuit of wealth, but by defining and sanctioning an ethic of 
everyday behavior that conduced to economic success.”  David Landes, Culture Makes 
Almost All the Difference, in CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 2, 
11 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000); see also DANIEL BELL, 
THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 287–88 (rev. ed. 1996) (1976) (“The 
impulse to profit and gain is found in all societies, but only in the West did capital-
ism, as a rational organization of production and the calculable balance sheet of 
costs, take hold and develop in the extraordinary way that it did.”). 
 490 GLENDON, supra note 356, at 31 (“In America, when we want to protect some-
thing, we try to get it characterized as a right. . . .  [W]hen we specially want to hold 
on to something (welfare benefits, a job), we try to get the object of our concern 
characterized as a property right.”); id. at 40 (“Remarkably, the property paradigm, 
including the old language of absoluteness, broods over this developing jurispru-
dence of personal rights.”). 
 491 See id. at 76–171.  According to Tocqueville, modern democracy “suggests to 
men very dangerous instincts . . . it tends to isolate them from one another and to 
bring each of them to be occupied with himself alone.”  TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 
480, at 419; id. at 484 (“Thus not only does democracy make each man forget his an-
cestors, but it hides his descendants from him and separates him from his contempo-
raries; it constantly leads him back toward himself alone and threatens finally to con-
fine him wholly in the solitude of his own heart.”). 
 492 BELL, supra note 489, at 21 (“[T]he Protestant ethic was undermined . . . by ca-
pitalism itself.”). 
 493 Id. at 295.  Capitalism as it developed “continued to demand a Protestant ethic 
in the area of production—that is, in the realm of work—but to stimulate a demand 
for pleasure and play in the area of consumption.  The disjunction was bound to wi-
den.”  Id. at 75. 
 494 Id. at 295. 
 495 Id. at 157. 
 496 Id. at 34 (“[S]ociety . . . has provided a market which eagerly gobbles up the 
new, because it believes it to be superior in value to all older forms.  Thus, our cul-
ture has an unprecedented mission: it is an official, ceaseless quest for new sensibili-
ty.”).  According to Bell, “The cultural, if not moral, justification of capitalism has 
become hedonism, the idea of pleasure as a way of life.”  Id. at 21–22. 
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Given Locke’s presentation of property as an alternative to reli-
gious devotion and social control, it should not be surprising that a 
Lockean regime would erode religious commitments and undermine 
social ties.  Yet Bell points to a possible flaw in the Lockean design.  
The formal institutions of property and economic exchange call forth 
particular norms and character traits, but individuals participate in 
the system because of the rewards they expect to receive, namely, “the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and pos-
sessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”
497
  
Because society is a means to achieving these individual ends, the end 
of society is separate from the social good or respect for social institu-
tions and forms.  “The trouble with modern constitutionalism,” ex-
plains Harvey Mansfield, “is that civil liberties and manmade constitu-
tional forms are made subordinate to the natural end that comprises 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  They are means to that end, 
not united with it; the form is not united with the end, as in Aris-
totle’s constitutionalism.”
498
  As Tocqueville noted, people in modern 
democracies tend to mistrust institutional formalities and “throw 
themselves impetuously toward the object of each of their desires.”
499
  
If the citizen of the Lockean regime promotes social peace, he does 
so in pursuit of the rights of man, not in performing the duties of a 
citizen.  His society is organized above all for industry rather than po-
litical life.
500
 
These effects were not unforeseen.  Locke displaced religious or-
thodoxy with human industry, and the paramount law with funda-
mental rights.  The erosion of community ties that this change ef-
fected was also a liberation from established authority.  Locke did not 
 
 497 Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776). 
 498 Mansfield, supra note 364, at 18. 
 499 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 480, at 669 (“Men who live in democratic centuries 
do not readily comprehend the utility of forms; they feel an instinctive disdain for 
them.”).  By way of illustration, Edward Banfield observes that Americans pay ho-
mage to doctrines of limited government, but “they are also accustomed to thinking 
that government ought to serve the people in whatever ways they want.”  EDWARD C. 
BANFIELD, Federalism and the Dilemma of Popular Government, in HERE THE PEOPLE RULE 
23, 24 (2d ed. 1991).  See generally Irving Kristol, The Disaffection from Capitalism, in 
CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 15, 16 (Michael Novak ed., 1979) 
(“No previous society or civilization—and certainly no church . . . had ever said that 
commercial transactions should shape the society.  They believed rather that society 
should regulate and shape commercial transactions.”). 
 500 See 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 358 n.3 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Ed-
ward Aveling trans., Charles H. Kerr 1921) (1867) (“Strictly, Aristotle’s definition is 
that man is by nature a town-citizen.  This is quite as characteristic of ancient classical 
society as Franklin’s definition of man, as a tool-making animal, is characteristic of 
Yankeedom.”). 
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explicitly reject Christian teaching, to be sure.  He wanted his readers 
to accept his arguments as an interpretation of authoritative religious 
teaching in order to achieve social change without sparking a reli-
gious backlash.  Some readers might note his carefully expressed ob-
jections, but others, disposed to accept what appear to be conven-
tional religious views, would adopt Locke’s argument and it would 
become, as it eventually did, the mainstream view.  This is how a civic 
religion develops, Locke recognized.  “The greatest part cannot 
know, and therefore they must believe,” he writes.
501
  Accordingly, 
Locke aimed not to overthrow the prevailing faith, but to change it in 
the direction of a more humane ethics.  “[C]ertainly propriety of 
speech is necessary in a discourse of this nature,” Locke writes in Two 
Treatises.
502
  The author seeks to appear as consistent with accepted 
views as possible.  If contemporary readers find in Locke a bland ref-
lection of conventional religious doctrine, he would appear to have 
succeeded.  He succeeded so much, in fact, that the once-
controversial and revolutionary foundation of modern constitutional-
ism now appears to be an unremarkable presupposition of the West-
ern tradition. 
 
 
 501 JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 157–58 (John C. Higgins-
Biddle ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1695). 
 502 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 109. 
